My professor of Russian history, Peter Brown, inspired our class to address some very interesting subjects over the course of our studies. For me, religion was always the most interesting - usually because the texts exaggerated the religious aspects drastically. My favorite source for this writing was "All Russia Is Burning!" - definitely one of the best texts I've read on the subject of "peasant practice".
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For the peasant of Late Imperial Russia, religion was a matter of extreme important and quite central to all aspects of life. Proper practice of the Orthodox faith and a strong clergy were considered more than essential to the life of the villages and the lengths to which the residents of countryside villages went to in order to ensure quality in their religious representatives was impressive . Religion was perhaps most important in the home, where invocations were made to saints – represented by icons in the human – for protection and to ensure the family’s prospering. To the peasants, God’s unmatchable position as the leading protector of honest Orthodox practitioners was bolstered by local rituals, some pre-Christian in origin but executed in ways that only affirmed the peasant’s dedication to Christianity, and included the utilization of matter meant to represent the divine such as holy water, religious sites or protective fire . The generally unchanging realm of Russian peasant religion allowed for villages to retain their traditions for many years and, in employing aspects of folk religion, ensured an ease of practice through access to the Orthodox God. As a result, the Russian peasant knew their religion thoroughly and could be particularly well-versed in biblical knowledge .
Despite the dedication of the peasantry to Orthodoxy, foreign observers regularly branded the religion practiced by the lower classes as dreadfully inappropriate and, in some cases, brazenly paganistic. Visiting religious figures or state officers regularly labeled peasant practice of Orthodoxy as marred and thoroughly desecrated through the crude behavior of the peasantry (as well as the local clergy, according to some ). To officials, the religion practiced by the Russian peasantry was incorrect and blamed on a number of reasons ranging from the dour state of literacy among the nation’s peasants as well as an assumed return to pre-Christian values that had begun to violently turn the lower classes against the religion: according to foreign observers, the church’s authority and possessions were commonly disrespected and the clergy even put into danger by the increasingly volatile lower classes . Efforts were made to better educate the peasantry within the religious sphere and denounce aspects of local religion considered heretical, but the peasants were still considered to be too uncivilized or unintelligent to properly adhere to Orthodox Christianity in the face of pagan practices . The more privileged of the Orthodox and state ranks saw the peasantry as heretical, while the peasantry saw their devotion to God as utterly legitimate and comprehensive. Thus emerges a question on the subject of the Russian peasant’s religious mentality: were the familiar devotions of the lower classes legitimate and conductive to peasant religious life – and the state too obtrusive in branding the peasants as heathens – or did foreign observers have a strong argument in favor of a tighter hold on peasant religious life to prevent the burgeoning irreligious nature of the Russian peasants?
The methods of religion put to use by the peasants themselves made much sense within the framework of the Russian peasant mindset and community. One of the most notable qualities of folk Orthodoxy, or dvoeverie (“double faith”), is its legacy of tradition among the peasants; as stated by Chulos in his piece “Myths of the Pious or Pagan…”, “tradition [dvoeverie] was sacred and, as a popular expression put it, not to be questioned” . Thus, the Orthodox peasant practice represented a comfortable factor within the otherwise difficult life of the peasants – it was a stable tradition to which the peasants could adhere in order to cope with daily trouble. Peasant Orthodoxy united and strengthened the community and its representatives in the forms of regional priests were very important figures in the community due to their positions as representative of the faith. In some cases, peasants protested against changes within the structure of the local clergy and provoked the appearance of Tsarist law enforcement to quell unrest over the perceived attempt at dismantling an aspect of their lives; the reaction from the visiting religious superintendent was to spitefully accuse the peasants of irreligious drunkardry . This event is a stark contrast to the accusation made by officials that the peasants had began a campaign of aggression against Orthodox clergy – rather, the peasants considered priests to be extremely important parts of their lives. Within some communities, a combination of unfamiliarity of proper treatment of Orthodox clergy or legitimate veneration caused some members of the peasant community to nearly worship members of the clergy due to their apparent holiness . The attempts of the state at interfering within the structure of the peasant community through denouncement of peasant activity as harmful to the church was restrictive to the peasants’ religious development and, in cases where the peasants performed acts that did not mesh well with existing state church doctrine, their innovations were branded as elements of dvoeverie.
Peasant practitioners thought themselves to be nothing more exotic or profane than simple Orthodox Christians and that the less ‘mainstream’ elements they incorporated into their faith were put to use in order to honor God, not to defame Orthodoxy like observers seemed to assume; ‘pagan rituals’ were simply prayers executed by peasants hoping to invoke holy protection or aid in almost any event – a useful quality in the world of the peasants, where each new daily hardship may require asking for the help of a patron saint . This is not dissimilar to the Catholic tradition in which the assistance of saints was invoked in a time of need, nor was it much different from the Islamic Sufi tendency to request the spiritual governance of famous hadrat (“great presences”).
An example of rituals perceived to be paganistic in nature would be the apparent ‘worship’ of fire by peasants as detailed in Russia is Burning!. In her work, Frierson observes that fire was not worshipped in any variety of anti-Christian or pagan behavior but venerated as an earthly representation of divine power; to many, the ‘holy fire’ produced through lightning strikes was considered the work of the Hebrew prophet Elijah and thus a direct representation of God’s legitimacy . The aforementioned Feast of St. John the Baptist, also known as ‘Kupalo’, used fire as a deliverer of divine protection: peasants would leap through a blazing bonfire in order to ensure holy shielding from evil. While leaning toward a folk tradition due to its position on the agrarian calendar (and thus potentially related to ancient non-Christian practices due to the pagan focus on the changing of the seasons), the practice is specifically noted by Frierson as representative of how peasants celebrated Orthodox Christian holidays . The peasant adoration of fire, despite the major role which it played in the life of the lower classes, was regarded as a thoroughly paganistic behavior by observers unfamiliar with the practice’s purpose. The use of fire as representative of a comforting divine presence can be compared to the more mainstream Russian use of holy icons, which could be seen in every Russian dwelling from the lowliest izba (“abode”) to the grandest royal palace.
In seeing what they believed to be un-Christian behavior, observers – as detailed in “Myths of the Pious or Pagan…” – noted that the peasants lacked a general adherence to the sacred nature of purely Orthodox symbols with a final summation being that the peasants were leaning toward a new form of Orthodox paganism . The truth was quite to the contrary, however, as seen through the violently protective nature of the peasantry toward Orthodox structures and icons during the Bolshevik Revolution in which representations of the faith were branded as tools of the collapsing Imperial state and demolished . Despite the truly pious nature of the peasants and the legitimacy of their faith, it could not be believed that the peasants had the capacity to independently interpret their own faith.
The opinion of foreign observers on the subject of the lower classes’ adherence to folk Orthodoxy was that it came as a result of the woeful amounts of peasant ignorance toward life outside of their birth villages. Up until and including this point in history, real education had been completely denied to peasants as decreed by a 1723 synod which stated that it was essential for houses of education “to dismiss and henceforth not to admit people belonging to estate owners and the sons of peasants, as well as the stupid and the malignant” – effectively a direct insult to the peasants, as well as a display of the general attitude of the privileged toward the peasants . In viewing material on the subject, a reader may quickly begin to see the insultingly simple way in which the privileged view the peasants: they were largely considered unintelligent and, thus, likely victims of religious corruption due to their complete lack of knowledge (and disinterest) of Orthodox Christianity . Some sources provide differing information, especially on the subject of religion: peasant devotees were known to log complaints about theologically unqualified clergymen, citing their own impressive understanding of Orthodox scripture and ritual in denouncing ill-informed church representatives . This interaction between the higher clergy and the peasantry supports the fact that the privileged did not fully comprehend the nature of peasant Christianity, as can also be seen in their mislabeling of folk Orthodoxy as paganism and general underappreciation of the consideration the peasantry put into their religion. An example of the latter can be seen in the chernitsy, young women of Central Russia who had taken a vow of celibacy in the name of God and spent their lives teaching the peasants about the importance of religion; these figures were popular among the peasantry and received much appreciation for the work that they did in the name of the faith. Citing this as yet another example of peasant ignorance, Archbishop Anastasii called for an end to chernitsy activity and for his clergy to actively preach against their influence . The criticism of the Orthodox Church – a belief structure that utilizes adapted ‘heathen’ symbols in the foundations of its own faith – toward innovations within their own religion in forms such as the chernitsy and the use of purifying ‘divine’ fire is fairly ludicrous. The peasants themselves were restrained in expressing their true religion due to the hypocrisies of the authoritative state church, and even later under the Bolsheviks.
As can be seen in records of interaction between foreign observers or the privileged and the peasantry, the nobility and upper clergy refuse to recognize the potential legitimacy in the lower classes’ interpretation of Orthodox Christianity. Continuing traditional trans-class Russian relations, the privileged members of Late Imperial Russia’s higher classes doubted that the religious convictions of the peasantry could be anything but a warped desecration of the faith system which the state clergy believed to be a form of new Christian paganism. The peasant’s supposed hostile treatment of the clergy, too, was indicative of the crude and unholy nature of the prostoi narod (“dark masses”). The inability of the peasants to adhere to true Orthodox ritual and holiday supported this mindset. Most likely unknown to the upper classes and high clergy of Late Imperial Russia was the true nature of the Russian peasant: well-informed in their piety and quite devoted in their worship of God, specifically within the Orthodox Christian frame. The higher classes’ disavowal of the peasantry’s potential to express itself religiously is simply a continuation of the unfair status of the peasantry – one that characterized the entire peasant class, an overwhelming portion of Russia’s population, as relegated to permanent ignorance and endless servitude to the upper classes as a result. The following passage, written by Vissarion Belinsky in his communications with famed Russian novelist Nikolai Gogol, describes the religious mentality of the Russian peasant quite succinctly.
“You, as far as I can see, do not properly understand the Russian public. Its character is determined by the condition of Russian society in which fresh forces are seething and struggling for expression, but weighted down by heavy oppression and finding no outlet, they induce merely dejection, weariness and apathy.”
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Works Cited
1. Belinsky, Vissarion and Thomas Riha (ed.). "Letter to Gogol” in Readings in Russian Civilization Volume II – Imperial Russia, 1700-1917 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1969).
2. Chulos, C.J. “Myths of the Pious or Pagan Peasant in Post-Emancipation Central Russia (Voronezh Province).” Russian History/Histoire Russe 22 (1995).
3. Frierson, Cathy A. All Russia is Burning!: a Cultural History of Fire and Arson in Late Imperial Russia (University of Washington Press: Seattle/London, 2002).
4. Menshutkin, Boris and Thomas Riha (ed.). “Lomonosov (Excerpts)” in Readings in Russian Civilization Volume II – Imperial Russia, 1700-1917 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1969.)
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I can't speak highly enough of Prof. Brown - the source materials he employed, alone, were worth the cost of admission.
Showing posts with label russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label russia. Show all posts
Saturday, August 21, 2010
As The Empire Fell: Russia's Subjects during World War I
Here's an analysis of a text by Peter Gatrell, pertaining to World War I and the impact it had upon society. Great book - read it for a great explanation of how the everyday subject of the Russian Empire functioned as the state itself began to strain.
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In Russia’s First World War: a Social and Economic History, Peter Gatrell characterizes the experiences of the Russian lower classes in a way that echoes historically their treatment by the upper classes and the state. Throughout World War I, the state absolutely commanded the lives of the peasants and workers to best serve the war effort, depriving them of other options and effectively disregarding the humanity of the state’s subjects. The Revolution of 1905 and the Tsar’s subsequent lack of regard for the peasant’s capacity for democracy were indicative of the state’s inability to connect with the lower classes. In addition, the war effort disabled any chance of the peasantry to better itself economically and stunted the social growth of the lower classes, preventing any sense of societal mobility in the face of international conflict. The conscription issue, too, displayed the largely corrupt methods put to use by the state in promoting the privileged over the peasants. The depletion of local males for use on the front lines also modified gender roles within the lower classes. In Russia’s First World War: a Social and Economic History, Peter Gatrell elaborates upon the generally transformative – and oftentimes destructive – nature of the state’s decision making and World War I itself on the social fabric of Russia’s lower social orders.
Late Imperial Russia’s ambivalence toward the actual humanity of the lower classes in the face of recent attempts at democratizing the state is truly indicative of the harsh treatment forced upon the Russian commoner in the face of the state’s war effort. Massive social unrest brought on by the Revolution of 1905 was answered with, instead of legitimate concessions or even consideration toward the cause of the problem, “a clever combination of repression and reform”: voting was formalized for lower class groups alongside brutal execution of peasants who actively sought a fairer state . The formation of the State Duma in 1906, a democratic concession granted by Nicholas II only after the aforementioned social upheaval, did little to impact the inner workings of the state: the Tsar himself had little innate knowledge as to why the events preceding the Duma’s creation have even occurred – a display of the state’s unabashed ignorance toward the motives of the progressives and lower classes – and did not take the opinion of the public into account by any means, rather deciding to continue the often corrupt and undemocratic methods to which Nicholas II was most accustomed . While this did not directly impact the social fabric of the peasantry, the government’s denial of the public’s legitimate ability to participate in the semi-democratic process of the Duma assisted in bolstering the irritation of the lower classes.
The mismanagement of conscription and production by the Russian state influenced the economic standing of the nation as a whole and, as a result, greatly impacted social life. Gatrell states that, shockingly, “no thought was given to the impact of conscription on industrial production” – an unbelievable move on the part of the Russian military planners, those educated individuals who seemed to completely ignore the very basic drop in production that would be suffered upon the significant removal of workers from the industrial sector for use in the war . The effects of the drop in industry were felt not only by the state’s war effort, which proved lackluster in terms of munitions, but also by the peasants who felt twin blows to their financial state and social mobility. The inability of many Russian factories to transfer over to military production also led to the loss of Russian jobs, plunging hundreds of thousands of workers into unemployment . Strikes were not common due to the patriotic sentiment behind war mobilization of Russia’s industrial sector: interrupting the flow of work may hurt or kill the Russian soldier, a fault that no lower class worker would want leveled against them by either state authorities (being branded as traitors and charged ) or by their peers (thus preventing social unity among the equally underprivileged worker classes) .
Finances in general were modified catastrophically due to the fluctuating Russian economy; as a result, the lower classes were affected socially. The value of Russian currency dropped and the likelihood of a peasant being able to buy land or even enter the market of manufactured goods thinned frighteningly, thus disallowing the Russian peasant to prosper in the war’s economic environment . At one point, the state imposed a prohibition on alcohol and, after a gain in economic activity, credited it for bolstering peasant productivity. Gatrell quickly disregards this, citing the peasants’ panicked attempts at liquidating their inventories as the true reason for economic activity – a much less hopeful view of what was only a temporary boost to the well-being of the peasants. Despite this, Gatrell does acknowledge that the general financial lot of the peasantry did remain steady or improve nominally. Business ventures such as the (sometimes coerced) distribution of livestock to the Tsarist army and the aforementioned liquidation of surplus onto the market allowed for peasants to gain an amount of cash. It is worth once again referencing, however, of the impressive inflation experienced by Russian currency – a fact that Gatrell should have attached directly to his thought on the state of peasant financial intake .
Understandably, the conscription itself proved to be destructive to the social fabric of the lower classes. Peasant households deprived villages of their male populations to extreme points, removing economic stability and leaving the home in the hands of the non-conscripted members. According to Gatrell, almost one half of peasant households did not possess males of working age due to the mass conscription of the lower classes leading up to 1917 . Exemptions among the lower classes were almost universally disregarded, even if it meant another worker in the factories to contribute to the war effort. Gatrell quotes General Mikhail Belaev as stating that regarding any peasant exemption as legitimate would contribute a “delirious impact on [the] morale” of the armed forces . This sort of consideration toward the peasantry led to a degradation of respect for state representatives and authority, including officials of the state’s Orthodox Church: priests suffered financially due to low attendance and were regarded as mouthpieces of the state . Even family structure and authority came into question as Russian youths engaged in criminal activity, regarded by the state – the very entity that pushed peasantry’s youth into such behavior due to the effects of the loss of jobs and conscription upon the family – as mere “hooligans” .
The depleting of the male population in the villages and towns changed the Russian social dynamic by forcing women into a more public role. As a result of the large amount of men forced to the front lines by the conflict, women were forced out from the homes and into the public sphere. Gatrell describes that by 1916, women outnumbered men in peasant villages by approximately 60%; as a result, female peasants – known for being a good amount more liberal than their masculine counterparts – not only gained a prominent role in the matters of farming but also assisted in the institution of new techniques and technologies within that field . Women also participated greatly within the industrial workplace, a setting populated by an increasingly limited amount of men. From 1913 to 1916, the amount of women participating in a factory setting increasing from 30% to 40% with the largest inclusions of new female workers in the chemical and textile industries . Perhaps most starkly representative of the changing role played by lower class women was the forming of a “women’s battalion of death” by Maria Bochkareva, a peasant worker who was admitted to participate in the military after proving her ability to the overwhelmingly misogynistic Tsarist armed forces . Although these units were utilized mostly to foster the faltering morale of the armed forces in the face of losses and eventually failing in that goal, the mobilization of women for any purpose on the front of battle is a distinct display of the shift in gender roles that occurred as a result of World War I.
