My professor of Russian history, Peter Brown, inspired our class to address some very interesting subjects over the course of our studies. For me, religion was always the most interesting - usually because the texts exaggerated the religious aspects drastically. My favorite source for this writing was "All Russia Is Burning!" - definitely one of the best texts I've read on the subject of "peasant practice".
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For the peasant of Late Imperial Russia, religion was a matter of extreme important and quite central to all aspects of life. Proper practice of the Orthodox faith and a strong clergy were considered more than essential to the life of the villages and the lengths to which the residents of countryside villages went to in order to ensure quality in their religious representatives was impressive . Religion was perhaps most important in the home, where invocations were made to saints – represented by icons in the human – for protection and to ensure the family’s prospering. To the peasants, God’s unmatchable position as the leading protector of honest Orthodox practitioners was bolstered by local rituals, some pre-Christian in origin but executed in ways that only affirmed the peasant’s dedication to Christianity, and included the utilization of matter meant to represent the divine such as holy water, religious sites or protective fire . The generally unchanging realm of Russian peasant religion allowed for villages to retain their traditions for many years and, in employing aspects of folk religion, ensured an ease of practice through access to the Orthodox God. As a result, the Russian peasant knew their religion thoroughly and could be particularly well-versed in biblical knowledge .
Despite the dedication of the peasantry to Orthodoxy, foreign observers regularly branded the religion practiced by the lower classes as dreadfully inappropriate and, in some cases, brazenly paganistic. Visiting religious figures or state officers regularly labeled peasant practice of Orthodoxy as marred and thoroughly desecrated through the crude behavior of the peasantry (as well as the local clergy, according to some ). To officials, the religion practiced by the Russian peasantry was incorrect and blamed on a number of reasons ranging from the dour state of literacy among the nation’s peasants as well as an assumed return to pre-Christian values that had begun to violently turn the lower classes against the religion: according to foreign observers, the church’s authority and possessions were commonly disrespected and the clergy even put into danger by the increasingly volatile lower classes . Efforts were made to better educate the peasantry within the religious sphere and denounce aspects of local religion considered heretical, but the peasants were still considered to be too uncivilized or unintelligent to properly adhere to Orthodox Christianity in the face of pagan practices . The more privileged of the Orthodox and state ranks saw the peasantry as heretical, while the peasantry saw their devotion to God as utterly legitimate and comprehensive. Thus emerges a question on the subject of the Russian peasant’s religious mentality: were the familiar devotions of the lower classes legitimate and conductive to peasant religious life – and the state too obtrusive in branding the peasants as heathens – or did foreign observers have a strong argument in favor of a tighter hold on peasant religious life to prevent the burgeoning irreligious nature of the Russian peasants?
The methods of religion put to use by the peasants themselves made much sense within the framework of the Russian peasant mindset and community. One of the most notable qualities of folk Orthodoxy, or dvoeverie (“double faith”), is its legacy of tradition among the peasants; as stated by Chulos in his piece “Myths of the Pious or Pagan…”, “tradition [dvoeverie] was sacred and, as a popular expression put it, not to be questioned” . Thus, the Orthodox peasant practice represented a comfortable factor within the otherwise difficult life of the peasants – it was a stable tradition to which the peasants could adhere in order to cope with daily trouble. Peasant Orthodoxy united and strengthened the community and its representatives in the forms of regional priests were very important figures in the community due to their positions as representative of the faith. In some cases, peasants protested against changes within the structure of the local clergy and provoked the appearance of Tsarist law enforcement to quell unrest over the perceived attempt at dismantling an aspect of their lives; the reaction from the visiting religious superintendent was to spitefully accuse the peasants of irreligious drunkardry . This event is a stark contrast to the accusation made by officials that the peasants had began a campaign of aggression against Orthodox clergy – rather, the peasants considered priests to be extremely important parts of their lives. Within some communities, a combination of unfamiliarity of proper treatment of Orthodox clergy or legitimate veneration caused some members of the peasant community to nearly worship members of the clergy due to their apparent holiness . The attempts of the state at interfering within the structure of the peasant community through denouncement of peasant activity as harmful to the church was restrictive to the peasants’ religious development and, in cases where the peasants performed acts that did not mesh well with existing state church doctrine, their innovations were branded as elements of dvoeverie.
