The Finest Diplomat: Olearius In Muscovy

I had some fun writing this piece; it's similar to that of one I did about a year ago on the subject of a scholar I regarded as a Tsarist apologist (if I remember correctly) in that his writings were easy to tear to shreds. Holsteinian diplomat Adam Olearius fares no better: I found him to be hypocritical, ignorant and far too self-righteous to even consider himself vaguely diplomatic, let alone an actual diplomat.

---

Adam Olearius was a German ambassador, secretary and translator who traveled Eurasia during the seventeenth century per the request of Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. He was tasked with, essentially, the future of the new German settlement “Friedrichstadt”: a locale founded by Dutch settlers with Frederick III’s blessing in hopes of fostering international trade within the territorial bounds of Holstein-Gottorp. As the lead diplomat, Adam Olearius was tasked with forging trade routes and completing monetary agreements with powers that would have links to lucrative trade to the East such as Persia and Muscovy. Despite years of effort on the part of Olearius, Friedrichstadt would not garner the sort of economic activity that Frederick III hoped it would achieve and the diplomat returned to work as the duke’s archivist.

Olearius’s real contributions were historical works, most notably his narrative “Moskowitische und Persische Reise: die Holsteinische Gesandtschaft beim Schah, 1633-1639“which described the foreign peoples he encountered while traveling with his entourage across Eurasia. His entertaining commentary on the state of the Russian people under Muscovite rule, including physical features and social behavior, is very detailed and useful for a scholar hoping to garner foreign views of the Eastern Slavs throughout their historical journey. Outside of this context, however, the writings of Olearius on the subject of the Muscovites can be seen as fairly bigoted: despite the necessity that Muscovy plays in his diplomatic task, he shows little appreciation or understanding of the people or their culture. Olearius directs much criticism and abject insults upon the population of Muscovy which includes – as he sees it – rowdy and murderous slaves, sex-crazed peasants and hypocritical, foul-mouth authority figures. As will be displayed in this piece, Adam Olearius’s work is extensive and well-written yet remains uninformed as a result of the author’s inability to make sense of or draw comparisons to Russian culture. Several examples of this will be investigated, but by no means can the entire document be analyzed and picked apart: it would require a piece of at least the length of Olearius’s to do so.

The biggest flaw put forth by the German diplomat in his dealings with the Muscovites is his stark inability to regard them as possessors of a legitimate and unique way or life. The first example of this can be seen only sentences into the work when Olearius labels the Russians as having skin pigmentation similar to that of ‘other Europeans’ – an interesting statement on the base level that, with the continued exposure of Western Europeans to the Russians and the insurmountable level of difference between them, a Holy Roman diplomat would consider Russians to be Europeans . It is notable that the scholar Olearius is willing to consider the widely-reviled Muscovites as fellow Europeans – especially notable due to the history of hostility between the Russians and Western Christians observable in events such as the Baltic Crusades (in which the Germans Teutonic Order faced the Poles, who Olearius repeatedly compares to the Muscovites).

In equating the Russians with ‘other’ Europeans, Olearius seems to ignore the uniqueness of Russian culture and development that unquestionably sets Russians apart from their counterparts to the West. Russian culture is not truly European: although it is influenced by European sources such as Rurik and his Varangians who founded the famed Rus’ trading center Novgorod, Russian culture is influenced by much more. The steppe – a region that originated a way of life that can be seen as the polar opposite of settled Western Europe – had a major impact on Russian culture in that it delivered unto the divided Rus’ new military techniques, court behavior, a revamped geographical dispersion of its people as well as new concepts for taxation and legal statues. As reasoned by the historian Isabel de Madariaga, the infamous Oprichnina of Muscovy’s Ivan IV can be seen as one of the many continuing legacies of the steppe’s influence upon the Russian people – in this case, through the influence of Ivan’s second wife, Maria Temrjukovna . The influence of Byzantine culture can be seen readily in Muscovite art by observing their use of traditionally Byzantine religious icons and the Muscovite adherence to Orthodox Christianity which possesses intense historical and cultural links to the Byzantine Empire. Olearius himself notes this, but does it demeaningly by stating that the Russians go out of their way to imitate the Greek way of life in an effort to give themselves legitimacy as a people. Olearius cites the Russian practices of mimicking Byzantine appearances in the practices of wearing ‘traditional’ Greek clothing and growing out ones’ hair in order to express shame. In contrary to Olearius’s accusations, it is worth noting that within the general Christian tradition the growing of a man’s hair was considered a sign of dismay – thus, it was mostly certainly not a practice limited to the Byzantines .