It is an undeniable fact that World War I and the Imperial Russian state’s treatment of the conflict had long-reaching effects upon the everyday lives of the lower classes. This fact is made even more important when one realizes the major role that these same peasants – neglected socially by the falsely inclusive government, their social fabric effectively torn asunder by the state’s lack of preparation for the Great War – would have in Russia’s rise in social unrest, which would eventually emerge into Russia’s February Revolution. The next social upheaval – the October Revolution – would come to be executed by the Bolsheviks, a group which disposed of the autocratic Tsar in favor of a government, at its base, with a large emphasis on the worth and participation of the lower classes. The seemingly endless abuse heaped unto the peasant classes throughout Russian history, from the period of the Rus’ serfs under the Mongol Yoke and eventually Ivan the Terrible’s harsh repression of any public resistance to the more contemporary ignorance toward the plight of the Imperial Russian peasant, would come to shape the Russian state in ways most certainly unexpected only years beforehand.
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Works Cited
Gatrell, Peter. Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History. Pearson Educated Limited: Harlow, England, 2005.
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Works on Russian history always seem to get me riled up - for good reason, it's always so damned interesting.
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In Russia’s First World War: a Social and Economic History, Peter Gatrell characterizes the experiences of the Russian lower classes in a way that echoes historically their treatment by the upper classes and the state. Throughout World War I, the state absolutely commanded the lives of the peasants and workers to best serve the war effort, depriving them of other options and effectively disregarding the humanity of the state’s subjects. The Revolution of 1905 and the Tsar’s subsequent lack of regard for the peasant’s capacity for democracy were indicative of the state’s inability to connect with the lower classes. In addition, the war effort disabled any chance of the peasantry to better itself economically and stunted the social growth of the lower classes, preventing any sense of societal mobility in the face of international conflict. The conscription issue, too, displayed the largely corrupt methods put to use by the state in promoting the privileged over the peasants. The depletion of local males for use on the front lines also modified gender roles within the lower classes. In Russia’s First World War: a Social and Economic History, Peter Gatrell elaborates upon the generally transformative – and oftentimes destructive – nature of the state’s decision making and World War I itself on the social fabric of Russia’s lower social orders.
Late Imperial Russia’s ambivalence toward the actual humanity of the lower classes in the face of recent attempts at democratizing the state is truly indicative of the harsh treatment forced upon the Russian commoner in the face of the state’s war effort. Massive social unrest brought on by the Revolution of 1905 was answered with, instead of legitimate concessions or even consideration toward the cause of the problem, “a clever combination of repression and reform”: voting was formalized for lower class groups alongside brutal execution of peasants who actively sought a fairer state . The formation of the State Duma in 1906, a democratic concession granted by Nicholas II only after the aforementioned social upheaval, did little to impact the inner workings of the state: the Tsar himself had little innate knowledge as to why the events preceding the Duma’s creation have even occurred – a display of the state’s unabashed ignorance toward the motives of the progressives and lower classes – and did not take the opinion of the public into account by any means, rather deciding to continue the often corrupt and undemocratic methods to which Nicholas II was most accustomed . While this did not directly impact the social fabric of the peasantry, the government’s denial of the public’s legitimate ability to participate in the semi-democratic process of the Duma assisted in bolstering the irritation of the lower classes.
The mismanagement of conscription and production by the Russian state influenced the economic standing of the nation as a whole and, as a result, greatly impacted social life. Gatrell states that, shockingly, “no thought was given to the impact of conscription on industrial production” – an unbelievable move on the part of the Russian military planners, those educated individuals who seemed to completely ignore the very basic drop in production that would be suffered upon the significant removal of workers from the industrial sector for use in the war . The effects of the drop in industry were felt not only by the state’s war effort, which proved lackluster in terms of munitions, but also by the peasants who felt twin blows to their financial state and social mobility. The inability of many Russian factories to transfer over to military production also led to the loss of Russian jobs, plunging hundreds of thousands of workers into unemployment . Strikes were not common due to the patriotic sentiment behind war mobilization of Russia’s industrial sector: interrupting the flow of work may hurt or kill the Russian soldier, a fault that no lower class worker would want leveled against them by either state authorities (being branded as traitors and charged ) or by their peers (thus preventing social unity among the equally underprivileged worker classes) .
Finances in general were modified catastrophically due to the fluctuating Russian economy; as a result, the lower classes were affected socially. The value of Russian currency dropped and the likelihood of a peasant being able to buy land or even enter the market of manufactured goods thinned frighteningly, thus disallowing the Russian peasant to prosper in the war’s economic environment . At one point, the state imposed a prohibition on alcohol and, after a gain in economic activity, credited it for bolstering peasant productivity. Gatrell quickly disregards this, citing the peasants’ panicked attempts at liquidating their inventories as the true reason for economic activity – a much less hopeful view of what was only a temporary boost to the well-being of the peasants. Despite this, Gatrell does acknowledge that the general financial lot of the peasantry did remain steady or improve nominally. Business ventures such as the (sometimes coerced) distribution of livestock to the Tsarist army and the aforementioned liquidation of surplus onto the market allowed for peasants to gain an amount of cash. It is worth once again referencing, however, of the impressive inflation experienced by Russian currency – a fact that Gatrell should have attached directly to his thought on the state of peasant financial intake .
Understandably, the conscription itself proved to be destructive to the social fabric of the lower classes. Peasant households deprived villages of their male populations to extreme points, removing economic stability and leaving the home in the hands of the non-conscripted members. According to Gatrell, almost one half of peasant households did not possess males of working age due to the mass conscription of the lower classes leading up to 1917 . Exemptions among the lower classes were almost universally disregarded, even if it meant another worker in the factories to contribute to the war effort. Gatrell quotes General Mikhail Belaev as stating that regarding any peasant exemption as legitimate would contribute a “delirious impact on [the] morale” of the armed forces . This sort of consideration toward the peasantry led to a degradation of respect for state representatives and authority, including officials of the state’s Orthodox Church: priests suffered financially due to low attendance and were regarded as mouthpieces of the state . Even family structure and authority came into question as Russian youths engaged in criminal activity, regarded by the state – the very entity that pushed peasantry’s youth into such behavior due to the effects of the loss of jobs and conscription upon the family – as mere “hooligans” .
The depleting of the male population in the villages and towns changed the Russian social dynamic by forcing women into a more public role. As a result of the large amount of men forced to the front lines by the conflict, women were forced out from the homes and into the public sphere. Gatrell describes that by 1916, women outnumbered men in peasant villages by approximately 60%; as a result, female peasants – known for being a good amount more liberal than their masculine counterparts – not only gained a prominent role in the matters of farming but also assisted in the institution of new techniques and technologies within that field . Women also participated greatly within the industrial workplace, a setting populated by an increasingly limited amount of men. From 1913 to 1916, the amount of women participating in a factory setting increasing from 30% to 40% with the largest inclusions of new female workers in the chemical and textile industries . Perhaps most starkly representative of the changing role played by lower class women was the forming of a “women’s battalion of death” by Maria Bochkareva, a peasant worker who was admitted to participate in the military after proving her ability to the overwhelmingly misogynistic Tsarist armed forces . Although these units were utilized mostly to foster the faltering morale of the armed forces in the face of losses and eventually failing in that goal, the mobilization of women for any purpose on the front of battle is a distinct display of the shift in gender roles that occurred as a result of World War I.
It is an undeniable fact that World War I and the Imperial Russian state’s treatment of the conflict had long-reaching effects upon the everyday lives of the lower classes. This fact is made even more important when one realizes the major role that these same peasants – neglected socially by the falsely inclusive government, their social fabric effectively torn asunder by the state’s lack of preparation for the Great War – would have in Russia’s rise in social unrest, which would eventually emerge into Russia’s February Revolution. The next social upheaval – the October Revolution – would come to be executed by the Bolsheviks, a group which disposed of the autocratic Tsar in favor of a government, at its base, with a large emphasis on the worth and participation of the lower classes. The seemingly endless abuse heaped unto the peasant classes throughout Russian history, from the period of the Rus’ serfs under the Mongol Yoke and eventually Ivan the Terrible’s harsh repression of any public resistance to the more contemporary ignorance toward the plight of the Imperial Russian peasant, would come to shape the Russian state in ways most certainly unexpected only years beforehand.
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Works Cited
Gatrell, Peter. Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History. Pearson Educated Limited: Harlow, England, 2005.
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Works on Russian history always seem to get me riled up - for good reason, it's always so damned interesting.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Corruption of Religion Vol. 523: Make It Into Law!
A paper I had to redo (due to data loss, on my new laptop of all things), this work - while hastily rewritten and rearranged - was one of my favorites to research. I hope you like it, or get something from it, maybe.
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Law and the Role of Religion:
Historical Explanations,
Constitutional Goals
and Contemporary Analysis
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Introduction
The role of religion in influencing a nation’s practice of law can vary grandly. This is made doubly so when a country’s history has a deeply religious nature – especially when its Constitution states that it is a secular state. Saudi Arabia, for instance, utilizes the centuries-old Islamic religious law of shari’ah in dictating the basic statutes of its legal structure and proceedings; other religions are treated harshly and effectively banned from public. For years, Argentinean legal policy was heavily influenced by outside Catholic influences and semi-religious political parties were openly persecuted by the forces of dictator Juan Peron until the ascension of reformist President Raul Alfonsin in 1983, prompting a secularization of laws and a non-religious reimagining of the country’s Constitution. While officially secular, the legal system of India has no definitive “wall of separation” which pushes apart religion and the state; thus, the state interacts with different religious organizations and centers on a consistent legal level. Finland deals with religion in a liberal fashion, expressing the legal importance of religious freedom while at the same time endorsing a special relationship with the Finnish Orthodox Church.
Through a display and analysis of these and other examples of religion’s impact on national law, especially in pertinence to a country’s Constitution, proper comparisons between states can be made and the reasons for why these differences have emerged may be examined properly.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Theocratic Courts
The starkest example of religion as indicative of the law’s treatment of an individual is Saudi Arabia, a staunchly conservative Islamic state which utilizes Sunni Islam-oriented Shari’ah law in determining the results of legal cases. The Saudi Constitution is, strikingly, the text of the Islamic holy book known as the Qur’an. This point alone is quite indicative of the role of religion in determining the judicial legacy of the state. The Hanbali fiqh of Shari’ah is put to use in Saudi courts as a means of determining, in a semi-inquisitorial way, the violations put forth by a suspect against the country’s religious law. Executed by religiously-trained judges with relatively little input from lawyers or defendants, Saudi courts use Islamic law as a means of regulating the private lives of the country’s subjects. Punishments are derived from sometimes centuries-old Islamic sources and are considered archaic or slanted by many, including international observer organizations such as the Human Rights Watch.
Saudi Arabia’s penchant for Shari’ah can be explained through an analysis of its formation and its intermingling with religious fundamentalists known as “Wahhabis”. Since the formation of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula had always been a place of conservative views due to the homogenous nature of peninsular Bedouin society and the isolation experienced by nomadic Muslims. The original Saudi state was a small tribal power in central Najd, a desert region of the modern nation, headed by Saudi patriarch Muhammad ibn Sa’ud. Sa’ud joined forces with Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, a religious fundamentalist imam who had been ejected from another settlement due to his extreme conservatism, and began to strike out against those Muslims they considered non-orthodox. After the movement was quashed by the Ottoman Empire, the Saudi state remained stagnant until the turn of the twentieth century when Sa’ud’s descendent Abdul Aziz ibn Sa’ud began to use Ottoman funds to rally those remaining Wahhabi forces to reassert their power over the Najdi region and eventually the western Arabian region known as the Hedjaz. Conservative Muslims from across the Arabian Peninsula joined the burgeoning state, promoting views which would later be codified into Saudi law. Ibn Sa’ud’s utilization of conservative Islam as a rallying point for jihad , and as a central pillar for the formation of a state, laid the foundation for the propagation of strict Islamic law in modern-day Saudi Arabia.
Those defendants within Saudi Arabia that are non-Sunni Muslims, such as the country’s Shi’ah Muslim minority or the sizeable number of non-Muslim foreign workers from both the West and Asia, are either afford a slight degree of religious autonomy in determining the results of less serious cases or must submit fully to Saudi Shari’ah courts despite their religious standing. In some cases, harsher punishments, from both the courts and the Saudi police, are dealt to non-Sunni Muslims. As seen in these examples, religion dominates the legal proceedings of Saudi Arabia despite the desires of those involved in the cases. Secular courts are utilized in only specific cases which tend to pertain to complaints against government policies and automobile accidents, issues for which the country’s generally archaic Islamic law has no proper statutes. Due to the strictness of the state’s enforcement of religion and Arab culture, traditional Bedouin gender roles are reinforced: women are legally exempt from voting or being in public without a written excuse from a male relative, and cuckolded men have the legal right to assist in deciding the punishment for their wives. Hanbali Sunni Islam law is applied in all cases in which it can be and secular legal proceedings are utilized only when there are no Shari’ah-oriented precedents.
The Republic of India: Officially Secular, Realistically Prescriptive
India presents a unique example of an interaction between a state which is technically secular and the many religious issues which it faces. The modern-day nation of India encompasses the birthplaces of multiple religions – Hinduism was effectively “founded” in India’s northeastern city of Varanasi, and Buddhism was doctrinally formulated nearby – and came to interact with others including Islam and Sikhism. While it was conceived as a secular state and was only reinforced in this by later amendments to its Constitution, religion continues to be much-discussed issue in the courts of India.
Prior to Indian independence, the interaction between foreign authorities and their very religious Indian subjects contributed to eventual Indian secularism. British colonial domination of the region led to the banning of certain religious practices such as Sati , prompting a public response that the statesmen who would eventually become India’s founders preferred to avoid. During the rise of Gandhi and Indian nationalism, the British policy of regarding separate religious communities in judicially different ways came under criticism and led to new calls for secularism. The sheer amount of influence from other religions in the country would make it difficult for any one religion to have proper “authority” within the government, which prompted India to emerge as a secular state. For others, religion functioned as a rallying point which anti-colonialists could call upon as a means of resisting the British attempts to stabilize their colony. Despite the proposed secularity of the state, religion continued to play a major role in its development and often took center stage in political and legal disputes. Events such as the partitioning of colonial India into the secular Republic of India and the starkly Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as well as conflicts over religiously-disputed regions between those two states such as Kashmir, support of this concept.
An observation of Indian laws pertaining to religion, as well as the Constitution of India, shows the interesting relationship that the supposedly secular state has with its multiple faiths. Officially dictated by the country’s Constitution is, once again, the secular nature of the nation: discrimination as a result of religion is prohibited, unfair legal considerations on a religious basis are strongly disallowed and Indian citizens are allowed to profess any religious belief they choose. As noted by Tahir Mahmood, however, the state reserves the right to initiate, codify and enforce legal statutes which promote “social reform” that may or may not affect religion. Narenda Subramanian of McGill University states that early Indian statesmen, in an attempt to quell potential religious unrest, had homogenized Hindu beliefs by transferring them into the legally-applicable doctrine that would become part of the Indian Constitution of 1950; this led to the adoption of multiple religious laws in determining the country’s family law, starting with the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Other legal codifications of religious practices include the country’s Hajj Committee Act of 1959 and the judicial regulation of activities pertaining to Hindu and Islamic religious land trusts. “Secular” Indian civil law, too, is greatly affected by religion.
“Conversion to any religion other than Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, or [Sikhism] is seen as a civil offense also under each of the other three Hindu-law enactments of 1956, resulting in loss of succession, guardianship, maintenance, and adoption rights. Thus, parents ceasing to be Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh lose guardianship of their minor children, while convert wives and children are deprived of their right to be provided maintenance by their husbands and parents, respectively.”
India’s official secularity, an important method of preventing any one of the country’s many religious factions from gaining overt influence, is tempered by its need for a method of regulation of its many faiths. The country’s subsequent incorporation of multiple forms of religious law in determining family law and civil law is simply an extension of India’s attempts at secularizing, or in this case ecumenicizing, its legal framework.
The Russian Federation: Resurgent Religion and the State’s Response
Contemporary Russia has emerged as a result of historical religious extremes. For hundreds of years, Tsarist Russia was an effective confessional state: strengthened in religious authority as a result of the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Russian Orthodox Church came to heavily influence all aspects of the Empire and dictated its policy of forced multireligious orthodoxy. Muslim and Protestant congregations operated at the behest of state religious authorities who, in some cases, codified and redefined religious laws in a way which ensured the loyalty of otherwise troublesome groups to the Empire. In contrast to Imperial Russia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – a state which overthrew the Tsar in 1922 – was staunchly atheistic and actively persecuted members of all state clergies. Soviet authorities forcefully disbanded religious communities and regularly demolished places of worship in an effort to redirect its citizens to identity with and support the state. This complex legacy led to the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991.