Peasant practitioners thought themselves to be nothing more exotic or profane than simple Orthodox Christians and that the less ‘mainstream’ elements they incorporated into their faith were put to use in order to honor God, not to defame Orthodoxy like observers seemed to assume; ‘pagan rituals’ were simply prayers executed by peasants hoping to invoke holy protection or aid in almost any event – a useful quality in the world of the peasants, where each new daily hardship may require asking for the help of a patron saint . This is not dissimilar to the Catholic tradition in which the assistance of saints was invoked in a time of need, nor was it much different from the Islamic Sufi tendency to request the spiritual governance of famous hadrat (“great presences”).
An example of rituals perceived to be paganistic in nature would be the apparent ‘worship’ of fire by peasants as detailed in Russia is Burning!. In her work, Frierson observes that fire was not worshipped in any variety of anti-Christian or pagan behavior but venerated as an earthly representation of divine power; to many, the ‘holy fire’ produced through lightning strikes was considered the work of the Hebrew prophet Elijah and thus a direct representation of God’s legitimacy . The aforementioned Feast of St. John the Baptist, also known as ‘Kupalo’, used fire as a deliverer of divine protection: peasants would leap through a blazing bonfire in order to ensure holy shielding from evil. While leaning toward a folk tradition due to its position on the agrarian calendar (and thus potentially related to ancient non-Christian practices due to the pagan focus on the changing of the seasons), the practice is specifically noted by Frierson as representative of how peasants celebrated Orthodox Christian holidays . The peasant adoration of fire, despite the major role which it played in the life of the lower classes, was regarded as a thoroughly paganistic behavior by observers unfamiliar with the practice’s purpose. The use of fire as representative of a comforting divine presence can be compared to the more mainstream Russian use of holy icons, which could be seen in every Russian dwelling from the lowliest izba (“abode”) to the grandest royal palace.
In seeing what they believed to be un-Christian behavior, observers – as detailed in “Myths of the Pious or Pagan…” – noted that the peasants lacked a general adherence to the sacred nature of purely Orthodox symbols with a final summation being that the peasants were leaning toward a new form of Orthodox paganism . The truth was quite to the contrary, however, as seen through the violently protective nature of the peasantry toward Orthodox structures and icons during the Bolshevik Revolution in which representations of the faith were branded as tools of the collapsing Imperial state and demolished . Despite the truly pious nature of the peasants and the legitimacy of their faith, it could not be believed that the peasants had the capacity to independently interpret their own faith.
The opinion of foreign observers on the subject of the lower classes’ adherence to folk Orthodoxy was that it came as a result of the woeful amounts of peasant ignorance toward life outside of their birth villages. Up until and including this point in history, real education had been completely denied to peasants as decreed by a 1723 synod which stated that it was essential for houses of education “to dismiss and henceforth not to admit people belonging to estate owners and the sons of peasants, as well as the stupid and the malignant” – effectively a direct insult to the peasants, as well as a display of the general attitude of the privileged toward the peasants . In viewing material on the subject, a reader may quickly begin to see the insultingly simple way in which the privileged view the peasants: they were largely considered unintelligent and, thus, likely victims of religious corruption due to their complete lack of knowledge (and disinterest) of Orthodox Christianity . Some sources provide differing information, especially on the subject of religion: peasant devotees were known to log complaints about theologically unqualified clergymen, citing their own impressive understanding of Orthodox scripture and ritual in denouncing ill-informed church representatives . This interaction between the higher clergy and the peasantry supports the fact that the privileged did not fully comprehend the nature of peasant Christianity, as can also be seen in their mislabeling of folk Orthodoxy as paganism and general underappreciation of the consideration the peasantry put into their religion. An example of the latter can be seen in the chernitsy, young women of Central Russia who had taken a vow of celibacy in the name of God and spent their lives teaching the peasants about the importance of religion; these figures were popular among the peasantry and received much appreciation for the work that they did in the name of the faith. Citing this as yet another example of peasant ignorance, Archbishop Anastasii called for an end to chernitsy activity and for his clergy to actively preach against their influence . The criticism of the Orthodox Church – a belief structure that utilizes adapted ‘heathen’ symbols in the foundations of its own faith – toward innovations within their own religion in forms such as the chernitsy and the use of purifying ‘divine’ fire is fairly ludicrous. The peasants themselves were restrained in expressing their true religion due to the hypocrisies of the authoritative state church, and even later under the Bolsheviks.