“(7) For man ought not to have his head covered, as he is in God’s image and glory…
(14) Does not nature itself teach you that if a man has long hair, it is a dishonor to him…”

Olearius continues to display his incomprehension of Russian culture throughout the piece. It is true that the Russians have what may be considered an aversion to outside culture – an almost humorous observation when one considers the large amount of foreign substance that the Rus’ have adapted to their own use and added into the sphere of their own society. Olearius’s view on the subject of Russian xenophobia seems to shift drastically throughout the piece: for example, at one point he is stern in his accusations of the Russians as mimics of the Greeks (as seen above). Later in the piece, he states that the Russians have few similarities with them especially in terms of language or art . This is entirely incorrect: while the Russians did conform the Byzantine religious practices to their own dialect, that would not insinuate that the Russians have ignorance to the Greek language but would actually suggest the utter opposite. The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian culture in general adapted much from Byzantine art, drawing from influences such as Christian icons and architectural practices. In stating that the Russians did not regard Greek culture, he seems to try to convince the reader that the residents of Muscovy are undeserving of carrying on the Roman and Greek legacies in the form of Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine-esque court politics and ‘Eastern’ design. In the same section of his narrative, Olearius cites examples of the Russian aversion to Classical avenues of effort such as the sciences: a Russian chancellor misunderstands the scholar’s attempts to stave off boredom through scientific antics as sorcery and brand a musically-inclined Dutch barber in a windy chamber as a heretic when the skeleton on his wall begins to move under ‘supernatural’ influence . These examples of Russian ignorance to foreign behavior are in contrast to Olearius’s constant branding of almost every Russian behavior he mentions as against the will of God and shameful to not only themselves but to their divine lord – a woefully hypocritical viewpoint from the learned Holsteinian.

It is possible that the only comparisons of substance Olearius can make are those between the uncivilized Muscovites and his own cultured German people. He cites the example of one ‘Nikita Ivanovich Romanov’, a wealth Russian xenophile whose appreciation for German culture goes misunderstood by Moscow’s Patriarch, who tricks him into removing the his European garb and disavowing it; to start the next paragraph, Olearius brands the Russians as barbarians and later says that the Russian people put little thought into foreigners . He later goes on to discuss the validity of holding skeletons for medical use (a more that Germans engaged in yet one the Russians were wary of, as can be seen above), the persecution of foreigners by Russian judges and the inability of Muscovites to regard foreigners as anything but a victim of their wiles. Going on, the ambassador states in one instance that they are a clever folk who do nothing but attempt to backstab and shame their rivals, be they neighbors or strangers, while gaining as much as possible. In the words of Jakob Ulfeldt as quoted by Olearius, Russians are “divorced… from all virtue”; he goes on for quite some time in his narrative describing the dishonesty of the Russians in attempting to achieve societal esteem and court positions . Further on, Olearius states that the Russians “are by nature cruel and fit only for slavery, [so] they must constantly be kept under a cruel and harsh yoke of restraint…” , regarding Russia’s tendency toward authoritarianism and absolutism as a show of their lack of civility. These qualities are not solely Russian traits but can be seen across the West: even a cursory knowledge of then-contemporary Italian political science piece Il Principe is a prime example, suggesting cruelty and fear as viable methods of rule in what Olearius would call ‘civilized Europe’. In addition, Olearius is not in Muscovy for the simple reason of cultural observation or societal analysis: he is among the Muscovites in order to secure politically-motivated financial matters with their ruling class. In his criticism of the Muscovites as particularly voracious toward foreigners in their attempts to gain things from them, he seems ignores the fact that he is doing the exact same thing and further invalidates himself. Olearius goes on: he compares the Russians’ lack of honor to the Germans in discussing the Muscovite inability to duel honorably as well as the offenses to the senses that no true German could bear that are commonplace in Moscow; the Muscovite tendency to disavow wine for cruder liquors is also discussed as an example of their barbarity . As an aside, he criticizes the Russian tendency to drink several times throughout his piece; he does not mention, however, the lack of refinement that almost every pre-modern society (including the Germans) shows upon the imbibing of illicit substance.