The Russian Federation is a secular state but has been known to respond to religious forces in ways reminiscent of tactics employed by both the Tsarist Russia and the USSR. The Russian Constitution, established in 1993, promotes a distinct policy of state non-interference in religious affairs and a purely secular position. Any discrimination based on religious preferences, legal or otherwise, is also prohibited by the Constitution. Factually, the system is quite different. After emerging from its Soviet Era, the Federation saw a “boom” in religious expression from non-Russian Orthodox factions such as Muslims in Chechnya and Evangelical Christians in European Russia. Fearing the loss of social cohesion promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church, the State Duma nearly passed legislation which would have legally limited the legitimacy of non-Orthodox faith communities which had not been in the Russian Federation for over fifteen years (an impossible task, considering the state had only existed for six years by this point) or subsets by banning “religious dissension” (a very broad term). The act, which gained huge support from European Russians and passed the Duma almost unanimously, was vetoed by President Yeltsin on July 22nd, 1997; despite the fact that it was in open violation of not only the Russian Constitution but also the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Man. The potential legal ramifications of the act’s passing would have severely undermined the Constitution’s secular intentions. Since this occurred, the state has gone on to criticize and restrict religious organizations such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Jesuit missionaries on the basis that their religion may destabilize the faith-related unity of European Russia. This is in direction violation of the Russian Constitution, as the state has acted out against religious minorities in a fashion the Constitution specifically restricts.
A place where the Russian Federation’s secularist mission has completely failed is Chechnya, an organ republic of the Federation in the northeastern Caucasus Mountains. Populated mostly by Muslims, Chechnya had once been a rebellious territory of Tsarist Russia that regularly fought against attempts by Imperial authority to control the region’s ecstatic religious practices. During the Soviet Era, the region’s stubborn Islamic subjects had been forced to migrate to Central Asia or Siberia in order to disintegrate any cohesive religious movement between former residents. From 1994 to 1996, separatist forces fighting for an independent Ichkerian Chechnya managed to secure state sovereignty by disabling Russian state apparatuses in the region and later repelling military forces sent against them. Brotherhoods of Sufi Muslims, groups indicative of the region’s Islam and are normally non-political, had assisted in turning away the Russians and did so without much difficulty. After several years of nominal sovereignty, the Second Chechen War broke out and the state was effectively swallowed up and dismantled by Russian authorities. In an attempt to dissuade such events from ever occurring again, the Russian Federation appointed former Ichkerian Chechens loyal to the state, such as current Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, to positions of authority. At the same time, Russia refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of moderate or Ichkeria-aligned figures due to their perceived penchant for Islamic extremism.
To stabilize the region and ensure order, these new statesmen have effectively ignored the legal statutes put forth by the Federation’s Constitution. Stating that the official mission is to “blunt the appeal of hardline Islamic separatists,” Kadyrov has enforced strict Shari’ah law and endorsed more conservative elements of Chechen culture. Harsh interpretations of gender roles and property law have been reinforced by these authorities and in many cases are more conservative than when the region had been under non-Russian control. By legally endorsing such things, and “[encouraging] men to take more than one wife, even though polygamy is illegal in Russia,” the Chechen Republic has generally abandoned the non-religious goals of the Russian Federation in order to ensure some sense of stability in the fragmented Caucasus republic. The government has turned a blind eye to Kadyrov’s actions, setting a precedent that may be followed in other parts of the country if there is truly no long-term reaction to his use of state-supported Shari’ah law.
Finland: A ‘Special’ Religious Relationship
Home to two state-endorsed churches, Finland is a former province of not only the Swedish Empire but also the Russian Empire. In 1917, Finland established its own independence; during World War II, the Baltic state fended off a Soviet invasion with the help of highly-skilled partisan guerrilla and sniper regiments. Prior to the state’s independence, every subject of Finland – as a province of the Russian or Swedish empires – had to be registered as either a member of the Finnish Lutheran Church or the Finnish Orthodox Church. The Act of Nonconformity was passed in 1889, allowing for other denominations such as the Baptists to gain state recognition. Finland’s subsequent exposure to multiple denominations of Christianity led to a historical policy of general religious tolerance. In contrast to this, Finland has maintained its two churches as state-supported apparatuses paid for mostly through tax revenue collected from members of the congregations. In opposition to this is Finland’s Constitution, which states that the nation does not treat any religious entity different than any other; the general message of the Constitution is that religious equality, as opposed to separation of Church and state, is the Finnish goal.
While the state’s relationship with its two major religious appendages may be unequal or preferential, the idea religion as contributive to judicial practice in Finland is largely unrecognized. The state funds its two churches, but allows citizens to exempt themselves from paying for them; religious education is a legal obligation for secondary school students, but they have the legal right to replace such classes with non-religious ethics-related courses. Unlike “secular” India and Russia, Finland does not utilize unconstitutional methods in maintaining the religious status quo of its nation nor does it use religious preference as a determinant in restricting what an organization may do. The twin churches of Finland have been steadily losing membership each year, as non-state-supported religious congregations have been gaining adherence. The state has not responded to this in any authoritarian or prescriptive way, allowing for both other religious groups and the country’s atheist community to grow in recent years. Populations of Muslims have begun to emerge to urban Finland, prompting the state to introduce non-Christian religious education into the state-funded educational system.
The popularity of social liberalism in Finland has been attributed as a reason behind the country’s policy of honest religious tolerance. Sexual and gender equality are actively addressed in state-funded churches, prompting organizations such as FreedomHouse to label Finland as one of the most religiously free and liberal countries in the world. Since independence, the country has promoted a policy of religious tolerance which has attracted members of foreign religious groups such as Muslims to the country; this is in great contrast to some European countries, such as France and Switzerland where religious minorities are sometimes faced with legal restrictions to their worship. State offices actively host ecumenical conferences between different religious groups, promoting cohesive social action across religious lines. Finland’s policy of religious tolerance is cyclical: as new religious communities are founded or migrate to the nation, ecumenical relationships between them and existing groups are founded and continuously propagate a cohesive religious atmosphere. This is, unlike the other “secular” states mentioned in this term paper, a sign of Finland’s success as a nation promoting religious tolerance.
Conclusion
The information drawn from the four nations mentioned in this report – Saudi Arabia, India, Russia and Finland – amount to explanations as to how the relationships of states, and their prior colonial or pre-state polities, with religion assist in the determination of religion’s role within the nation. The foundation of Saudi Arabia as a staunchly Wahhabist Islamic state garnered it support from ultra-orthodox Arabian Muslims who later solidified their beliefs through policy once the state came into being, leading to the legally-sanctioned oppression of non-Muslims and Muslims alike. The prevalence of religion in Indian society prompted an attempt at secularism, which later resulted in the state codifying and ecumenicizing preexisting indigenous religious law in an effort to accommodate its populations. Russia’s policy of secularism, stained with authoritarianism and a bent for conserving important aspects of Russian culture, led to the distinct legal oppression and subjugation of non-Russian Orthodox religious groups of which the state is wary. Despite its historical support of multiple state religious institutions, Finland successfully promotes a policy of religious tolerance with no existing religious legal preference due to the traditionally high prevalence of social liberalism within the state.
The states all contrast to each other quite grandly. Both Russia and Finland have had historical state support for religious entities, but Russia’s legacy of effective authoritarianism has prevented its secular mission from succeeding in the same way as ultraliberal Finland. India’s attempts at secularism despite a high prevalence of religion led to an ecumenical approach to law, while Saudi Arabia’s existence as an entity endorsed by conservative religious authorities effectively collapsed any attempt at secularism within its legal system. One of the few things that can be truly established from this analysis is that two influences – the historical role of religion, and the state’s use or misuse of religion – have the ability to dictate how a modern state may operate. The role of religion in Russia as a unifying aspect of culture and authority or a basis for gaining popular support and regional recognition as in Saudi Arabia, shows the important result of what happens when a nation utilizes religion as an apparatus of the state. In Finland and India, the state actively attempted to promote interreligious relations: India saw the hostile reactions to British attempts at banning or dictating religious behavior, while Finland was split between powers which endorsed their own religious views upon the eventually independent nation.
Religion is a powerful tool for a state to utilize, but has many negative consequences if used inappropriately. Russia and Saudi Arabia, two authoritarian polities with little consideration for religious minorities and futures bound with future trials pertaining to religion, are examples of this. India stands at a middle point, while Finland has ascended to a high point of religious tolerance. Responsibility in the use of religion, it seems, dictates the future of a state.
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All rewritten from scratch over the course of a few hours. Not bad.
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Law and the Role of Religion:
Historical Explanations,
Constitutional Goals
and Contemporary Analysis
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Introduction
The role of religion in influencing a nation’s practice of law can vary grandly. This is made doubly so when a country’s history has a deeply religious nature – especially when its Constitution states that it is a secular state. Saudi Arabia, for instance, utilizes the centuries-old Islamic religious law of shari’ah in dictating the basic statutes of its legal structure and proceedings; other religions are treated harshly and effectively banned from public. For years, Argentinean legal policy was heavily influenced by outside Catholic influences and semi-religious political parties were openly persecuted by the forces of dictator Juan Peron until the ascension of reformist President Raul Alfonsin in 1983, prompting a secularization of laws and a non-religious reimagining of the country’s Constitution. While officially secular, the legal system of India has no definitive “wall of separation” which pushes apart religion and the state; thus, the state interacts with different religious organizations and centers on a consistent legal level. Finland deals with religion in a liberal fashion, expressing the legal importance of religious freedom while at the same time endorsing a special relationship with the Finnish Orthodox Church.
Through a display and analysis of these and other examples of religion’s impact on national law, especially in pertinence to a country’s Constitution, proper comparisons between states can be made and the reasons for why these differences have emerged may be examined properly.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Theocratic Courts
The starkest example of religion as indicative of the law’s treatment of an individual is Saudi Arabia, a staunchly conservative Islamic state which utilizes Sunni Islam-oriented Shari’ah law in determining the results of legal cases. The Saudi Constitution is, strikingly, the text of the Islamic holy book known as the Qur’an. This point alone is quite indicative of the role of religion in determining the judicial legacy of the state. The Hanbali fiqh of Shari’ah is put to use in Saudi courts as a means of determining, in a semi-inquisitorial way, the violations put forth by a suspect against the country’s religious law. Executed by religiously-trained judges with relatively little input from lawyers or defendants, Saudi courts use Islamic law as a means of regulating the private lives of the country’s subjects. Punishments are derived from sometimes centuries-old Islamic sources and are considered archaic or slanted by many, including international observer organizations such as the Human Rights Watch.
Saudi Arabia’s penchant for Shari’ah can be explained through an analysis of its formation and its intermingling with religious fundamentalists known as “Wahhabis”. Since the formation of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula had always been a place of conservative views due to the homogenous nature of peninsular Bedouin society and the isolation experienced by nomadic Muslims. The original Saudi state was a small tribal power in central Najd, a desert region of the modern nation, headed by Saudi patriarch Muhammad ibn Sa’ud. Sa’ud joined forces with Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, a religious fundamentalist imam who had been ejected from another settlement due to his extreme conservatism, and began to strike out against those Muslims they considered non-orthodox. After the movement was quashed by the Ottoman Empire, the Saudi state remained stagnant until the turn of the twentieth century when Sa’ud’s descendent Abdul Aziz ibn Sa’ud began to use Ottoman funds to rally those remaining Wahhabi forces to reassert their power over the Najdi region and eventually the western Arabian region known as the Hedjaz. Conservative Muslims from across the Arabian Peninsula joined the burgeoning state, promoting views which would later be codified into Saudi law. Ibn Sa’ud’s utilization of conservative Islam as a rallying point for jihad , and as a central pillar for the formation of a state, laid the foundation for the propagation of strict Islamic law in modern-day Saudi Arabia.
Those defendants within Saudi Arabia that are non-Sunni Muslims, such as the country’s Shi’ah Muslim minority or the sizeable number of non-Muslim foreign workers from both the West and Asia, are either afford a slight degree of religious autonomy in determining the results of less serious cases or must submit fully to Saudi Shari’ah courts despite their religious standing. In some cases, harsher punishments, from both the courts and the Saudi police, are dealt to non-Sunni Muslims. As seen in these examples, religion dominates the legal proceedings of Saudi Arabia despite the desires of those involved in the cases. Secular courts are utilized in only specific cases which tend to pertain to complaints against government policies and automobile accidents, issues for which the country’s generally archaic Islamic law has no proper statutes. Due to the strictness of the state’s enforcement of religion and Arab culture, traditional Bedouin gender roles are reinforced: women are legally exempt from voting or being in public without a written excuse from a male relative, and cuckolded men have the legal right to assist in deciding the punishment for their wives. Hanbali Sunni Islam law is applied in all cases in which it can be and secular legal proceedings are utilized only when there are no Shari’ah-oriented precedents.
The Republic of India: Officially Secular, Realistically Prescriptive
India presents a unique example of an interaction between a state which is technically secular and the many religious issues which it faces. The modern-day nation of India encompasses the birthplaces of multiple religions – Hinduism was effectively “founded” in India’s northeastern city of Varanasi, and Buddhism was doctrinally formulated nearby – and came to interact with others including Islam and Sikhism. While it was conceived as a secular state and was only reinforced in this by later amendments to its Constitution, religion continues to be much-discussed issue in the courts of India.
Prior to Indian independence, the interaction between foreign authorities and their very religious Indian subjects contributed to eventual Indian secularism. British colonial domination of the region led to the banning of certain religious practices such as Sati , prompting a public response that the statesmen who would eventually become India’s founders preferred to avoid. During the rise of Gandhi and Indian nationalism, the British policy of regarding separate religious communities in judicially different ways came under criticism and led to new calls for secularism. The sheer amount of influence from other religions in the country would make it difficult for any one religion to have proper “authority” within the government, which prompted India to emerge as a secular state. For others, religion functioned as a rallying point which anti-colonialists could call upon as a means of resisting the British attempts to stabilize their colony. Despite the proposed secularity of the state, religion continued to play a major role in its development and often took center stage in political and legal disputes. Events such as the partitioning of colonial India into the secular Republic of India and the starkly Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as well as conflicts over religiously-disputed regions between those two states such as Kashmir, support of this concept.
An observation of Indian laws pertaining to religion, as well as the Constitution of India, shows the interesting relationship that the supposedly secular state has with its multiple faiths. Officially dictated by the country’s Constitution is, once again, the secular nature of the nation: discrimination as a result of religion is prohibited, unfair legal considerations on a religious basis are strongly disallowed and Indian citizens are allowed to profess any religious belief they choose. As noted by Tahir Mahmood, however, the state reserves the right to initiate, codify and enforce legal statutes which promote “social reform” that may or may not affect religion. Narenda Subramanian of McGill University states that early Indian statesmen, in an attempt to quell potential religious unrest, had homogenized Hindu beliefs by transferring them into the legally-applicable doctrine that would become part of the Indian Constitution of 1950; this led to the adoption of multiple religious laws in determining the country’s family law, starting with the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Other legal codifications of religious practices include the country’s Hajj Committee Act of 1959 and the judicial regulation of activities pertaining to Hindu and Islamic religious land trusts. “Secular” Indian civil law, too, is greatly affected by religion.
“Conversion to any religion other than Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, or [Sikhism] is seen as a civil offense also under each of the other three Hindu-law enactments of 1956, resulting in loss of succession, guardianship, maintenance, and adoption rights. Thus, parents ceasing to be Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh lose guardianship of their minor children, while convert wives and children are deprived of their right to be provided maintenance by their husbands and parents, respectively.”
India’s official secularity, an important method of preventing any one of the country’s many religious factions from gaining overt influence, is tempered by its need for a method of regulation of its many faiths. The country’s subsequent incorporation of multiple forms of religious law in determining family law and civil law is simply an extension of India’s attempts at secularizing, or in this case ecumenicizing, its legal framework.
The Russian Federation: Resurgent Religion and the State’s Response
Contemporary Russia has emerged as a result of historical religious extremes. For hundreds of years, Tsarist Russia was an effective confessional state: strengthened in religious authority as a result of the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Russian Orthodox Church came to heavily influence all aspects of the Empire and dictated its policy of forced multireligious orthodoxy. Muslim and Protestant congregations operated at the behest of state religious authorities who, in some cases, codified and redefined religious laws in a way which ensured the loyalty of otherwise troublesome groups to the Empire. In contrast to Imperial Russia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – a state which overthrew the Tsar in 1922 – was staunchly atheistic and actively persecuted members of all state clergies. Soviet authorities forcefully disbanded religious communities and regularly demolished places of worship in an effort to redirect its citizens to identity with and support the state. This complex legacy led to the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991.