As can be seen in records of interaction between foreign observers or the privileged and the peasantry, the nobility and upper clergy refuse to recognize the potential legitimacy in the lower classes’ interpretation of Orthodox Christianity. Continuing traditional trans-class Russian relations, the privileged members of Late Imperial Russia’s higher classes doubted that the religious convictions of the peasantry could be anything but a warped desecration of the faith system which the state clergy believed to be a form of new Christian paganism. The peasant’s supposed hostile treatment of the clergy, too, was indicative of the crude and unholy nature of the prostoi narod (“dark masses”). The inability of the peasants to adhere to true Orthodox ritual and holiday supported this mindset. Most likely unknown to the upper classes and high clergy of Late Imperial Russia was the true nature of the Russian peasant: well-informed in their piety and quite devoted in their worship of God, specifically within the Orthodox Christian frame. The higher classes’ disavowal of the peasantry’s potential to express itself religiously is simply a continuation of the unfair status of the peasantry – one that characterized the entire peasant class, an overwhelming portion of Russia’s population, as relegated to permanent ignorance and endless servitude to the upper classes as a result. The following passage, written by Vissarion Belinsky in his communications with famed Russian novelist Nikolai Gogol, describes the religious mentality of the Russian peasant quite succinctly.
“You, as far as I can see, do not properly understand the Russian public. Its character is determined by the condition of Russian society in which fresh forces are seething and struggling for expression, but weighted down by heavy oppression and finding no outlet, they induce merely dejection, weariness and apathy.”
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Works Cited
1. Belinsky, Vissarion and Thomas Riha (ed.). "Letter to Gogol” in Readings in Russian Civilization Volume II – Imperial Russia, 1700-1917 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1969).
2. Chulos, C.J. “Myths of the Pious or Pagan Peasant in Post-Emancipation Central Russia (Voronezh Province).” Russian History/Histoire Russe 22 (1995).
3. Frierson, Cathy A. All Russia is Burning!: a Cultural History of Fire and Arson in Late Imperial Russia (University of Washington Press: Seattle/London, 2002).
4. Menshutkin, Boris and Thomas Riha (ed.). “Lomonosov (Excerpts)” in Readings in Russian Civilization Volume II – Imperial Russia, 1700-1917 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1969.)
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I can't speak highly enough of Prof. Brown - the source materials he employed, alone, were worth the cost of admission.
Showing posts with label sufi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sufi. Show all posts
Saturday, August 21, 2010
Religious Development in Post-Independence Algeria
A paper that's admittedly shorter than I'd prefer, but a decent one that I had fun researching. I hope you like reading about the long-term results of colonialism!