The true hypocrisy and bias of Olearius comes to pass in an observation he makes in one of the many comparisons between Muscovite and European (specifically German) civilization. In this statement, he suggests that the Russians are “very receptive” toward German techniques in the schools of artistic expression and science – a direct noncorrelation to his previous expressed beliefs that the Russians were in no way interested in such things. Olearius continues, assuming that Muscovite observers to Western forging and artwork will do all they can to steal the methods of foreigners . Olearius disregards the Western tendency to mimic technology and artwork throughout history: from the Romans putting to use Greek naval techniques to medieval Europeans copying Chinese and Middle Eastern use of gunpowder, Western Europe has had a massive history of ‘copycat’ behavior. It is possible that this statement is the opus of Olearius’s hypocritical and bigoted beliefs: while the Russian people are entirely unreceptive to all foreigners and lack culture in entirety, they are nevertheless enamored with German civilization and do all they can to plagiarize it for their own use.

Olearius’s work shines in its total inability to even touch upon the legitimacy of Muscovy’s culture outside of it being a copycat amalgamation of most groups that border the Russians. According to Baron’s translation, Moscow is populated by drunks and rogues who do nothing but cheat themselves and others out of money that will only be spent on earthly vices. Every cultural practice of the Muscovites, according to Olearius, seems to be stolen from either Western Europe or the Byzantine Empire – an entity whose legacy the Western Europeans and the Russians were competing to uphold. The German shows complete bias in his piece through constant compliments toward his own people followed by what are essentially insults against even the idea of Russian ‘culture’, stating that barbarians of the Muscovite variety possess little more than the practice of banditry and will leave it as their sole legacy. As can be seen in the provided opposing examples, the exact opposite is true: Muscovite civilization was a unique, non-European way of life that was apparently baffling to the unreceptive and fairly ignorant Olearius.

Works Cited
1 Auty, Robert and Dimitri Obolensky. Companion to Russian Studies, Vol. 1: An Introduction to Russian History. Cambridge University Press: 1976.
2. Trans. New World Translation Committee. New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York: Brooklyn, 1984.
3. Olearius, Adam; trans. Samuel H. Baron. The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1967.

---


While I value Olearius's observations on cultural and court matters in Muscovy, everything he says has to be taken with a grain of salt because he's extremely prejudiced. His writing has the potential to skew a reader's views on Russian society which, despite its 'frontier' nature to the Europeans, was similar enough to life in most of Europe; essentially, Olearius had no real grounds to insult the Muscovites as he does repeatedly. I would love to get hold of his writings on the Persians with whom he also associated, as the cultural differences must produce even greater nigh-comedic prejudice.

Germans In Mexico: It's Been A While

Wow, it's been like a month since I've posted here. Oh well. School's juuust about over, so I might as well start posting the last of my assignments. Enjoy this one, it's about World War I. This is how I had to whittle it down over time in terms of subject matter.

February: Comparison of American press (New York Times) and British Press (London Times) on their opinion of the Germans before and during World War I.
March: Discussion of American press's pro-German nature prior to the outbreak of World War I and why it was as such.
April: Explanation of how American appeal toward Germany changed negatively as a result of Germany's actions abroad, the actions of the Kaiser's armies in war and international influence on the United States.
May (as in, two days before the paper was due and because I had 15 pages written on this already and didn't want to turn in 40+ pages): Argument in favor of idea that American appeal, as judged through examples in the American press, soured toward Germany and pushed the United States toward entry into World War I as a result of aggressive German actions in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I overdrew myself desperately in my History 200 class. It all turned out well, though.