The Russian Federation is a secular state but has been known to respond to religious forces in ways reminiscent of tactics employed by both the Tsarist Russia and the USSR. The Russian Constitution, established in 1993, promotes a distinct policy of state non-interference in religious affairs and a purely secular position. Any discrimination based on religious preferences, legal or otherwise, is also prohibited by the Constitution. Factually, the system is quite different. After emerging from its Soviet Era, the Federation saw a “boom” in religious expression from non-Russian Orthodox factions such as Muslims in Chechnya and Evangelical Christians in European Russia. Fearing the loss of social cohesion promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church, the State Duma nearly passed legislation which would have legally limited the legitimacy of non-Orthodox faith communities which had not been in the Russian Federation for over fifteen years (an impossible task, considering the state had only existed for six years by this point) or subsets by banning “religious dissension” (a very broad term). The act, which gained huge support from European Russians and passed the Duma almost unanimously, was vetoed by President Yeltsin on July 22nd, 1997; despite the fact that it was in open violation of not only the Russian Constitution but also the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Man. The potential legal ramifications of the act’s passing would have severely undermined the Constitution’s secular intentions. Since this occurred, the state has gone on to criticize and restrict religious organizations such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Jesuit missionaries on the basis that their religion may destabilize the faith-related unity of European Russia. This is in direction violation of the Russian Constitution, as the state has acted out against religious minorities in a fashion the Constitution specifically restricts.
A place where the Russian Federation’s secularist mission has completely failed is Chechnya, an organ republic of the Federation in the northeastern Caucasus Mountains. Populated mostly by Muslims, Chechnya had once been a rebellious territory of Tsarist Russia that regularly fought against attempts by Imperial authority to control the region’s ecstatic religious practices. During the Soviet Era, the region’s stubborn Islamic subjects had been forced to migrate to Central Asia or Siberia in order to disintegrate any cohesive religious movement between former residents. From 1994 to 1996, separatist forces fighting for an independent Ichkerian Chechnya managed to secure state sovereignty by disabling Russian state apparatuses in the region and later repelling military forces sent against them. Brotherhoods of Sufi Muslims, groups indicative of the region’s Islam and are normally non-political, had assisted in turning away the Russians and did so without much difficulty. After several years of nominal sovereignty, the Second Chechen War broke out and the state was effectively swallowed up and dismantled by Russian authorities. In an attempt to dissuade such events from ever occurring again, the Russian Federation appointed former Ichkerian Chechens loyal to the state, such as current Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, to positions of authority. At the same time, Russia refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of moderate or Ichkeria-aligned figures due to their perceived penchant for Islamic extremism.
To stabilize the region and ensure order, these new statesmen have effectively ignored the legal statutes put forth by the Federation’s Constitution. Stating that the official mission is to “blunt the appeal of hardline Islamic separatists,” Kadyrov has enforced strict Shari’ah law and endorsed more conservative elements of Chechen culture. Harsh interpretations of gender roles and property law have been reinforced by these authorities and in many cases are more conservative than when the region had been under non-Russian control. By legally endorsing such things, and “[encouraging] men to take more than one wife, even though polygamy is illegal in Russia,” the Chechen Republic has generally abandoned the non-religious goals of the Russian Federation in order to ensure some sense of stability in the fragmented Caucasus republic. The government has turned a blind eye to Kadyrov’s actions, setting a precedent that may be followed in other parts of the country if there is truly no long-term reaction to his use of state-supported Shari’ah law.
Finland: A ‘Special’ Religious Relationship
Home to two state-endorsed churches, Finland is a former province of not only the Swedish Empire but also the Russian Empire. In 1917, Finland established its own independence; during World War II, the Baltic state fended off a Soviet invasion with the help of highly-skilled partisan guerrilla and sniper regiments. Prior to the state’s independence, every subject of Finland – as a province of the Russian or Swedish empires – had to be registered as either a member of the Finnish Lutheran Church or the Finnish Orthodox Church. The Act of Nonconformity was passed in 1889, allowing for other denominations such as the Baptists to gain state recognition. Finland’s subsequent exposure to multiple denominations of Christianity led to a historical policy of general religious tolerance. In contrast to this, Finland has maintained its two churches as state-supported apparatuses paid for mostly through tax revenue collected from members of the congregations. In opposition to this is Finland’s Constitution, which states that the nation does not treat any religious entity different than any other; the general message of the Constitution is that religious equality, as opposed to separation of Church and state, is the Finnish goal.
While the state’s relationship with its two major religious appendages may be unequal or preferential, the idea religion as contributive to judicial practice in Finland is largely unrecognized. The state funds its two churches, but allows citizens to exempt themselves from paying for them; religious education is a legal obligation for secondary school students, but they have the legal right to replace such classes with non-religious ethics-related courses. Unlike “secular” India and Russia, Finland does not utilize unconstitutional methods in maintaining the religious status quo of its nation nor does it use religious preference as a determinant in restricting what an organization may do. The twin churches of Finland have been steadily losing membership each year, as non-state-supported religious congregations have been gaining adherence. The state has not responded to this in any authoritarian or prescriptive way, allowing for both other religious groups and the country’s atheist community to grow in recent years. Populations of Muslims have begun to emerge to urban Finland, prompting the state to introduce non-Christian religious education into the state-funded educational system.
The popularity of social liberalism in Finland has been attributed as a reason behind the country’s policy of honest religious tolerance. Sexual and gender equality are actively addressed in state-funded churches, prompting organizations such as FreedomHouse to label Finland as one of the most religiously free and liberal countries in the world. Since independence, the country has promoted a policy of religious tolerance which has attracted members of foreign religious groups such as Muslims to the country; this is in great contrast to some European countries, such as France and Switzerland where religious minorities are sometimes faced with legal restrictions to their worship. State offices actively host ecumenical conferences between different religious groups, promoting cohesive social action across religious lines. Finland’s policy of religious tolerance is cyclical: as new religious communities are founded or migrate to the nation, ecumenical relationships between them and existing groups are founded and continuously propagate a cohesive religious atmosphere. This is, unlike the other “secular” states mentioned in this term paper, a sign of Finland’s success as a nation promoting religious tolerance.
Conclusion
The information drawn from the four nations mentioned in this report – Saudi Arabia, India, Russia and Finland – amount to explanations as to how the relationships of states, and their prior colonial or pre-state polities, with religion assist in the determination of religion’s role within the nation. The foundation of Saudi Arabia as a staunchly Wahhabist Islamic state garnered it support from ultra-orthodox Arabian Muslims who later solidified their beliefs through policy once the state came into being, leading to the legally-sanctioned oppression of non-Muslims and Muslims alike. The prevalence of religion in Indian society prompted an attempt at secularism, which later resulted in the state codifying and ecumenicizing preexisting indigenous religious law in an effort to accommodate its populations. Russia’s policy of secularism, stained with authoritarianism and a bent for conserving important aspects of Russian culture, led to the distinct legal oppression and subjugation of non-Russian Orthodox religious groups of which the state is wary. Despite its historical support of multiple state religious institutions, Finland successfully promotes a policy of religious tolerance with no existing religious legal preference due to the traditionally high prevalence of social liberalism within the state.
The states all contrast to each other quite grandly. Both Russia and Finland have had historical state support for religious entities, but Russia’s legacy of effective authoritarianism has prevented its secular mission from succeeding in the same way as ultraliberal Finland. India’s attempts at secularism despite a high prevalence of religion led to an ecumenical approach to law, while Saudi Arabia’s existence as an entity endorsed by conservative religious authorities effectively collapsed any attempt at secularism within its legal system. One of the few things that can be truly established from this analysis is that two influences – the historical role of religion, and the state’s use or misuse of religion – have the ability to dictate how a modern state may operate. The role of religion in Russia as a unifying aspect of culture and authority or a basis for gaining popular support and regional recognition as in Saudi Arabia, shows the important result of what happens when a nation utilizes religion as an apparatus of the state. In Finland and India, the state actively attempted to promote interreligious relations: India saw the hostile reactions to British attempts at banning or dictating religious behavior, while Finland was split between powers which endorsed their own religious views upon the eventually independent nation.
Religion is a powerful tool for a state to utilize, but has many negative consequences if used inappropriately. Russia and Saudi Arabia, two authoritarian polities with little consideration for religious minorities and futures bound with future trials pertaining to religion, are examples of this. India stands at a middle point, while Finland has ascended to a high point of religious tolerance. Responsibility in the use of religion, it seems, dictates the future of a state.
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Works Cited
Amato, Sean. “Saudi Arabia – Wikiversity.” The Wikiversity Project. http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia (website accessed December 11th, 2009).
Associated Press. “Chechen Leader imposes strict brand of Islam.” MSNBC News. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29445232/ (website accessed December 20th, 2009).
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “International Religious Freedom Report 2006 – Finland.” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71379.htm (website accessed December 18th, 2009).
Country Reports. “Finland – Religion.” Country Reports. http://www.countryreports.org/login/login.aspx?myurl=/people/Religion.aspx&countryid=82 (website accessed December 19th, 2009).
Crews, Robert. “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” The American Historical Review 108.1 (2003): 50-83.
Dalrymple, William. The Last Mughal, The Fall of a Dynasty: Delhi, 1857. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
Damrel, David. “The Religious Roots of Conflict: Russia and Chechnya.” Belfast Islamic Center. http://www.iol.ie/~afifi/Articles/chechnya.htm (website accessed December 17th, 2009).
FreedomHouse. “Freedom In The World – Finland (2007.” FreedomHouse. http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2007&country=7177&pf (website accessed December 19th, 2009).
Isseroff, Ami. “Saudi Arabia: A Brief History.” MidEast Web. http://www.mideastweb.org/arabiahistory.htm (website accessed December 18th, 2009).
Keen, Shirin. “The Partition of India.” Postcolonial Studies, Emory University. http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Part.html (website accessed December 18th, 2009).
Mahmood, Tahir. “Religion, Law, and Judiciary in Modern India”. Brigham University Law Review. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3736/is_200605/ai_n16779605/?tag=content;col1 (website accessed December 20th, 2009).
Metz, Helen Chapin (editor). “Saudi Arabia – The Legal System.” U.S. Library of Congress. http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/51.htm (website accessed December 19th, 2009).
Reichel, Philip J. Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A Topical Approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2008.
Robinson, B.A. “A 1997 Law Restricting Freedom.” Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance. http://www.religioustolerance.org/rt_russi1.htm (website accessed December 18th, 2009).
Robinson, B.A. “Oppression of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals and Jesuits.” Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance. http://www.religioustolerance.org/rt_russi2.htm (website accessed December 18th, 2009).
Subramanian, Narenda. “Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family Law in India." Lecture, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 12, 2005.
Tran, Can. Human Rights Watch Appeals To Saudi King To Nullify Execution of ‘Witch’.” GroundReport, http://www.groundreport.com/World/Human-Rights-Watch-Appeals-To-Saudi-King-To-Nullif/2855589 (website accessed December 20th, 2009).
User “Cgalvan 8389.” “Russia CLJ – Wikiversity.” The Wikiversity Project. http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Russia_CLJ (website accessed December 20th, 2009).
User “Mattyb2024”. “Finland – Wikiversity.” The Wikiversity Project. http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Finland (website accesed December 20th, 2009).
User “Bameas”. “India – Wikiversity.” The Wikiversity Project. http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/India (website accessed December 20th, 2009).
Weisbrod, Carol. “Symposium: Gender-Based Analyses of World Religion and Law: Universals and Particulars: A Comment on Women’s Human Rights and Religious Marriage Contracts.” Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies (1999).
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All rewritten from scratch over the course of a few hours. Not bad.
Saturday, January 17, 2009
The Finest Diplomat: Olearius In Muscovy
I had some fun writing this piece; it's similar to that of one I did about a year ago on the subject of a scholar I regarded as a Tsarist apologist (if I remember correctly) in that his writings were easy to tear to shreds. Holsteinian diplomat Adam Olearius fares no better: I found him to be hypocritical, ignorant and far too self-righteous to even consider himself vaguely diplomatic, let alone an actual diplomat.
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Adam Olearius was a German ambassador, secretary and translator who traveled Eurasia during the seventeenth century per the request of Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. He was tasked with, essentially, the future of the new German settlement “Friedrichstadt”: a locale founded by Dutch settlers with Frederick III’s blessing in hopes of fostering international trade within the territorial bounds of Holstein-Gottorp. As the lead diplomat, Adam Olearius was tasked with forging trade routes and completing monetary agreements with powers that would have links to lucrative trade to the East such as Persia and Muscovy. Despite years of effort on the part of Olearius, Friedrichstadt would not garner the sort of economic activity that Frederick III hoped it would achieve and the diplomat returned to work as the duke’s archivist.
Olearius’s real contributions were historical works, most notably his narrative “Moskowitische und Persische Reise: die Holsteinische Gesandtschaft beim Schah, 1633-1639“which described the foreign peoples he encountered while traveling with his entourage across Eurasia. His entertaining commentary on the state of the Russian people under Muscovite rule, including physical features and social behavior, is very detailed and useful for a scholar hoping to garner foreign views of the Eastern Slavs throughout their historical journey. Outside of this context, however, the writings of Olearius on the subject of the Muscovites can be seen as fairly bigoted: despite the necessity that Muscovy plays in his diplomatic task, he shows little appreciation or understanding of the people or their culture. Olearius directs much criticism and abject insults upon the population of Muscovy which includes – as he sees it – rowdy and murderous slaves, sex-crazed peasants and hypocritical, foul-mouth authority figures. As will be displayed in this piece, Adam Olearius’s work is extensive and well-written yet remains uninformed as a result of the author’s inability to make sense of or draw comparisons to Russian culture. Several examples of this will be investigated, but by no means can the entire document be analyzed and picked apart: it would require a piece of at least the length of Olearius’s to do so.
The biggest flaw put forth by the German diplomat in his dealings with the Muscovites is his stark inability to regard them as possessors of a legitimate and unique way or life. The first example of this can be seen only sentences into the work when Olearius labels the Russians as having skin pigmentation similar to that of ‘other Europeans’ – an interesting statement on the base level that, with the continued exposure of Western Europeans to the Russians and the insurmountable level of difference between them, a Holy Roman diplomat would consider Russians to be Europeans . It is notable that the scholar Olearius is willing to consider the widely-reviled Muscovites as fellow Europeans – especially notable due to the history of hostility between the Russians and Western Christians observable in events such as the Baltic Crusades (in which the Germans Teutonic Order faced the Poles, who Olearius repeatedly compares to the Muscovites).
In equating the Russians with ‘other’ Europeans, Olearius seems to ignore the uniqueness of Russian culture and development that unquestionably sets Russians apart from their counterparts to the West. Russian culture is not truly European: although it is influenced by European sources such as Rurik and his Varangians who founded the famed Rus’ trading center Novgorod, Russian culture is influenced by much more. The steppe – a region that originated a way of life that can be seen as the polar opposite of settled Western Europe – had a major impact on Russian culture in that it delivered unto the divided Rus’ new military techniques, court behavior, a revamped geographical dispersion of its people as well as new concepts for taxation and legal statues. As reasoned by the historian Isabel de Madariaga, the infamous Oprichnina of Muscovy’s Ivan IV can be seen as one of the many continuing legacies of the steppe’s influence upon the Russian people – in this case, through the influence of Ivan’s second wife, Maria Temrjukovna . The influence of Byzantine culture can be seen readily in Muscovite art by observing their use of traditionally Byzantine religious icons and the Muscovite adherence to Orthodox Christianity which possesses intense historical and cultural links to the Byzantine Empire. Olearius himself notes this, but does it demeaningly by stating that the Russians go out of their way to imitate the Greek way of life in an effort to give themselves legitimacy as a people. Olearius cites the Russian practices of mimicking Byzantine appearances in the practices of wearing ‘traditional’ Greek clothing and growing out ones’ hair in order to express shame. In contrary to Olearius’s accusations, it is worth noting that within the general Christian tradition the growing of a man’s hair was considered a sign of dismay – thus, it was mostly certainly not a practice limited to the Byzantines .