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Under the French, Algeria’s Islam was considered indigenous subversion against colonial rule. In French Algeria, religious uniformity was used as a qualifier for avoiding the eye of the colonial authorities. Abandonment of indigenous (or in the Protestant case, non-French) creeds also bestowed the ability to apply for French citizenship – an essential step toward participating in France’s progressive republican system of governance. French restrictions upon Islamic symbols, such as the popular veiling of women according to Qur’anic law, led to the use of colonial tactics such as the forced unveiling of Algerian women as punishment for practicing the tradition. The religious structure, too, was restricted in its behavior. The French actively persecuted the rural Algerian mystics known as marabouts due to their potentially subversive and rebellious nature ; the urban ulama were stripped of their societal influence by the forcefully secular colonial authorities. These anti-Islamic, and indeed anti-religious actions, would have a deep impact upon Algeria’s future.
The independence of Algeria in July of 1962, achieved after a long and costly war between various factions hoping to gain control of the collapsing colonial entity, occurred in part due to religious factors. One of the major factions, the revolutionary Algerian group known as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), incorporated members of not only secular Algerian society but also members of an emerging reformist bloc within the generally powerless urban religious class. This “Reformist Ulama” derived its beliefs from the teachings of the modernist Algerian theologian Ben Badis (1889-1940), a conservative Muslim who disavowed the Islam of the Sufi-oriented marabouts and founded the conservative and anti-colonial Association of Muslim Algerian Ulama. His views gradually gained popular adherence as the public began to identify with the reformists, moreso than with the weakened urban ulama or the quietist rural Sufis who no longer represented the best interests of the Algerians. Islam acted as a unifying force among the resistant Algerians, and the “Reformist Ulama” functioned as a sort of lightning rod of resistance against the French. Thus, at the turn of Algeria’s rebirth, its religious traditions gained resurgence through conservatism.
Algeria’s new government, led by and large by former members of the Front de Libération Nationale, immediately elevated Islam to the level of state doctrine. Both the Algerian Constitution of 1964 as well as the second Algerian Constitution of 1976 declared Islam as the official religion of the Algerian Republic – a far cry from the secularism of the French colonial period. Islamic courts were utilized in family matters, and the Constitution detailed the illegitimacy of any state policies or legal rulings which violating the rules of the Qur’an. The one-party FLN-based government acted quickly, monopolizing their control of the new state’s religious establishment: mosques were built with state funding, Islamic schools were founded to train officials who favored the ruling party, and the FLN even distributed mandatory weekly prayers to imams across the country. The views of the Reformist Ulama were utilized by the FLN in reforming national religious institutions, and the views of Ben Badis contributed – on a noteworthy yet state-friendly note – to the modernist FLN government.
Left out of the new state’s arrangement of power were the actual members of the conservative Reformist Ulama. The more secular FLN had effectively taken control of the new state – leaving other organizations, including the conservative modernist Muslims who had actively fought alongside the FLN against the French and the pieds-noirs, without much influence in the direction taken by the post-colonial government. The initial response to this political maneuvering was the1963 foundation of Al-Qiyam Al-Islamiya – “Islamic Values” – an early Islamist organization composed of both reformist theologians and conservative FLN members who called for the FLN to overhaul the new government to fit into an Islamic state framework. This organization’s ideology was indicative of the changing face of Algerian Islam: while incorporating the views of Ben Badis, it also drew influences of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) – a prominent Islamic modernist writer who functioned as the primary ideologue for the ultraconservative Egyptian Islamist group known as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Al-Qiyam did not last long in any official capacity; similar ideals, however, were soon co-opted by the government. Houari Boumedienne (1932-1978), the military leader who led a coup against the presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella (1918-), advocated a policy of both Arabization and Islamization of the state – a move which led to the official recruitment of exiled members of the ultraconservative Islamist Muslim Brotherhood faction. On a lesser note, Boumedienne also utilized the youth of Al-Qiyam to combat leftist and Marxist student groups at state educational facilities – a precedent which would have grisly repercussions – before dissolving the group and pushing the Islamists underground.