---

It is an indisputable fact that, while the largest aggressor of the Great War (or World War I), Germany did not bring about the reasons that the conflict occurred; however, Germany’s actions did escalate the situation into the now legendary struggle that was the Great War. On the level of public opinion – especially in neutral nations, initially including United States – the actions of Kaiser Wilhelm II in the Western Hemisphere before and during the war made a convincing argument for involvement of Americans in the Great War to protect the sanctity of American dominance. This essay will examine several key of examples of events that turned American public opinion against Germany before the United States intervened in the conflict. In the Western Hemisphere, Germany enacted a trade monopoly over South America, Central America and several Caribbean nations; the Kaiser’s motives seemed to work directly against the statements of the Monroe Doctrine in at least one case. In South American nations such as Brazil and Chile, European trade monopolies sprung up and, aided by the German government, merchants pledging their allegiances to Germany received government protection and assuredness of the safety of their assets. American fears arose when the Germans stood against the United States government on the subject of rebellious Haiti, demanding to keep control of the trade there. A similar situation occurred in Mexico with the rise of authoritarian Victoriano Huerta, supported by the Germans with supplies but opposed by Americans in war. The diminutive Virgin Islands, too, prove to be troublesome for German-American relations as the Great War pushes America to acquire a base in the Caribbean. These incidents and others will show that Germany’s questionable actions in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean contributed to a change in public opinion in the United States toward Germany, as seen in the American press, and pushed the country to intervene in the Great War.

Despite the fact that a great deal is known about German activity in the Western Hemisphere before and during the Great War, much attention is focused on the Atlantic and in Europe; however, the actions put forth by the German government in their dealings with powers in Latin America show ulterior motives. Moves made by Wilhelm II and his government in Latin America and the Caribbean purportedly challenged the Monroe Doctrine as well as American dominance of the region[1]. Before the Great War, America was very familiar with European colonialism and attempts at dominance in foreign lands. As a result, suspicion was levied by the American people against the Germans as their interests in Latin America increased[2]. Several pieces of information lend credibility to this suspicion, but not outright fear over recolonialization of Latin America by the Germans. Military officials such as Constant Cordier were stationed in Latin America and viewed certain acts of German business in the region as worthy of investigation. Captain Constant Cordier was an American military attaché to Peru in 1912 and noted officially much German participation in regional business, reporting that Germans sent many workers to Bolivia in what he saw as an effort to take over industry there.[3] Cordier was very distrustful of German activity in Latin America and viewed their protections of German merchants from local harm as well as general protection of all Latin American ventures as precursors to German annexation of the entire landmass[4]. According to the reports of Cordier and others, Germany had large influence in Peru (where Cordier was stationed), Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. Germany also had strangleholds on trade in Brazil and Chile.

Despite the suspect practices of Germany as reported by Constant Cordier the situation with Germany in Latin America was different and less hostile than it had been in the early 1900’s. Early on in the spreading of German influence in Latin America at the turn of the century, Germany’s actions were considered with much more seriousness; Germany’s eventual acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary led to a cooling down of the situation[5]. This occurred despite the fact that a large amount of the German populace desired their state to have a larger impact in Latin America; however, the “ruling circles” of the central European state did not hold any real intentions of actually expanding their national influence to Latin America just before the outbreak of the Great War[6].

Germany was not alone in its attempts to make use of Latin America as grounds for lucrative financial gains. The markets of Latin America were bountiful for any industrialized nation which could fund market participation there; however, Germany had moved toward this goal much more quickly than other European powers, leading to an interesting statistic: a large portion of Latin America’s merchant class consisted of German merchants[7] . From 1903 to 1912, Americans made large economic ground in Latin America, especially in Bolivia, Brazil and Cuba, where it is worth noting that America had militarily intervened in Cuba repeatedly in the early 1900’s[8]. Future president William H. Taft was placed in a position to observe German efforts in Latin America and stated that despite gains in Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, Germany would most likely not try to capitalize on their market monopolies in Latin America and make political moves. Taft saw that the reasoning for this was simple: Germans preferred to work outside of their own possessions because they made more money doing so and, thus, would not jeopardize their lucrative position in Latin America[9].