“(7) For man ought not to have his head covered, as he is in God’s image and glory…
(14) Does not nature itself teach you that if a man has long hair, it is a dishonor to him…”
Olearius continues to display his incomprehension of Russian culture throughout the piece. It is true that the Russians have what may be considered an aversion to outside culture – an almost humorous observation when one considers the large amount of foreign substance that the Rus’ have adapted to their own use and added into the sphere of their own society. Olearius’s view on the subject of Russian xenophobia seems to shift drastically throughout the piece: for example, at one point he is stern in his accusations of the Russians as mimics of the Greeks (as seen above). Later in the piece, he states that the Russians have few similarities with them especially in terms of language or art . This is entirely incorrect: while the Russians did conform the Byzantine religious practices to their own dialect, that would not insinuate that the Russians have ignorance to the Greek language but would actually suggest the utter opposite. The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian culture in general adapted much from Byzantine art, drawing from influences such as Christian icons and architectural practices. In stating that the Russians did not regard Greek culture, he seems to try to convince the reader that the residents of Muscovy are undeserving of carrying on the Roman and Greek legacies in the form of Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine-esque court politics and ‘Eastern’ design. In the same section of his narrative, Olearius cites examples of the Russian aversion to Classical avenues of effort such as the sciences: a Russian chancellor misunderstands the scholar’s attempts to stave off boredom through scientific antics as sorcery and brand a musically-inclined Dutch barber in a windy chamber as a heretic when the skeleton on his wall begins to move under ‘supernatural’ influence . These examples of Russian ignorance to foreign behavior are in contrast to Olearius’s constant branding of almost every Russian behavior he mentions as against the will of God and shameful to not only themselves but to their divine lord – a woefully hypocritical viewpoint from the learned Holsteinian.
It is possible that the only comparisons of substance Olearius can make are those between the uncivilized Muscovites and his own cultured German people. He cites the example of one ‘Nikita Ivanovich Romanov’, a wealth Russian xenophile whose appreciation for German culture goes misunderstood by Moscow’s Patriarch, who tricks him into removing the his European garb and disavowing it; to start the next paragraph, Olearius brands the Russians as barbarians and later says that the Russian people put little thought into foreigners . He later goes on to discuss the validity of holding skeletons for medical use (a more that Germans engaged in yet one the Russians were wary of, as can be seen above), the persecution of foreigners by Russian judges and the inability of Muscovites to regard foreigners as anything but a victim of their wiles. Going on, the ambassador states in one instance that they are a clever folk who do nothing but attempt to backstab and shame their rivals, be they neighbors or strangers, while gaining as much as possible. In the words of Jakob Ulfeldt as quoted by Olearius, Russians are “divorced… from all virtue”; he goes on for quite some time in his narrative describing the dishonesty of the Russians in attempting to achieve societal esteem and court positions . Further on, Olearius states that the Russians “are by nature cruel and fit only for slavery, [so] they must constantly be kept under a cruel and harsh yoke of restraint…” , regarding Russia’s tendency toward authoritarianism and absolutism as a show of their lack of civility. These qualities are not solely Russian traits but can be seen across the West: even a cursory knowledge of then-contemporary Italian political science piece Il Principe is a prime example, suggesting cruelty and fear as viable methods of rule in what Olearius would call ‘civilized Europe’. In addition, Olearius is not in Muscovy for the simple reason of cultural observation or societal analysis: he is among the Muscovites in order to secure politically-motivated financial matters with their ruling class. In his criticism of the Muscovites as particularly voracious toward foreigners in their attempts to gain things from them, he seems ignores the fact that he is doing the exact same thing and further invalidates himself. Olearius goes on: he compares the Russians’ lack of honor to the Germans in discussing the Muscovite inability to duel honorably as well as the offenses to the senses that no true German could bear that are commonplace in Moscow; the Muscovite tendency to disavow wine for cruder liquors is also discussed as an example of their barbarity . As an aside, he criticizes the Russian tendency to drink several times throughout his piece; he does not mention, however, the lack of refinement that almost every pre-modern society (including the Germans) shows upon the imbibing of illicit substance.
The true hypocrisy and bias of Olearius comes to pass in an observation he makes in one of the many comparisons between Muscovite and European (specifically German) civilization. In this statement, he suggests that the Russians are “very receptive” toward German techniques in the schools of artistic expression and science – a direct noncorrelation to his previous expressed beliefs that the Russians were in no way interested in such things. Olearius continues, assuming that Muscovite observers to Western forging and artwork will do all they can to steal the methods of foreigners . Olearius disregards the Western tendency to mimic technology and artwork throughout history: from the Romans putting to use Greek naval techniques to medieval Europeans copying Chinese and Middle Eastern use of gunpowder, Western Europe has had a massive history of ‘copycat’ behavior. It is possible that this statement is the opus of Olearius’s hypocritical and bigoted beliefs: while the Russian people are entirely unreceptive to all foreigners and lack culture in entirety, they are nevertheless enamored with German civilization and do all they can to plagiarize it for their own use.
Olearius’s work shines in its total inability to even touch upon the legitimacy of Muscovy’s culture outside of it being a copycat amalgamation of most groups that border the Russians. According to Baron’s translation, Moscow is populated by drunks and rogues who do nothing but cheat themselves and others out of money that will only be spent on earthly vices. Every cultural practice of the Muscovites, according to Olearius, seems to be stolen from either Western Europe or the Byzantine Empire – an entity whose legacy the Western Europeans and the Russians were competing to uphold. The German shows complete bias in his piece through constant compliments toward his own people followed by what are essentially insults against even the idea of Russian ‘culture’, stating that barbarians of the Muscovite variety possess little more than the practice of banditry and will leave it as their sole legacy. As can be seen in the provided opposing examples, the exact opposite is true: Muscovite civilization was a unique, non-European way of life that was apparently baffling to the unreceptive and fairly ignorant Olearius.
Works Cited
1 Auty, Robert and Dimitri Obolensky. Companion to Russian Studies, Vol. 1: An Introduction to Russian History. Cambridge University Press: 1976.
2. Trans. New World Translation Committee. New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York: Brooklyn, 1984.
3. Olearius, Adam; trans. Samuel H. Baron. The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1967.
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While I value Olearius's observations on cultural and court matters in Muscovy, everything he says has to be taken with a grain of salt because he's extremely prejudiced. His writing has the potential to skew a reader's views on Russian society which, despite its 'frontier' nature to the Europeans, was similar enough to life in most of Europe; essentially, Olearius had no real grounds to insult the Muscovites as he does repeatedly. I would love to get hold of his writings on the Persians with whom he also associated, as the cultural differences must produce even greater nigh-comedic prejudice.
---
Adam Olearius was a German ambassador, secretary and translator who traveled Eurasia during the seventeenth century per the request of Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. He was tasked with, essentially, the future of the new German settlement “Friedrichstadt”: a locale founded by Dutch settlers with Frederick III’s blessing in hopes of fostering international trade within the territorial bounds of Holstein-Gottorp. As the lead diplomat, Adam Olearius was tasked with forging trade routes and completing monetary agreements with powers that would have links to lucrative trade to the East such as Persia and Muscovy. Despite years of effort on the part of Olearius, Friedrichstadt would not garner the sort of economic activity that Frederick III hoped it would achieve and the diplomat returned to work as the duke’s archivist.
Olearius’s real contributions were historical works, most notably his narrative “Moskowitische und Persische Reise: die Holsteinische Gesandtschaft beim Schah, 1633-1639“which described the foreign peoples he encountered while traveling with his entourage across Eurasia. His entertaining commentary on the state of the Russian people under Muscovite rule, including physical features and social behavior, is very detailed and useful for a scholar hoping to garner foreign views of the Eastern Slavs throughout their historical journey. Outside of this context, however, the writings of Olearius on the subject of the Muscovites can be seen as fairly bigoted: despite the necessity that Muscovy plays in his diplomatic task, he shows little appreciation or understanding of the people or their culture. Olearius directs much criticism and abject insults upon the population of Muscovy which includes – as he sees it – rowdy and murderous slaves, sex-crazed peasants and hypocritical, foul-mouth authority figures. As will be displayed in this piece, Adam Olearius’s work is extensive and well-written yet remains uninformed as a result of the author’s inability to make sense of or draw comparisons to Russian culture. Several examples of this will be investigated, but by no means can the entire document be analyzed and picked apart: it would require a piece of at least the length of Olearius’s to do so.
The biggest flaw put forth by the German diplomat in his dealings with the Muscovites is his stark inability to regard them as possessors of a legitimate and unique way or life. The first example of this can be seen only sentences into the work when Olearius labels the Russians as having skin pigmentation similar to that of ‘other Europeans’ – an interesting statement on the base level that, with the continued exposure of Western Europeans to the Russians and the insurmountable level of difference between them, a Holy Roman diplomat would consider Russians to be Europeans . It is notable that the scholar Olearius is willing to consider the widely-reviled Muscovites as fellow Europeans – especially notable due to the history of hostility between the Russians and Western Christians observable in events such as the Baltic Crusades (in which the Germans Teutonic Order faced the Poles, who Olearius repeatedly compares to the Muscovites).
In equating the Russians with ‘other’ Europeans, Olearius seems to ignore the uniqueness of Russian culture and development that unquestionably sets Russians apart from their counterparts to the West. Russian culture is not truly European: although it is influenced by European sources such as Rurik and his Varangians who founded the famed Rus’ trading center Novgorod, Russian culture is influenced by much more. The steppe – a region that originated a way of life that can be seen as the polar opposite of settled Western Europe – had a major impact on Russian culture in that it delivered unto the divided Rus’ new military techniques, court behavior, a revamped geographical dispersion of its people as well as new concepts for taxation and legal statues. As reasoned by the historian Isabel de Madariaga, the infamous Oprichnina of Muscovy’s Ivan IV can be seen as one of the many continuing legacies of the steppe’s influence upon the Russian people – in this case, through the influence of Ivan’s second wife, Maria Temrjukovna . The influence of Byzantine culture can be seen readily in Muscovite art by observing their use of traditionally Byzantine religious icons and the Muscovite adherence to Orthodox Christianity which possesses intense historical and cultural links to the Byzantine Empire. Olearius himself notes this, but does it demeaningly by stating that the Russians go out of their way to imitate the Greek way of life in an effort to give themselves legitimacy as a people. Olearius cites the Russian practices of mimicking Byzantine appearances in the practices of wearing ‘traditional’ Greek clothing and growing out ones’ hair in order to express shame. In contrary to Olearius’s accusations, it is worth noting that within the general Christian tradition the growing of a man’s hair was considered a sign of dismay – thus, it was mostly certainly not a practice limited to the Byzantines .
“(7) For man ought not to have his head covered, as he is in God’s image and glory…
(14) Does not nature itself teach you that if a man has long hair, it is a dishonor to him…”
Olearius continues to display his incomprehension of Russian culture throughout the piece. It is true that the Russians have what may be considered an aversion to outside culture – an almost humorous observation when one considers the large amount of foreign substance that the Rus’ have adapted to their own use and added into the sphere of their own society. Olearius’s view on the subject of Russian xenophobia seems to shift drastically throughout the piece: for example, at one point he is stern in his accusations of the Russians as mimics of the Greeks (as seen above). Later in the piece, he states that the Russians have few similarities with them especially in terms of language or art . This is entirely incorrect: while the Russians did conform the Byzantine religious practices to their own dialect, that would not insinuate that the Russians have ignorance to the Greek language but would actually suggest the utter opposite. The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian culture in general adapted much from Byzantine art, drawing from influences such as Christian icons and architectural practices. In stating that the Russians did not regard Greek culture, he seems to try to convince the reader that the residents of Muscovy are undeserving of carrying on the Roman and Greek legacies in the form of Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine-esque court politics and ‘Eastern’ design. In the same section of his narrative, Olearius cites examples of the Russian aversion to Classical avenues of effort such as the sciences: a Russian chancellor misunderstands the scholar’s attempts to stave off boredom through scientific antics as sorcery and brand a musically-inclined Dutch barber in a windy chamber as a heretic when the skeleton on his wall begins to move under ‘supernatural’ influence . These examples of Russian ignorance to foreign behavior are in contrast to Olearius’s constant branding of almost every Russian behavior he mentions as against the will of God and shameful to not only themselves but to their divine lord – a woefully hypocritical viewpoint from the learned Holsteinian.
It is possible that the only comparisons of substance Olearius can make are those between the uncivilized Muscovites and his own cultured German people. He cites the example of one ‘Nikita Ivanovich Romanov’, a wealth Russian xenophile whose appreciation for German culture goes misunderstood by Moscow’s Patriarch, who tricks him into removing the his European garb and disavowing it; to start the next paragraph, Olearius brands the Russians as barbarians and later says that the Russian people put little thought into foreigners . He later goes on to discuss the validity of holding skeletons for medical use (a more that Germans engaged in yet one the Russians were wary of, as can be seen above), the persecution of foreigners by Russian judges and the inability of Muscovites to regard foreigners as anything but a victim of their wiles. Going on, the ambassador states in one instance that they are a clever folk who do nothing but attempt to backstab and shame their rivals, be they neighbors or strangers, while gaining as much as possible. In the words of Jakob Ulfeldt as quoted by Olearius, Russians are “divorced… from all virtue”; he goes on for quite some time in his narrative describing the dishonesty of the Russians in attempting to achieve societal esteem and court positions . Further on, Olearius states that the Russians “are by nature cruel and fit only for slavery, [so] they must constantly be kept under a cruel and harsh yoke of restraint…” , regarding Russia’s tendency toward authoritarianism and absolutism as a show of their lack of civility. These qualities are not solely Russian traits but can be seen across the West: even a cursory knowledge of then-contemporary Italian political science piece Il Principe is a prime example, suggesting cruelty and fear as viable methods of rule in what Olearius would call ‘civilized Europe’. In addition, Olearius is not in Muscovy for the simple reason of cultural observation or societal analysis: he is among the Muscovites in order to secure politically-motivated financial matters with their ruling class. In his criticism of the Muscovites as particularly voracious toward foreigners in their attempts to gain things from them, he seems ignores the fact that he is doing the exact same thing and further invalidates himself. Olearius goes on: he compares the Russians’ lack of honor to the Germans in discussing the Muscovite inability to duel honorably as well as the offenses to the senses that no true German could bear that are commonplace in Moscow; the Muscovite tendency to disavow wine for cruder liquors is also discussed as an example of their barbarity . As an aside, he criticizes the Russian tendency to drink several times throughout his piece; he does not mention, however, the lack of refinement that almost every pre-modern society (including the Germans) shows upon the imbibing of illicit substance.
The true hypocrisy and bias of Olearius comes to pass in an observation he makes in one of the many comparisons between Muscovite and European (specifically German) civilization. In this statement, he suggests that the Russians are “very receptive” toward German techniques in the schools of artistic expression and science – a direct noncorrelation to his previous expressed beliefs that the Russians were in no way interested in such things. Olearius continues, assuming that Muscovite observers to Western forging and artwork will do all they can to steal the methods of foreigners . Olearius disregards the Western tendency to mimic technology and artwork throughout history: from the Romans putting to use Greek naval techniques to medieval Europeans copying Chinese and Middle Eastern use of gunpowder, Western Europe has had a massive history of ‘copycat’ behavior. It is possible that this statement is the opus of Olearius’s hypocritical and bigoted beliefs: while the Russian people are entirely unreceptive to all foreigners and lack culture in entirety, they are nevertheless enamored with German civilization and do all they can to plagiarize it for their own use.
Olearius’s work shines in its total inability to even touch upon the legitimacy of Muscovy’s culture outside of it being a copycat amalgamation of most groups that border the Russians. According to Baron’s translation, Moscow is populated by drunks and rogues who do nothing but cheat themselves and others out of money that will only be spent on earthly vices. Every cultural practice of the Muscovites, according to Olearius, seems to be stolen from either Western Europe or the Byzantine Empire – an entity whose legacy the Western Europeans and the Russians were competing to uphold. The German shows complete bias in his piece through constant compliments toward his own people followed by what are essentially insults against even the idea of Russian ‘culture’, stating that barbarians of the Muscovite variety possess little more than the practice of banditry and will leave it as their sole legacy. As can be seen in the provided opposing examples, the exact opposite is true: Muscovite civilization was a unique, non-European way of life that was apparently baffling to the unreceptive and fairly ignorant Olearius.
Works Cited
1 Auty, Robert and Dimitri Obolensky. Companion to Russian Studies, Vol. 1: An Introduction to Russian History. Cambridge University Press: 1976.
2. Trans. New World Translation Committee. New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York: Brooklyn, 1984.
3. Olearius, Adam; trans. Samuel H. Baron. The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1967.
---
While I value Olearius's observations on cultural and court matters in Muscovy, everything he says has to be taken with a grain of salt because he's extremely prejudiced. His writing has the potential to skew a reader's views on Russian society which, despite its 'frontier' nature to the Europeans, was similar enough to life in most of Europe; essentially, Olearius had no real grounds to insult the Muscovites as he does repeatedly. I would love to get hold of his writings on the Persians with whom he also associated, as the cultural differences must produce even greater nigh-comedic prejudice.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Russian Leader Goes Crazy, Kills Indiscriminately, Isn't Stalin
Well then who is it? It's Ivan, the guy Stalin imitated in order to get his kicks. My professor really liked this paper - it's an analytical book review of Isabel de Madariaga's Ivan The Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. I wasn't sure how well I did on it but the instructor's high praise bolstered how I felt about it.