While new elements were introduced to Algerian Islam, more familiar aspects of the region’s religion began to fall out of favor with both these new groups as well as the authoritarian government. This new conservatism gained adherence not only among urban Muslims, but also among rural Muslims – at the cost of abandoning a prominent historical aspect of Algerian Islam. The mystic thought of the Sufi marabouts, while still popular in urban areas, came under criticism from Al-Qiyam due to their non-conformist views and, according to the Islamists, their collaboration-through-inaction in favor of the French colonial government. The FLN-led government, too, began to act out against the marabouts for their lack of adherence to the state’s attempts at modernizing both society and religion. In 1968, sporadic violence occurred around the port city of Mostaganem involving Sufis; instead of addressing the dire social issues impacting the locale, including poverty and crime, the government readily blamed the chaos on the rebellious behavior of subversive mystics.
As official policies toward liberal religious thought hardened, so did the religious practice of the Algerians themselves – just in time for nationwide tumult. A massive government campaign toward creating jobs in the cities, as well as a general trend toward urbanization during the 1970’s and 1980’s, led to a swelling of the population in places such as the national capital at Algiers. The factor which lent fuel to this development was the discovery of both oil and natural gases on Algerian territory. These developments occurred as the state of life in Algerian worsened due to the constantly-tightening grip of the one-party government, which violently struck down protests and culled any emergent organizations – religious or otherwise – which emerged without their consent.
Those within the Islamist structure who hoped to achieve unity with the government were pushed aside by the growing bloc of hardline Islamists who espoused ultraorthodox views, claiming that their views were indicative of real Algerian virtues despite their recent foreign influences. Underneath the economic development of the 1980’s, the simmering ire held by the common Algerian toward his or her government began to fall prey to the influence of this subtle Islamism. Urban men and women began to “Islamify” themselves to keep up with these standards of Algerian value, donning traditional religious clothing such as the hijab for women as well as the thawb and kufi for men. In accordance with the Islamists’ Arabizing ideals, men began to wear beards as a sign of piety – a decision which was critiqued by Sufi figures, a historically weakened demographic which the government began to court in the 1980’s as an ally against Islamist influence, as indicative of the “alien” Wahhabi influence which was infecting the country’s religious atmosphere. Regardless of these views, the Algerian adoption of orthodox Arab-Islamic practices continued, and intensified, through the 1980’s.
As unrest increased and an adherence to conservative Islam emerged in popular Algerian society, the Islamist structure was revived. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), led by Muslims bred by a Muslim Brotherhood-styled education system, was founded in the early 1980’s but splintered quickly. The Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), a successor group led by former FLN official Moustafa Bouyali, courted and employed fundamentalist Muslims who had participated as mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan only months beforehand. The MIA endorsed its own uniformity at universities to compete with government attempts to enact the same policies; this led to the 1982 murder of a University of Algiers student as conducted by MIA operatives. The organization called openly for jihad against the Algerian government, branding it as an apostate regime and laying claim to the true legacy of the Algerian Revolution. Religion, once the glue that kept Algeria unified, began to push the state into instability. that had emerged amidst the government’s reconciliatory period.
Most pertinent to the state of Islam in Algeria were the results of the 1991 election. Prior to them, the growing influence of Algerian Islamists – as well as subversive state-employed former Muslim Brotherhood figures – led to a conciliatory approach by the government, who passed restrictive new family laws in 1984 to appease the Islamists. A resurgent Front Islamique du Salut, led by the populist Ali Benhadj (1956-) and funded by the Saudi-linked former FLN minister Abbassi Madani (1931-), gained admittance to the elections and, after an initial round of voting, seemed poised to gain control of the government. The authoritarian party-in-power, however, disavowed the results and banned further elections in the name of preserving democracy. This spark lit the fire which would become the Algerian Civil War – a conflict that would for eleven years and end in a government victory, a continued low-level insurgency, and a splintered sense of religious unity.