An example of American suspicion about German motives can be seen in the plight of August Dziuk. Dziuk was a German businessman who deigned to spend a good amount of currency in order to establish a sprawling railway system in Panama, assisting local industry with the aid of the local government as well as aiding other German-backed industries in the region. At the time, Panama was a region of severe interest by many powers, specifically the United States, due to its crucial trading and logistical position as the connection between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The board of Dziuk’s representing company featured a cavalcade of higher-ups within German society including members of the German parliament as well as direct relatives of presiding state officials[10]. There was no solid evidence of the German government ever participating in Dziuk’s business in Panama, nor any real reasons for the United States to find a grand amount of suspicion with Dziuk’s actions. American statesmen such as Francis M. Hunt, the Undersecretary of State, saw a potential threat in that if Dziuk were to ever run afoul of the German government, his Panamanian possessions could be taken by the German state and put to use as federal territory[11]. With this in mind, Hunt approach the Panamanian government and convinced it to refuse Dziuk approval of his venture. This incident shows the extent of suspicion to which the American government adhered to toward the German government after their former exploits in Latin America.

The American press began to respond to the events occurring in Latin America by publishing more stories and editorials on the subject as well as transcribing state speeches that referenced occurrences in the Western Hemisphere. As seen in “The President’s Warning”, the American president’s words shamed the “unprincipled adventures” who may find it lucrative to interfere in Latin America by sowing the seeds of revolution and creating conspiracies that work against the American cause. The article specifically mentions Germany as a nation that may have the potential to take advantage of resource-rich backwater nations in Latin America[12]. While not the only reason as to why American sentiment began to turn away from Germany, Latin America did indeed have an impact. As written by Henry H. Chamberlin, the arrogance of the Kaiser had begun to get the better of his nation – Wilhelm II’s demands and motives were becoming unruly across the globe[13]. Chamberlin also echoed a statement made by many members of the press: even outside of war, Germany’s aggressive nature was making it no friends on the international stage.

Haiti was a staging point for Germany’s closest violation of the Monroe Doctrine before the Great War commenced. Haiti was a place of constant turmoil at the turn of the century and beyond. After multiple revolutions in an extremely short span of time, the United States occupied the island nation in 1915 and stayed there for nearly 20 years in order to quell unrest (while only creating even more; however, that is a different commentary for a different assignment). Before the American occupation of Haiti, Germany had a very notable amount of internal trade – possibly as much as 90% of it – in Haiti[14]. In addition, Germany had a literal monopoly on the water surrounding Hispaniola, the island that Haiti shares with the Dominican Republic. The Hamburg-Amerika Line, Germany’s largest shipping company for trans-Atlantic trade, controlled sea business around Haiti at the time[15]. Germany strengthened their economic position by openly funding Haitian revolutionary factions in bouts for sovereignty of the nation, as well[16]. If a faction the Germans supported came into power, they would be given kickbacks and access to national projects. On the other hand, the Germans could also lose access to markets and have their assets seized by a counterrevolutionary government. In the Haitian Revolution of 1907, German merchants backed the losing side of a guerrilla stand-off and had its Haitian possessions sized by the new government[17]. The binds Germany fell into by supporting revolutionary groups in Haiti can be seen in the interesting example of faction leader Theodore. The Germans had just suffered a major blow in the assassination of Cincinnatus Leconte, a German-backed Haitian warlord. In turn, Germany funded Theodore, a revolutionary leader who was soon assassinated by his associate Zamor, who quickly gained power over the state. Germany demanded compensation from Zamor, who had used Theodore’s German-supplied assets to gain his victory; Zamor refused to grant them anything, resulting in a total financial loss for the Germans[18]. Zamor had also been backed by the Americans, who attempted to take control of Haitian customs to not only preserve Zamor’s role as the nation’s new leader but also their own role in Haiti’s economy. In an awkward diplomatic move, the German government made a demand that America internationalize Haitian customs[19]. This event made American headlines due to the danger of Germany violating the Monroe Doctrine; “Germany Balks at Plan for American Control of Customs Revenue” and “Haitian Situation Acute” are just two of the many headlines on the subject posted by The New York Times, reflecting American opinion on the subject as negative toward German intervention. The Germans eventually backed down from their demand; however, for a time, the possibility of conflict over Germany’s demands was a reality.