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An utterly brutal and undoubtedly troubled man, Grand Prince – and later Tsar – Ivan IV of Moscow stands as one of the starkest and least human personalities of Russia’s authoritarian history. As investigated in Isabel de Madariaga’s Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia, the paranoia of the Tsar can be explained as a result of the many negative influences he felt along his life. From the beginning of Ivan’s life until his death, intrigue in the courts lead to death among his family and confidantes, forcing him to utilize similar underhandedness in order to regain his royal power after years of his supporters being crushed publicly. Ivan’s mental state would continue to deteriorate as a result of possible court intrigues: the death of his beloved wife Anastasia soon after his own brush with death quickly led to his wedding with the widely-despised ‘pagan’ princess Maria Temrjukovna, who acted harshly toward Ivan and may have incited him to poison her for political gain, showing the full change in Ivan’s personality over the course of two marriages. Maria would only be the second of Ivan’s eventual eight wives, all of whom would suffer at the hands of Ivan. His cruelty, which bloomed during his youth as he pointlessly ended lives with nary a care, became center stage during his rule as he ravaged any and all potential rivals to his power (as well as the general public) with the use of his Oprichnina, a personal “state” consisting of totally loyal, notably savage subjects; these men would become known for their wanton slaughters of entire populations in locales such as Novgorod and Tver. Later, Ivan IV’s sanity collapsed sharply and, with it, did the stability his harshness had achieved: opponents such as the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania encroached upon Ivan’s borders as he acted wildly at home, committing acts such as the accidental murder of his son Ivan, granting the position of heir to his other son Feodor – a future Tsar regarded as aloof, politically uninterested and, in the opinion of de Madariaga, mentally unsound. Fedor’s inability to not only rule but also reproduce would eventually collapse the nigh-ancient dynasty of Rurik, leading to the tumultuous Time of Troubles. It is very evident that through Ivan’s life, most specifically his developmental years and young adulthood, negative influences played a major part in the shaping of his personality: his mental instability, self-importance and cruel authoritarianism can all be seen as results of events in his youth. Despite his political skill, reform-based management preferences and general intelligence, Ivan IV would forever be remembered for his maddening paranoia – which, as seen in Isabel de Madariaga’s seminal Ivan the Terrible, originated early in Ivan’s life as a result of the dangerous environment into which Ivan was born.
The emphasis of this review will be based on de Madariaga’s focus on the youth of Ivan IV, for good reason: the author places a special importance upon the early experiences of the future Tsar of All Russia, citing many examples that would be repeated through Ivan’s life which would come to characterize his personality and, in general, his reign. Court treachery and barbarity toward rivals were heavily experienced by Ivan during his youth – the offenses experienced by Ivan and his brother Iuri at the hands of the Shiusky’s during the Regency Council period bred contempt in young Ivan, giving him reason to repeat the actions of that period upon later rivals. The direct cruelty Ivan experienced also fueled that part of his personality: he exhibited rage toward defenseless creatures and, later in his youth, adult subjects. This cruelty would come to characterize his rule: grisly, widespread executions as a result of paranoia were commonplace. Other examples as provided by de Madariaga and analyzed in this piece will show the necessity of the author’s emphasis upon Ivan IV’s youth.
De Madariaga rings true in her belief that the early youth of Ivan IV is rife with situations that may eventually breed a contemptible, paranoid individual. The very first of these examples would be the Regency Council set up by his father Vasily III and his mother Elena Glinskaya: as easily observable by Ivan, his importance to his parents and their supporters overshadowed the stability and potential acquiescence of the boyars – rivals to Ivan IV’s reign such as the Shiusky family were suppressed with physical harm, and insults toward the honor of rival princes were made on a constant basis (and usually followed by arrests) . This sort of background may have granted Ivan IV an inflated sense of self importance; the later influence of Vasily III’s ally Metropolitan Makarii, too, can be seen as a major influence in this regard. One of Ivan’s only true outlets during this time of his life was the church, where latent delusions of grandeur in young Ivan were influenced heavily by the teachings of Makarii, whose words may have convinced Ivan that he possessed the favor of God. Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod, was also responsible for introducing Ivan to the Poems of Repentance, a series of hymns focused on the admittance of mortal sins; de Madariaga’s comments on the appropriateness of the subject matter in pertinence to Ivan’s behavior is a display of the message she is accurately attempting to portray in her branding of Ivan as a disturbed individual . De Madariaga makes note of Makarii’s impact on Ivan’s religious self-importance quite often; it is a valid point, however, in that Ivan used his position to assume the title of Tsar, a notably non-secular role. In doing so, Ivan attempts to place himself into the same role as the Byzantine Emperor or, in the West, Holy Roman Emperor: a monarch whose role was bestowed upon him by the will of God. This action by Ivan is further evidence as provided by de Madariaga of a potential for mental instability in terms of an extreme inflated ego.
De Madariaga mentions that through this holy outlet Ivan may have also fell under the spell of Vlad Tepes Dracul, the infamous Wallachian voivod whose shocking actions against court rivals and his Turkish enemies – done so in the name of protecting his own assets – could have dictated to Ivan the proper way of responding to internal threats . Another example of a negative influence upon Ivan can be seen when, in the midst of the Regency Council period, Ivan’s hale and hearty mother Elena died suddenly – poisoned, by de Madariaga’s estimation, and mourned only by Ivan . The death of Elena and the succession of neglectful political rivals undoubtedly had a major impact on Ivan, now eight years old. De Madariaga’s mentioning of this as an impact upon Ivan’s personality is dreadfully important: it is the first true exposure of Ivan to human cruelty. The result of his mother’s death leads to the virtual abandonment of Ivan and his brother Iuri by the political structure until his adulthood – leading Ivan, naturally, to become a frustrated individual with a skewed sense of self-importance. Madariaga’s claims make it plain to see from where Ivan’s youthful habits, including animal torture, began to originate . Later, Ivan acts out further against defenseless prey when he and his friends act as criminals and chase innocent women with little reason other than malice. He would go on to execute three princes as a result of boredom during army exercise. These examples may strike the reader as similar to Ivan’s later origination and administering of the ‘Oprichnina’ system, which functioned similarly in its brigand-esque activity and intentional harassment of non-guilty subjects. Without this build-up, de Madariaga would be hard pressed to explain the mean behavior exhibited by Ivan later in life.
Ivan is seen accurately through his youth by de Madariaga as a cunning yet overly suspicious individual, even in his youth. As discussed earlier, Ivan was influenced negatively through the intrigue of the Muscovite court; this can be seen through the death of his mother and neglect at the hands of the rival Shiusky party. Despite this, Ivan showed a quick aptitude for adherence to such underhanded behavior: before his marriage to Elena Glinskaya, some of Ivan’s letters as well as other documents support harsh actions against former friends and the families of rivals that strike a tone similar to the traitorous methods put to use by the Regency Council in the suppression of rivals to the Rurikid power structure . De Madariaga’s special mentioning of this event harkens to Ivan’s later years in which he would brutally attack and destroy entire lineages that he considered, despite the reality of their position, rivals to his own power. The Oprichnina were a further example of this: formed originally as a separate ruling body free from the influence of the plotting boyars, the organization was eventually put to use as an oppressive deterrent against any who opposed Ivan’s rule (or who he suspected of doing so, factually or not). Through this and other mentioned examples, de Madariaga makes clear that Ivan’s youth is just a foreshadowing to later events: the future Tsar’s early years would set the stage for a Russia at the whim of a man, quick to act, whose suspicions would rule his realm.
De Madariaga’s ability to articulate her case on the subject of Ivan IV’s development toward the desolate historical figure he now represents is admirable in the least. The lengthy cases she makes pertaining to Ivan’s religious importance are central to his own self-view and assumption of formerly Byzantine religious importance. His cruelty is explained truthfully as being a result of the behavior he was exposed to and the treatment he dealt with at the hands of early opponents; this maturing negative behavior would become a hallmark of his name. His political maneuverings are simply an extension of his harshness: his consistent actions against any perceived threats and his institutionalization of the Oprichnina were executed as a result of the behavior for which he became known. It is not only the treatment he was victim to that is to blame for his identity as a vindictive, paranoid ruler but also how he acted unchecked due to his position – de Madariaga’s discussion of his youth show this, despite how early on in his life the events occurred.
Works Cited
1 de Madariaga, Isabel. Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 1981.
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That's a wrap. Hope you enjoyed the "gripping narrative".
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An utterly brutal and undoubtedly troubled man, Grand Prince – and later Tsar – Ivan IV of Moscow stands as one of the starkest and least human personalities of Russia’s authoritarian history. As investigated in Isabel de Madariaga’s Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia, the paranoia of the Tsar can be explained as a result of the many negative influences he felt along his life. From the beginning of Ivan’s life until his death, intrigue in the courts lead to death among his family and confidantes, forcing him to utilize similar underhandedness in order to regain his royal power after years of his supporters being crushed publicly. Ivan’s mental state would continue to deteriorate as a result of possible court intrigues: the death of his beloved wife Anastasia soon after his own brush with death quickly led to his wedding with the widely-despised ‘pagan’ princess Maria Temrjukovna, who acted harshly toward Ivan and may have incited him to poison her for political gain, showing the full change in Ivan’s personality over the course of two marriages. Maria would only be the second of Ivan’s eventual eight wives, all of whom would suffer at the hands of Ivan. His cruelty, which bloomed during his youth as he pointlessly ended lives with nary a care, became center stage during his rule as he ravaged any and all potential rivals to his power (as well as the general public) with the use of his Oprichnina, a personal “state” consisting of totally loyal, notably savage subjects; these men would become known for their wanton slaughters of entire populations in locales such as Novgorod and Tver. Later, Ivan IV’s sanity collapsed sharply and, with it, did the stability his harshness had achieved: opponents such as the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania encroached upon Ivan’s borders as he acted wildly at home, committing acts such as the accidental murder of his son Ivan, granting the position of heir to his other son Feodor – a future Tsar regarded as aloof, politically uninterested and, in the opinion of de Madariaga, mentally unsound. Fedor’s inability to not only rule but also reproduce would eventually collapse the nigh-ancient dynasty of Rurik, leading to the tumultuous Time of Troubles. It is very evident that through Ivan’s life, most specifically his developmental years and young adulthood, negative influences played a major part in the shaping of his personality: his mental instability, self-importance and cruel authoritarianism can all be seen as results of events in his youth. Despite his political skill, reform-based management preferences and general intelligence, Ivan IV would forever be remembered for his maddening paranoia – which, as seen in Isabel de Madariaga’s seminal Ivan the Terrible, originated early in Ivan’s life as a result of the dangerous environment into which Ivan was born.
The emphasis of this review will be based on de Madariaga’s focus on the youth of Ivan IV, for good reason: the author places a special importance upon the early experiences of the future Tsar of All Russia, citing many examples that would be repeated through Ivan’s life which would come to characterize his personality and, in general, his reign. Court treachery and barbarity toward rivals were heavily experienced by Ivan during his youth – the offenses experienced by Ivan and his brother Iuri at the hands of the Shiusky’s during the Regency Council period bred contempt in young Ivan, giving him reason to repeat the actions of that period upon later rivals. The direct cruelty Ivan experienced also fueled that part of his personality: he exhibited rage toward defenseless creatures and, later in his youth, adult subjects. This cruelty would come to characterize his rule: grisly, widespread executions as a result of paranoia were commonplace. Other examples as provided by de Madariaga and analyzed in this piece will show the necessity of the author’s emphasis upon Ivan IV’s youth.
De Madariaga rings true in her belief that the early youth of Ivan IV is rife with situations that may eventually breed a contemptible, paranoid individual. The very first of these examples would be the Regency Council set up by his father Vasily III and his mother Elena Glinskaya: as easily observable by Ivan, his importance to his parents and their supporters overshadowed the stability and potential acquiescence of the boyars – rivals to Ivan IV’s reign such as the Shiusky family were suppressed with physical harm, and insults toward the honor of rival princes were made on a constant basis (and usually followed by arrests) . This sort of background may have granted Ivan IV an inflated sense of self importance; the later influence of Vasily III’s ally Metropolitan Makarii, too, can be seen as a major influence in this regard. One of Ivan’s only true outlets during this time of his life was the church, where latent delusions of grandeur in young Ivan were influenced heavily by the teachings of Makarii, whose words may have convinced Ivan that he possessed the favor of God. Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod, was also responsible for introducing Ivan to the Poems of Repentance, a series of hymns focused on the admittance of mortal sins; de Madariaga’s comments on the appropriateness of the subject matter in pertinence to Ivan’s behavior is a display of the message she is accurately attempting to portray in her branding of Ivan as a disturbed individual . De Madariaga makes note of Makarii’s impact on Ivan’s religious self-importance quite often; it is a valid point, however, in that Ivan used his position to assume the title of Tsar, a notably non-secular role. In doing so, Ivan attempts to place himself into the same role as the Byzantine Emperor or, in the West, Holy Roman Emperor: a monarch whose role was bestowed upon him by the will of God. This action by Ivan is further evidence as provided by de Madariaga of a potential for mental instability in terms of an extreme inflated ego.
De Madariaga mentions that through this holy outlet Ivan may have also fell under the spell of Vlad Tepes Dracul, the infamous Wallachian voivod whose shocking actions against court rivals and his Turkish enemies – done so in the name of protecting his own assets – could have dictated to Ivan the proper way of responding to internal threats . Another example of a negative influence upon Ivan can be seen when, in the midst of the Regency Council period, Ivan’s hale and hearty mother Elena died suddenly – poisoned, by de Madariaga’s estimation, and mourned only by Ivan . The death of Elena and the succession of neglectful political rivals undoubtedly had a major impact on Ivan, now eight years old. De Madariaga’s mentioning of this as an impact upon Ivan’s personality is dreadfully important: it is the first true exposure of Ivan to human cruelty. The result of his mother’s death leads to the virtual abandonment of Ivan and his brother Iuri by the political structure until his adulthood – leading Ivan, naturally, to become a frustrated individual with a skewed sense of self-importance. Madariaga’s claims make it plain to see from where Ivan’s youthful habits, including animal torture, began to originate . Later, Ivan acts out further against defenseless prey when he and his friends act as criminals and chase innocent women with little reason other than malice. He would go on to execute three princes as a result of boredom during army exercise. These examples may strike the reader as similar to Ivan’s later origination and administering of the ‘Oprichnina’ system, which functioned similarly in its brigand-esque activity and intentional harassment of non-guilty subjects. Without this build-up, de Madariaga would be hard pressed to explain the mean behavior exhibited by Ivan later in life.
Ivan is seen accurately through his youth by de Madariaga as a cunning yet overly suspicious individual, even in his youth. As discussed earlier, Ivan was influenced negatively through the intrigue of the Muscovite court; this can be seen through the death of his mother and neglect at the hands of the rival Shiusky party. Despite this, Ivan showed a quick aptitude for adherence to such underhanded behavior: before his marriage to Elena Glinskaya, some of Ivan’s letters as well as other documents support harsh actions against former friends and the families of rivals that strike a tone similar to the traitorous methods put to use by the Regency Council in the suppression of rivals to the Rurikid power structure . De Madariaga’s special mentioning of this event harkens to Ivan’s later years in which he would brutally attack and destroy entire lineages that he considered, despite the reality of their position, rivals to his own power. The Oprichnina were a further example of this: formed originally as a separate ruling body free from the influence of the plotting boyars, the organization was eventually put to use as an oppressive deterrent against any who opposed Ivan’s rule (or who he suspected of doing so, factually or not). Through this and other mentioned examples, de Madariaga makes clear that Ivan’s youth is just a foreshadowing to later events: the future Tsar’s early years would set the stage for a Russia at the whim of a man, quick to act, whose suspicions would rule his realm.
De Madariaga’s ability to articulate her case on the subject of Ivan IV’s development toward the desolate historical figure he now represents is admirable in the least. The lengthy cases she makes pertaining to Ivan’s religious importance are central to his own self-view and assumption of formerly Byzantine religious importance. His cruelty is explained truthfully as being a result of the behavior he was exposed to and the treatment he dealt with at the hands of early opponents; this maturing negative behavior would become a hallmark of his name. His political maneuverings are simply an extension of his harshness: his consistent actions against any perceived threats and his institutionalization of the Oprichnina were executed as a result of the behavior for which he became known. It is not only the treatment he was victim to that is to blame for his identity as a vindictive, paranoid ruler but also how he acted unchecked due to his position – de Madariaga’s discussion of his youth show this, despite how early on in his life the events occurred.
Works Cited
1 de Madariaga, Isabel. Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 1981.
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That's a wrap. Hope you enjoyed the "gripping narrative".
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Summer Is Done; With It, My Inability To Post
Expect a flood of new posts in the next few days, now that I am able to actually have things to put up. Thank goodness for school - I would atrophy without it.