A second and noteworthy act of German participation in the Caribbean would be the German states’ impact on Denmark’s holdings in the region. For quite some time, the Virgin Islands were an economic hole for the Danish government; various economic policies meant to improve the holdings were met with no reaction. In an effort to gain more territory, the United States was fairly relentless in its efforts to gain the Virgin Islands as a Caribbean base. The acquisition of the Virgin Islands during the Great War became an important issue with the United States due to the general fear that it would be sized by a belligerent nation such as Germany for use as a naval station. Germany may have actually put pressure on Denmark to prevent the sale of its government property to the United States for that very reason[20]. In 1902, Denmark attempted to negotiate a deal with the United States in which the Virgin Islands would have been passed on to American sovereignty; the Danish Parliament put down the deal by a very slim margin. The failure of this Danish-American Treaty of 1902 was blamed on outside German pressure upon members of the Danish parliament; almost in response to this blame, Germany began moving into the region in a fashion similar to their actions in Latin America[21]. This can be seen as yet another example of German interference in American dominance of the Western Hemisphere.

Perhaps the most notable example of German intervention in the Western Hemisphere can be seen in Central America at the time of the Mexican Revolution. The dictator of Mexico until 1915 was Porfirio Diaz, a harsh ruler in a region known for its rebellious tendencies. To strength the force of his military, Diaz hired on German military advisors and put them in charge of the modernization of the Mexican Army[22]. While not a direct participation in the Mexican government by the German government, the appearance of German military advisors at the side of a repressive dictator did not do much for German appeal in the southwestern United States. The outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, which lasted in slight spats into the 1920’s, brought the United States into Mexican affairs while the Germans acquiesced to remove themselves from movement against the Americans in the politics of the region for a time[23]. To a point, the two powers even worked together to further a mutual hope for stability in the area – for instance, German and American forces cooperated in the rescue of Francisco Madero, a Mexican intellectual who had predicted by Mexican Revolution as a result of Diaz’s terrible reign and had demanded armed revolution from his fellow countrymen[24]. As a result of his saving by American and German forces, Madero was able to fuel the revolution and eventually return to Mexico where he would be president before his eventual capture and execution.

Eventually, Germany and other European nations began to demand stability in tumultuous Mexico. The American government had been calling for the resignation of new Mexican leader Victoriano Huerta, known for his similarity to Diaz for repressing democracy; Germany, on the other hand, saw Huerta as an upholder of the law. While in no position to move against America on the subject of Huerta’s reign, Germany feared much unrest if America interfered in the Mexican Revolution: unrest that may destabilize German trade possessions and economic participation in Mexico[25]. This point was pushed even further when Mexican revolutionary and legendary historical figure Pancho Villa took several international dignitaries hostage at the Mexican city of Torreon. Villa freed the Americans quickly but held many of the European dignitaries, including those representing Germany. This outraged the German government and American papers began to publish rumors that the Germans were planning on sending a force to rescue their diplomats[26].

In April of 1914, another near-violation of the Monroe Doctrine was seen in the “Vera Cruz Incident”. A Hamburg-Amerika Line liner, Ypiranga, arrived in Mexican port city of Vera Cruz carrying arms for Huerta’s military. The situation in Mexico was similar to the situation in Haiti – the German government vowed support for revolutionary forces, supplying them with weapons and hoping that their victories would contribute to German economic activity in the region. When the Ypiranga entered the harbor, it was confronted by Utah, an American ship that had been keeping guard over the waters of Vera Cruz. The Americans had taken control of Vera Cruz recently and had made the order to investigate all naval vessels in the region. When the Americans discovered the cargo of the German ship and demanded that the Ypiranga turn over its weapons, the Germans reacted negatively; after all, this was a direct violation of international law in that the Americans were demanding the cargo of the German ship before their release[27]. Eventually, the German ship left the harbor with its cargo, against American wishes, and landed further north to deliver its cargo to Huerta’s forces. This was seen as a near-violation of the Monroe Doctrine as Germany influenced politics in the Western Hemisphere against American wishes.