Here's some article comparisons for Russian history. I was on a kick for the Khazars, a Jewish(!)-led Medieval nomadic group based just to the northeast of the Black Sea. I strayed from that and showed my love for colonialism and adventure, etc etc etc in the second article but it all turned out well. My professor's comments on the work included his admiration for my position as an 'archival junkie'.
The articles are George V. Lantzeff's "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion" (The American Slavic and East Europe Review, Vol. 6, pp1-10) and Richard Foltz's "Judaism and the Silk Route" (The History Teacher, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp9-16). Enjoy.
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Lantzeff’s work focuses on the colonial policies of competing Russian principalities from the tenth century to the fourteenth century. The wealthy Novgorodian Republic and the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal – an entity that would become the Grand Duchy of Muscovy – were two major participants in the conflict. Initially a discussion of the Novgorodian tribute collected from tribal groups up to and including the Ural Mountains, Lantzeff expounds upon the rough competition between the Republic and Rostov-Suzdal on a martial and political level. Rostov-Suzdal’s founding of Nizhny Novgorod, a major part of Rus’ colonialism, spelled the end of that era as the Tatars invaded.
Lantzeff does a fine job of explaining the fairly unexplored area of Rus’ colonialism in his “Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion”. It is a surprise on an academic level that such little emphasis is put on early Russian colonialism, considering the founding of Novgorod as an essentially Varangian possession as well as Russia’s future as an empire known for its frontier expansionism. Considering the generally unaddressed nature of the issue, Lantzeff’s work is a suitable introduction to pre-Mongol Russian expansion to the east: it shows the amateur Russian historian that even outside of the traditional territory of rival principalities, the struggles between the territories of European Russia were long-reaching.
The reasons for and background surrounding Rus’ colonialism provided by Lantzeff are clear enough to the casual reader. The Novgorodians sought new resources to continue the building of their mercantile empire, and Rostov-Suzdal finally acted on the greedy eye it had cast on the colonial possessions of the rival trade republic. Lantzeff mentions repeatedly, and rightfully so, the originality and importance of the Novgorodians’ frontiersmen-esque methods in establishing colonies and charging tribute from the indigenous people and settlers: it would be a technique put to use by not only the Russians in time to come but by almost all other colonial powers as an introductory method of gaining regional control. Lantzeff’s use of Russian chronicles in describing the lands being colonized by the Rus’ inspires thoughts of a semi-mythical far-off land. Admittedly, the distance to be crossed between say, Novgorod and the Ural Mountains, is fairly impressive; the descriptions given by Lantzeff only enhance this quality. His use of statistics and official records, too, add to the scope of the conflict: the participation of almost a hundred princes in an alliance aiming to grab up Novgorod’s riches, the large amounts of captives as a result of martial actions between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal as well as the surprisingly consistent dates between attacks put the situation into perspective.
The lack of much detail outside of statistics and basic reasoning in Lantzeff’s work did prevent the article from shining in a particular fashion. The author could have gone much more in-depth with his work and seemed to toe the line between basic historical information and further description that would have helped his work significantly. True, Lantzeff covered the necessary facts of the situation: he addressed the “who and where” as well as whatever else background was needed for his work but did not go into detail. An example of this would be his addressing of the actual battles between the Novgorodians and the Rostov-Suzdalians, as well as the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Volga Bulgars: there was no discussion of battle tactics or superior arms, nor was there a record of the obvious value of raiding gained by the future Muscovites (although Lantzeff does mention the garnering of the spoils). The author seems to ignore the grand amount of comparisons that could be made between the Rostov-Suzdalians and their later Muscovite counterparts who instituted a fairly similar system of colonialism. Lantzeff spoke of Kiev’s preference toward Novgorod as opposed to Rostov-Suzdal as well as the general ire directed at Novgorod from the other princely states but did not discuss any background – namely, that Novgorod regularly paid heed as well as tribute to Kiev due to its powerful position in regional economics and politics (a trend that would end very soon as the Mongols made their way westward) and that the two powers relied on each other for economic and military means. A final overarching fact that Lantzeff seemed to ignore was the political clout of Novgorod throughout the ages. Its economic power, geographic position, relationship with Kiev and general importance as a Rus’ principality allowed Novgorod much leeway in terms of its actions (political or martial) and monetary ventures, which Lantzeff could have addressed as it is a factor of importance in the colonial competition between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal. After all, Novgorod participated heartily in Mongol politics after the Horde had effectively collapsed the other Russian principalities – a fact that Lantzeff only brushes on at the end of the article.
“Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion” is an interesting and informative article that does a decent job of explaining the very early colonial ventures of the Russian people. While Lantzeff accomplishes the task of providing a suitable background to the conflict between the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Novgorodians, he does not delve deep enough into the situation to sate a reader expecting more than an overview of the events. On the whole, however, the article is most certainly an acceptable piece of work and has no problem gaining the attention of a reader who is new to the information.
Works Cited
Lantzeff, George V. "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion." The American Slavic and East European Review 6.3 (1947): 1-10.
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Here is the other - this is the one that pertained (vaguely) to the Khazars, but more to medieval Jews in general.
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“Judaism and the Silk Route” is an article pertaining to the impact made upon the Silk Route by followers of Judaism throughout history. Richard Foltz examines Judaism’s cohabitation with local beliefs including Iranian ideology, a factor that allowed Judaism to spread along the route and not only give birth to small pockets of Jewish traders along the Eurasian beltline but also influenced indigenous peoples’ beliefs and actions. Foltz also speaks about the adaptive ability of the Jews in the face of Islamization in Central Asia, leaving them to be the only non-Muslim religious minority in the area.
A positive aspect of Richard Foltz’s work on this subject is that it is immersive in its scope. Foltz’s work on “Judaism and the Silk Route” is one of the few examples of academic work that I have seem that is not neck-deep in discussion pertaining to the limitation and oppression of Judaic merchants and operatives on the Eurasian landmass. Rather, to someone who is new to the subject of continent-spanning Jewry, it is a welcome matter: throughout history, followers of Judaism have fostered transcontinental trade on a scale as massive as the almost fantastical Silk Route (or Road). Foltz starts with a historical background of the Levant and the Middle East pertaining to the Jews, specifically their time in Mesopotamia under the heel of the Babylonians and the flowering of Jewish activity under Persian influence. The foundations of several major cities in Iran can be sourced to Jewish ex-slaves and even the ideology of Persia has influenced and been influenced by Judaism: the systems of belief share similar holidays and legends pertaining to the region, a fine example of the influence and prospering of Jews in the region. Foltz’s detailed explanation of the Radanites and their power base in the Mediterranean shows that, despite the seemingly negative reputation given to European Jews, they were still a force to be reckoned with from an economic standpoint.
As Foltz mentions, the various converts to Judaism along the Silk Route are a very interesting (and sometimes peculiar) aspect of the Jews’ widespread nature. The actions of Mediterranean Jews led them to communication with the “Khazars” – a nomadic Turkic group centered on the northeast shore of the Black Sea who hoped to trade slaves with the Jews. Foltz’s use of the Turkish proverb, “There is no Iranian merchant without a Turkish associate, just as there is no cap without a head” strikes home the relationship between the two differently-civilized worlds of sedentary people and nomadic people in terms of a symbiotic relationship. The Khazar elite eventually converted to Judaism in order to gain the further benefit of what they perceived as ‘religious neutrality’ – that is to say, they would be more privileged than their shamanistic steppe kin due to foreign traders’ familiarity with the Jewish people. This is a very interesting factor: a nomadic group, normally suited to raiding and on-the-move living, wished to gain partial immunity against oppressors by converting to a religion that most viewed as a trader’s ideology. As a student of nomadic history, that concept is a very exciting one and is definitely something I will have to investigate in other regions such as Eastern Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The influence of the Jews on indigenous peoples (and vice versa) as well as the founding of Jewish communities along the Silk Route fosters a uniquely interesting chain of settlements and communication across Eurasia – from Marseille in France to Kaifeng in China.
The positive nature of Foltz’s work here is overshadowed by the fact that little to no mention is made of anti-Jewish sentiment in the regions that they begin to influence. Throughout the early tenure of the Jewish people in Persian lands, a great amount of good was done for the Jews by the Persian royalty; a case for this would be Cyrus the Great’s order to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. However, they were also placed under heavy scrutiny: early Zoroastrian texts list Judaism among the many beliefs that its follower had oppressed. Later dynasties in Persia did not necessarily oppress the Jews but actively sought to limit any Jewish gains toward positions of authority. The large Jewish minority in Central Asia, while influential and long-lasting, did attract negative attention – the Arab conquests resulted in Bukharan Jews having to pay exorbitant taxes, the Mongol Invasions decreased the number of Central Asian followers of Judaism greatly and eventually the hardline Islamic nomadic tribes of the region would turn against the Jews through forced conversion and violence. Foltz fails to mention these events entirely, and thus is not even able to remark upon the fact that one of the only reasons that the Jews were targeted by their oppressors in Central-to-Eastern Eurasia was their perceived higher wealth due to trade along the Silk Route.
“Judaism and the Silk Route” is definitely written in a fashion to ignore the negatives while focusing more on the positive impacts and receptions of the Jewish people operating on and as a result of the Silk Route. While he completely glosses over negative events, Foltz’s work is informative and interesting to someone who may have not been aware of the far-reaching nature of Judaism or the impact of Classical-to-Pre-Modern Jews upon trade and ideology. Foltz’s talk of a continent-spanning Jewish community not suspicion or oppression is sorely wishful thinking across the wide expanse of history; however, that is not to say that for a time it did not exist and prosper.
Works Cited
Foltz, Richard. "Judaism and the Silk Route." The History Teacher 32 (1998): 9-16.
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I don't know why the formatting comes out so weirdly on these, but I'm not particularly troubled by it. If anyone's bothering to read, I hope they won't mind.
Here's some article comparisons for Russian history. I was on a kick for the Khazars, a Jewish(!)-led Medieval nomadic group based just to the northeast of the Black Sea. I strayed from that and showed my love for colonialism and adventure, etc etc etc in the second article but it all turned out well. My professor's comments on the work included his admiration for my position as an 'archival junkie'.
The articles are George V. Lantzeff's "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion" (The American Slavic and East Europe Review, Vol. 6, pp1-10) and Richard Foltz's "Judaism and the Silk Route" (The History Teacher, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp9-16). Enjoy.
---
Lantzeff’s work focuses on the colonial policies of competing Russian principalities from the tenth century to the fourteenth century. The wealthy Novgorodian Republic and the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal – an entity that would become the Grand Duchy of Muscovy – were two major participants in the conflict. Initially a discussion of the Novgorodian tribute collected from tribal groups up to and including the Ural Mountains, Lantzeff expounds upon the rough competition between the Republic and Rostov-Suzdal on a martial and political level. Rostov-Suzdal’s founding of Nizhny Novgorod, a major part of Rus’ colonialism, spelled the end of that era as the Tatars invaded.
Lantzeff does a fine job of explaining the fairly unexplored area of Rus’ colonialism in his “Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion”. It is a surprise on an academic level that such little emphasis is put on early Russian colonialism, considering the founding of Novgorod as an essentially Varangian possession as well as Russia’s future as an empire known for its frontier expansionism. Considering the generally unaddressed nature of the issue, Lantzeff’s work is a suitable introduction to pre-Mongol Russian expansion to the east: it shows the amateur Russian historian that even outside of the traditional territory of rival principalities, the struggles between the territories of European Russia were long-reaching.
The reasons for and background surrounding Rus’ colonialism provided by Lantzeff are clear enough to the casual reader. The Novgorodians sought new resources to continue the building of their mercantile empire, and Rostov-Suzdal finally acted on the greedy eye it had cast on the colonial possessions of the rival trade republic. Lantzeff mentions repeatedly, and rightfully so, the originality and importance of the Novgorodians’ frontiersmen-esque methods in establishing colonies and charging tribute from the indigenous people and settlers: it would be a technique put to use by not only the Russians in time to come but by almost all other colonial powers as an introductory method of gaining regional control. Lantzeff’s use of Russian chronicles in describing the lands being colonized by the Rus’ inspires thoughts of a semi-mythical far-off land. Admittedly, the distance to be crossed between say, Novgorod and the Ural Mountains, is fairly impressive; the descriptions given by Lantzeff only enhance this quality. His use of statistics and official records, too, add to the scope of the conflict: the participation of almost a hundred princes in an alliance aiming to grab up Novgorod’s riches, the large amounts of captives as a result of martial actions between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal as well as the surprisingly consistent dates between attacks put the situation into perspective.
The lack of much detail outside of statistics and basic reasoning in Lantzeff’s work did prevent the article from shining in a particular fashion. The author could have gone much more in-depth with his work and seemed to toe the line between basic historical information and further description that would have helped his work significantly. True, Lantzeff covered the necessary facts of the situation: he addressed the “who and where” as well as whatever else background was needed for his work but did not go into detail. An example of this would be his addressing of the actual battles between the Novgorodians and the Rostov-Suzdalians, as well as the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Volga Bulgars: there was no discussion of battle tactics or superior arms, nor was there a record of the obvious value of raiding gained by the future Muscovites (although Lantzeff does mention the garnering of the spoils). The author seems to ignore the grand amount of comparisons that could be made between the Rostov-Suzdalians and their later Muscovite counterparts who instituted a fairly similar system of colonialism. Lantzeff spoke of Kiev’s preference toward Novgorod as opposed to Rostov-Suzdal as well as the general ire directed at Novgorod from the other princely states but did not discuss any background – namely, that Novgorod regularly paid heed as well as tribute to Kiev due to its powerful position in regional economics and politics (a trend that would end very soon as the Mongols made their way westward) and that the two powers relied on each other for economic and military means. A final overarching fact that Lantzeff seemed to ignore was the political clout of Novgorod throughout the ages. Its economic power, geographic position, relationship with Kiev and general importance as a Rus’ principality allowed Novgorod much leeway in terms of its actions (political or martial) and monetary ventures, which Lantzeff could have addressed as it is a factor of importance in the colonial competition between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal. After all, Novgorod participated heartily in Mongol politics after the Horde had effectively collapsed the other Russian principalities – a fact that Lantzeff only brushes on at the end of the article.
“Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion” is an interesting and informative article that does a decent job of explaining the very early colonial ventures of the Russian people. While Lantzeff accomplishes the task of providing a suitable background to the conflict between the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Novgorodians, he does not delve deep enough into the situation to sate a reader expecting more than an overview of the events. On the whole, however, the article is most certainly an acceptable piece of work and has no problem gaining the attention of a reader who is new to the information.
Works Cited
Lantzeff, George V. "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion." The American Slavic and East European Review 6.3 (1947): 1-10.
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Here is the other - this is the one that pertained (vaguely) to the Khazars, but more to medieval Jews in general.
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“Judaism and the Silk Route” is an article pertaining to the impact made upon the Silk Route by followers of Judaism throughout history. Richard Foltz examines Judaism’s cohabitation with local beliefs including Iranian ideology, a factor that allowed Judaism to spread along the route and not only give birth to small pockets of Jewish traders along the Eurasian beltline but also influenced indigenous peoples’ beliefs and actions. Foltz also speaks about the adaptive ability of the Jews in the face of Islamization in Central Asia, leaving them to be the only non-Muslim religious minority in the area.
A positive aspect of Richard Foltz’s work on this subject is that it is immersive in its scope. Foltz’s work on “Judaism and the Silk Route” is one of the few examples of academic work that I have seem that is not neck-deep in discussion pertaining to the limitation and oppression of Judaic merchants and operatives on the Eurasian landmass. Rather, to someone who is new to the subject of continent-spanning Jewry, it is a welcome matter: throughout history, followers of Judaism have fostered transcontinental trade on a scale as massive as the almost fantastical Silk Route (or Road). Foltz starts with a historical background of the Levant and the Middle East pertaining to the Jews, specifically their time in Mesopotamia under the heel of the Babylonians and the flowering of Jewish activity under Persian influence. The foundations of several major cities in Iran can be sourced to Jewish ex-slaves and even the ideology of Persia has influenced and been influenced by Judaism: the systems of belief share similar holidays and legends pertaining to the region, a fine example of the influence and prospering of Jews in the region. Foltz’s detailed explanation of the Radanites and their power base in the Mediterranean shows that, despite the seemingly negative reputation given to European Jews, they were still a force to be reckoned with from an economic standpoint.