An example of failed espionage that brought Germany’s participation in the Mexican Revolution to a forefront was the capture and charging of Franz Von Rintelen, a German spy charged with, among other things, the diversion of American attention to Mexico instead of the Great War. As stated scathingly in the New York Times on December 8^th, 1915, a plot conducted by high-ranking German official Franz von Rintelen was discovered by American investigators and Mexican-Carranzista officials[28]. According to the interrogated contacts of Rintelen, a major goal assigned to him by the German government was the sparking of a Second Mexican Revolution in order to prevent the United States from turning its military attention to the situation in Europe. In order to accomplish this, Rintelen hoped to follow what seemed to be a German tradition of funding new revolutionary groups in hopes of destabilizing Mexico, which was under heavy American influence at the time, and bringing about a Second Mexican Revolution. Rintelen was introduced to revolutionary figures and pledged support for Huerta, the former authoritarian coup-backed president of Mexico. Huerta had been forced to step down from the presidency after a series of losses against other rebels in southern Mexico and, since that point, had hoped to strike out against the Carranzista-run Mexican government[29]. Rintelen’s funding for the purpose of driving up a Second Mexican Revolution was essentially limitless; reports in the New York Time state that he had upwards of $30,000,000 to spend on the Mexican situation alone, not to mention other acts of subterfuge in the Western Hemisphere for which he had more funding. In terms of general inflation, Rintelen’s funding in the modern day would be $613,992,747.44 – a number that, when put into a modern perspective, shows the importance of Rintelen’s assignments. As a first move, Rintelen purchased approximately 10,000 rifles that, at the outbreak of the investigation, were initially thought to have been intended for use in Europe. Further investigation displaying communications between Rintelen and Huerta show that the weapons were intended for use in Mexico[30]

The German government disavowed any knowledge of Franz von Rintelen’s actions as a spy by way of Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador to America. A statement made repeatedly by Bernstorff claimed that Rintelen was not in the United States under orders of the German government but was acting on “private interests” – a statement now known to be false[31]. After this, the New York Times began to openly criticize Bernstorff’s position as German ambassador to America.

As shown in the many examples of Latin America and the Western Hemisphere in general as well as the American press response, the actions of the Germans did nothing but alienate its position in terms of the opinion of the citizens and government of the United States. Germany’s interference in US business ranging from aggressive business in South America to participation in the Mexican Revolution have been actions that directly opposed to the United States and, at times, direct violations of the Monroe Doctrine. In the months after the capture of Rintelen, American relations with Germany would sour even further with events such as the continued use of chlorine gas by German forces (as well as Allied forces) and the sinking of the HMS Lusitania as a result of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare. Combined with the British monopoly upon American press and European news, America’s entry into the Great War seemed to be inevitable.





Bibliography
Primary Sources

“Berlin Disavows Rintelen’s Plot In Official Order to Bernstorff…” The New York Times (Dec 13, 1915): 1. ProQuest 04 May 2008. Keyword: “Germany”, “Mexican Revolution”.

“The Presidents Warning.” The New York Times (Mar. 13, 1913): 10. ProQuest 04 May 2008. Keyword: “Latin America”, “anti-German”.

“Uncover German Plot To Embroil US With Mexico.” The New York Times (Dec. 8, 1915): 1. 04 May 2008. Keyword: “von Rintelen”, “Mexico”.

Chamberlin, Henry H. “Anti-German Sentiment: Two Reasons Why the Kaiser is to Blame for the War.” The New York Times (Aug. 16, 1914): 14. ProQuest 04 May 2008. Keyword: “American opinion”, “anti-German”.

Secondary Sources

Small, Melvin. “The United States and the German “Threat” to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914.” The Americas 28.3 (1972): 252-270. JSTOR. 23 Apr. 2008. Keyword: “anti-German”, “great war”.

---

[1] Melvin Small. “The United States and the German “Threat” to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914.” The Americas 28.3 (1972), 252.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 253.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere, 254.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 267.

[11] Ibid.

[12] “The President’s Warning.” The New York Times (Mar. 13, 1913), 1.

[13] “Anti-German Setiment: Two Reasons Why the Kaiser is to Blame for the War.” The New York Times (Aug. 16, 1914), 14.

[14] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 257.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 258.

[18] Small, “German “Threat” to the “Hemisphere”, 259.

[19] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 260.

[20] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 261.

[21] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 263.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 263.

[25] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 254.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Small, “German “Threat” to the Hemisphere”, 265.

[28] “Uncover German Plot To Embroil US With Mexico.” The New York Times (Dec. 8^th, 1915), 1.

[29] Ibid.

[30] “Berlin Disavows Rintelen’s Plots In Official Order to Bernstorff…” The New Yo k Times (Dec. 13^th, 1915): 1.

[31] Ibid.