As Foltz mentions, the various converts to Judaism along the Silk Route are a very interesting (and sometimes peculiar) aspect of the Jews’ widespread nature. The actions of Mediterranean Jews led them to communication with the “Khazars” – a nomadic Turkic group centered on the northeast shore of the Black Sea who hoped to trade slaves with the Jews. Foltz’s use of the Turkish proverb, “There is no Iranian merchant without a Turkish associate, just as there is no cap without a head” strikes home the relationship between the two differently-civilized worlds of sedentary people and nomadic people in terms of a symbiotic relationship. The Khazar elite eventually converted to Judaism in order to gain the further benefit of what they perceived as ‘religious neutrality’ – that is to say, they would be more privileged than their shamanistic steppe kin due to foreign traders’ familiarity with the Jewish people. This is a very interesting factor: a nomadic group, normally suited to raiding and on-the-move living, wished to gain partial immunity against oppressors by converting to a religion that most viewed as a trader’s ideology. As a student of nomadic history, that concept is a very exciting one and is definitely something I will have to investigate in other regions such as Eastern Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The influence of the Jews on indigenous peoples (and vice versa) as well as the founding of Jewish communities along the Silk Route fosters a uniquely interesting chain of settlements and communication across Eurasia – from Marseille in France to Kaifeng in China.
The positive nature of Foltz’s work here is overshadowed by the fact that little to no mention is made of anti-Jewish sentiment in the regions that they begin to influence. Throughout the early tenure of the Jewish people in Persian lands, a great amount of good was done for the Jews by the Persian royalty; a case for this would be Cyrus the Great’s order to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. However, they were also placed under heavy scrutiny: early Zoroastrian texts list Judaism among the many beliefs that its follower had oppressed. Later dynasties in Persia did not necessarily oppress the Jews but actively sought to limit any Jewish gains toward positions of authority. The large Jewish minority in Central Asia, while influential and long-lasting, did attract negative attention – the Arab conquests resulted in Bukharan Jews having to pay exorbitant taxes, the Mongol Invasions decreased the number of Central Asian followers of Judaism greatly and eventually the hardline Islamic nomadic tribes of the region would turn against the Jews through forced conversion and violence. Foltz fails to mention these events entirely, and thus is not even able to remark upon the fact that one of the only reasons that the Jews were targeted by their oppressors in Central-to-Eastern Eurasia was their perceived higher wealth due to trade along the Silk Route.
“Judaism and the Silk Route” is definitely written in a fashion to ignore the negatives while focusing more on the positive impacts and receptions of the Jewish people operating on and as a result of the Silk Route. While he completely glosses over negative events, Foltz’s work is informative and interesting to someone who may have not been aware of the far-reaching nature of Judaism or the impact of Classical-to-Pre-Modern Jews upon trade and ideology. Foltz’s talk of a continent-spanning Jewish community not suspicion or oppression is sorely wishful thinking across the wide expanse of history; however, that is not to say that for a time it did not exist and prosper.
Works Cited
Foltz, Richard. "Judaism and the Silk Route." The History Teacher 32 (1998): 9-16.
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I don't know why the formatting comes out so weirdly on these, but I'm not particularly troubled by it. If anyone's bothering to read, I hope they won't mind.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
An Intro
My name is Sean. I was advised to start a blog, so here it is. This post is a placeholder, so it will have some substance if someone Googles my name - I'd like to bore them a little bit. Nothing juicy here. Sorry, folks. My goal for this blog is to achieve a return to constant writing, a state everyone should achieve. Write everyday, it's as good as apples.
What follows is a piece of work I had to do for a Russian Identity assignment pertaining to the works of Berdyaev, who I consider atrociously biased and Slavophilic. If you have any interest in what I said, read on.
I wrote it while in a bad mood, and I guess it shows - I didn't really hate the guy despite his almost humorous admiration of very dead and otherwise overworked Russians. Enjoy.
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Berdyaev’s argument is that since the time of Kiev’s position as the seat of power for the people of Russia, the lands of the Rus have always been torn between eastern and western influences. His statement that Russia has been a place of pain and has developed a timeline of tumultuousness throughout the ages immediately sets the tone for his description of the five different Russia’s: Kievan Rus, Mongol Russia, Muscovite Russia, Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia. Kievan Russia was a time of culture beyond those of Europe as Russia was superior in the categories of art and architecture. Under Muscovite rule, an intellectual culture never flourished; this period of Russia was bereft of “thought and speech”. Russia has a primordial disposition toward nature; it was strictly religious under Orthodoxy and under influence from the West, specifically the late Roman-Byzantine Empire. Peter himself was a supporter of western ideals, removing from power the pious Muscovites. This leads to a comparison between Peter and Lenin’s respective revolutions; while both were brutal and executed to sharply change Russia, Lenin’s revolution inspired the common man to take part in history while Peter’s revolution thickened the lines between Russia’s classes. This led to a continuing struggle between the incorporation between western ideals and eastern lifestyles.
Berdyaev’s approach to the subject of Russia’s identity being torn between East and West seems fairly slanted against what he calls the “Latin” West. The first comparison Berdyaev makes is that the near-ancient realm of Kievan Russia produced a level of culture greater than contemporary Europe. In that statement, Berdyaev shows his outright bias toward the subject of Russia’s superiority over its western neighbors and sets the stage for the rest of his piece. Berdyaev’s blanket summation that Kievan Russia’s production of iconography and architecture surpassed all of the West seems like a statement one may make in an attempt to start an argument due to how unnecessarily pretentious it seems; after all, what of even ancient Roman architecture that survives to this day? Past that, European architecture in places such as Germany with its monumental Gothic architecture certainly does not deserve a snubbing. In addition, the many historical pieces of Christian art in Italy (specifically Rome) are a notable aspect of the West’s skills with iconography. Depending on Berdyaev’s definition of the West and his possible inclusion of Al-Andalus, the architecture of southern Spain’s Moorish occupants during medieval times is still considered a landmark in architectural history as quite magnificent. Berdyaev also explains, at length, Russia’s kinship with nature being a major aspect of why it is unique from the West. While possibly not as major, why does he fail to even mention the severe historical importance of the forests to the Germanic people, who avoided being conquered by the vastly powerful Roman Empire and eventually ending the reign of the Western Roman Empire due to their reliance on the black forests of northern Europe? An appreciation and involvement with nature, while special in Russia’s case, is not a historical quality belonging solely to Russia. Finally, Berdyaev criticizes the overall major impact of the West as a blow against the common Russian citizen and an emboldening of the Russian nobility, separating the country to an extreme point. While the West may have had an impact upon the social structure of Russia with the possible influence of feudalism and serfdom (which would eventually become huge aspects of the Russian social crisis), Berdyaev already admits earlier in his piece that in order to control the mighty amount of lands under the Russian flag a despotic leader is almost a necessity. Undoubtedly, Russia would have found its social classes greatly separated despite the impact of the West due to the harsh reality of survival and superiority.
On the other hand, the duality Berdyaev employs is an interesting and nominally informative method of informing the reader about Russia’s patchwork identity. His most striking initial comparison between the East and West’s impacts upon Russia is that of religion as Berdyaev explains the “Russian spirit”. As stated, Russians are a paradoxically spiritual people; although they have the influence of pagan naturalism from the East instilling a hardy appreciation for natural life, the influence of the West in the form of Orthodox Christianity instills a strict system of faith in the Russian people. Berdyaev’s statement that the Russian people were molded by a combination of an appreciation of nature and the Orthodox Church into who the Russians are historically known to be is a striking statement. Also, Berdyaev goes on to explain another unique aspect of Russia in its territory; while the West is steeped in formulation and categories in terms of organizing a nation, Russia has a nigh-boundless landscape which would be extremely hard to manage unless under the fist of a strong, despotic leader. This factor is particularly important when one consider Berdyaev’s later quoting of Russian historian Kluchevsky who stated that as ‘the state expands, the people grow sickly.’ Berdyaev’s claim that the East and West’s unique impact on Russia’s religion instilled in its people a sense of dogmatism and the ability to put up with earthly suffering to exist in the afterlife, two factors that are certainly true after noting the material for the course; the Russian people have endured a harsh, back-breaking existence. Yet another note of importance would be the author’s claim that no matter what the professed religious views of a Russian, due to the hardships they must endure, they are “always apocalyptic or nihilist”, lending credibility to the impact of Russia’s roughness on its own people.
A portion of Berdyaev’s piece that is of particular interest is that of his commentary on Peter the Great’s own dualism between East and West. He compares Peter to the Bolsheviks, even going as far as to address him as such. Berdyaev states that Peter wanted to “destroy the old Muscovite Russia”, which had been mostly untainted by western ideals and had remained fairly alone in its practices. In his description of Peter, Berdyaev seems to infer that Peter’s attempt to modernize (and effectively westernize) his people was a savage attack upon the Russian spirit itself and a traitorous act against the Russian people. He is mentioned as executing his own son for believing in the heart and soul of Muscovy and cracking down and any Russians in positions of religious power despite their faith, comparing him to the Bolsheviks once more (more specifically, the Society of the Godless, a militant atheist organization). He compares Peter’s revolution to the October Revolution of 1917 as barbaric, violent, authoritarian and ultimately detrimental to the Russian people, making one major note of difference: while the Bolsheviks’ acts forced the involvement of the common man into the realm of history-making, Peter’s revolution drew further lines between the Russian people and benefitted only the highest in Russian society. Berdyaev makes another backhanded comparison concerning the West, calling Peter’s actions reminiscent of enlightened absolutism, as Peter had secularized the Russian Orthodox Church and empowered it as just another branch of his government.
Overall it seems that through his beliefs on the subject of Peter and his constant comparisons of the Imperial leader to the Russian communists of the 20th century, Berdyaev seems to simply have a grudge against the West and any attempts at tweaking Russia even slightly toward western ideals. Although he admits Peter’s actions were “unavoidable”, Berdyaev seems more like an imperial apologist as opposed to a critic of the West. Despite his avoidance of many facts absolving the West of the sins it has apparently committed against the Russian spirit and people, Berdyaev’s employment of duality does do quite a job of explaining the tumultuous history of Russia and how it has come to be what it currently represents. Without a doubt, the West did indeed play quite a role in the advancement of the Russian people through the ages. Berdyaev seems to be highly negative toward Western influence, instead seeming to believe that Russia would have been better off without it. Whether or not this is true is very much up for argument, although this humble student disagrees vehemently with Berdyaev’s rhetoric.
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There'll be more here soon. Unless I abandon it immediately - which I hope to avoid doing.
What follows is a piece of work I had to do for a Russian Identity assignment pertaining to the works of Berdyaev, who I consider atrociously biased and Slavophilic. If you have any interest in what I said, read on.
I wrote it while in a bad mood, and I guess it shows - I didn't really hate the guy despite his almost humorous admiration of very dead and otherwise overworked Russians. Enjoy.
---
Berdyaev’s argument is that since the time of Kiev’s position as the seat of power for the people of Russia, the lands of the Rus have always been torn between eastern and western influences. His statement that Russia has been a place of pain and has developed a timeline of tumultuousness throughout the ages immediately sets the tone for his description of the five different Russia’s: Kievan Rus, Mongol Russia, Muscovite Russia, Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia. Kievan Russia was a time of culture beyond those of Europe as Russia was superior in the categories of art and architecture. Under Muscovite rule, an intellectual culture never flourished; this period of Russia was bereft of “thought and speech”. Russia has a primordial disposition toward nature; it was strictly religious under Orthodoxy and under influence from the West, specifically the late Roman-Byzantine Empire. Peter himself was a supporter of western ideals, removing from power the pious Muscovites. This leads to a comparison between Peter and Lenin’s respective revolutions; while both were brutal and executed to sharply change Russia, Lenin’s revolution inspired the common man to take part in history while Peter’s revolution thickened the lines between Russia’s classes. This led to a continuing struggle between the incorporation between western ideals and eastern lifestyles.
Berdyaev’s approach to the subject of Russia’s identity being torn between East and West seems fairly slanted against what he calls the “Latin” West. The first comparison Berdyaev makes is that the near-ancient realm of Kievan Russia produced a level of culture greater than contemporary Europe. In that statement, Berdyaev shows his outright bias toward the subject of Russia’s superiority over its western neighbors and sets the stage for the rest of his piece. Berdyaev’s blanket summation that Kievan Russia’s production of iconography and architecture surpassed all of the West seems like a statement one may make in an attempt to start an argument due to how unnecessarily pretentious it seems; after all, what of even ancient Roman architecture that survives to this day? Past that, European architecture in places such as Germany with its monumental Gothic architecture certainly does not deserve a snubbing. In addition, the many historical pieces of Christian art in Italy (specifically Rome) are a notable aspect of the West’s skills with iconography. Depending on Berdyaev’s definition of the West and his possible inclusion of Al-Andalus, the architecture of southern Spain’s Moorish occupants during medieval times is still considered a landmark in architectural history as quite magnificent. Berdyaev also explains, at length, Russia’s kinship with nature being a major aspect of why it is unique from the West. While possibly not as major, why does he fail to even mention the severe historical importance of the forests to the Germanic people, who avoided being conquered by the vastly powerful Roman Empire and eventually ending the reign of the Western Roman Empire due to their reliance on the black forests of northern Europe? An appreciation and involvement with nature, while special in Russia’s case, is not a historical quality belonging solely to Russia. Finally, Berdyaev criticizes the overall major impact of the West as a blow against the common Russian citizen and an emboldening of the Russian nobility, separating the country to an extreme point. While the West may have had an impact upon the social structure of Russia with the possible influence of feudalism and serfdom (which would eventually become huge aspects of the Russian social crisis), Berdyaev already admits earlier in his piece that in order to control the mighty amount of lands under the Russian flag a despotic leader is almost a necessity. Undoubtedly, Russia would have found its social classes greatly separated despite the impact of the West due to the harsh reality of survival and superiority.
On the other hand, the duality Berdyaev employs is an interesting and nominally informative method of informing the reader about Russia’s patchwork identity. His most striking initial comparison between the East and West’s impacts upon Russia is that of religion as Berdyaev explains the “Russian spirit”. As stated, Russians are a paradoxically spiritual people; although they have the influence of pagan naturalism from the East instilling a hardy appreciation for natural life, the influence of the West in the form of Orthodox Christianity instills a strict system of faith in the Russian people. Berdyaev’s statement that the Russian people were molded by a combination of an appreciation of nature and the Orthodox Church into who the Russians are historically known to be is a striking statement. Also, Berdyaev goes on to explain another unique aspect of Russia in its territory; while the West is steeped in formulation and categories in terms of organizing a nation, Russia has a nigh-boundless landscape which would be extremely hard to manage unless under the fist of a strong, despotic leader. This factor is particularly important when one consider Berdyaev’s later quoting of Russian historian Kluchevsky who stated that as ‘the state expands, the people grow sickly.’ Berdyaev’s claim that the East and West’s unique impact on Russia’s religion instilled in its people a sense of dogmatism and the ability to put up with earthly suffering to exist in the afterlife, two factors that are certainly true after noting the material for the course; the Russian people have endured a harsh, back-breaking existence. Yet another note of importance would be the author’s claim that no matter what the professed religious views of a Russian, due to the hardships they must endure, they are “always apocalyptic or nihilist”, lending credibility to the impact of Russia’s roughness on its own people.
A portion of Berdyaev’s piece that is of particular interest is that of his commentary on Peter the Great’s own dualism between East and West. He compares Peter to the Bolsheviks, even going as far as to address him as such. Berdyaev states that Peter wanted to “destroy the old Muscovite Russia”, which had been mostly untainted by western ideals and had remained fairly alone in its practices. In his description of Peter, Berdyaev seems to infer that Peter’s attempt to modernize (and effectively westernize) his people was a savage attack upon the Russian spirit itself and a traitorous act against the Russian people. He is mentioned as executing his own son for believing in the heart and soul of Muscovy and cracking down and any Russians in positions of religious power despite their faith, comparing him to the Bolsheviks once more (more specifically, the Society of the Godless, a militant atheist organization). He compares Peter’s revolution to the October Revolution of 1917 as barbaric, violent, authoritarian and ultimately detrimental to the Russian people, making one major note of difference: while the Bolsheviks’ acts forced the involvement of the common man into the realm of history-making, Peter’s revolution drew further lines between the Russian people and benefitted only the highest in Russian society. Berdyaev makes another backhanded comparison concerning the West, calling Peter’s actions reminiscent of enlightened absolutism, as Peter had secularized the Russian Orthodox Church and empowered it as just another branch of his government.
Overall it seems that through his beliefs on the subject of Peter and his constant comparisons of the Imperial leader to the Russian communists of the 20th century, Berdyaev seems to simply have a grudge against the West and any attempts at tweaking Russia even slightly toward western ideals. Although he admits Peter’s actions were “unavoidable”, Berdyaev seems more like an imperial apologist as opposed to a critic of the West. Despite his avoidance of many facts absolving the West of the sins it has apparently committed against the Russian spirit and people, Berdyaev’s employment of duality does do quite a job of explaining the tumultuous history of Russia and how it has come to be what it currently represents. Without a doubt, the West did indeed play quite a role in the advancement of the Russian people through the ages. Berdyaev seems to be highly negative toward Western influence, instead seeming to believe that Russia would have been better off without it. Whether or not this is true is very much up for argument, although this humble student disagrees vehemently with Berdyaev’s rhetoric.
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There'll be more here soon. Unless I abandon it immediately - which I hope to avoid doing.
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