Contemporarily, the government still deals with the threat of Islamism. While the older blocs have weakened, new ones – including the infamous Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – have gained power and societal influence, which are utilized to commit acts of terrorism against a state which fundamentalist Muslims still consider an apostate entity. The semi-authoritarian state still regards itself as adhering to Islam, but has taken steps toward secularization – a move which, within the Algerian religious sense, is both despised and understood.
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Works Cited
Burgat, Francois. Face to Face with Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003.
Burke, Edmund. Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Cudsi, Alexander S. and Ali al-Din Hilal. Islam and Power. London: Croon Helm, 1981.
Deeb, Mary Jane. “Islam and the Algerian State,” in Algeria (Country Study). Library of Congress: Federal Research Division, 2003.
Kepel, Gilles and Anthony F. Roberts (translator). Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Islamic & Politics in the Contemporary World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
Vatin, Jean-Claude. “Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism: Islam in Algeria,” in Islam in the Political Process by James P. Piscatori (editor), 98-121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Winter, Bronwyn. Hijab & the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008.
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If only the professor hadn't put a page limit on it!
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Under the French, Algeria’s Islam was considered indigenous subversion against colonial rule. In French Algeria, religious uniformity was used as a qualifier for avoiding the eye of the colonial authorities. Abandonment of indigenous (or in the Protestant case, non-French) creeds also bestowed the ability to apply for French citizenship – an essential step toward participating in France’s progressive republican system of governance. French restrictions upon Islamic symbols, such as the popular veiling of women according to Qur’anic law, led to the use of colonial tactics such as the forced unveiling of Algerian women as punishment for practicing the tradition. The religious structure, too, was restricted in its behavior. The French actively persecuted the rural Algerian mystics known as marabouts due to their potentially subversive and rebellious nature ; the urban ulama were stripped of their societal influence by the forcefully secular colonial authorities. These anti-Islamic, and indeed anti-religious actions, would have a deep impact upon Algeria’s future.
The independence of Algeria in July of 1962, achieved after a long and costly war between various factions hoping to gain control of the collapsing colonial entity, occurred in part due to religious factors. One of the major factions, the revolutionary Algerian group known as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), incorporated members of not only secular Algerian society but also members of an emerging reformist bloc within the generally powerless urban religious class. This “Reformist Ulama” derived its beliefs from the teachings of the modernist Algerian theologian Ben Badis (1889-1940), a conservative Muslim who disavowed the Islam of the Sufi-oriented marabouts and founded the conservative and anti-colonial Association of Muslim Algerian Ulama. His views gradually gained popular adherence as the public began to identify with the reformists, moreso than with the weakened urban ulama or the quietist rural Sufis who no longer represented the best interests of the Algerians. Islam acted as a unifying force among the resistant Algerians, and the “Reformist Ulama” functioned as a sort of lightning rod of resistance against the French. Thus, at the turn of Algeria’s rebirth, its religious traditions gained resurgence through conservatism.
Algeria’s new government, led by and large by former members of the Front de Libération Nationale, immediately elevated Islam to the level of state doctrine. Both the Algerian Constitution of 1964 as well as the second Algerian Constitution of 1976 declared Islam as the official religion of the Algerian Republic – a far cry from the secularism of the French colonial period. Islamic courts were utilized in family matters, and the Constitution detailed the illegitimacy of any state policies or legal rulings which violating the rules of the Qur’an. The one-party FLN-based government acted quickly, monopolizing their control of the new state’s religious establishment: mosques were built with state funding, Islamic schools were founded to train officials who favored the ruling party, and the FLN even distributed mandatory weekly prayers to imams across the country. The views of the Reformist Ulama were utilized by the FLN in reforming national religious institutions, and the views of Ben Badis contributed – on a noteworthy yet state-friendly note – to the modernist FLN government.
Left out of the new state’s arrangement of power were the actual members of the conservative Reformist Ulama. The more secular FLN had effectively taken control of the new state – leaving other organizations, including the conservative modernist Muslims who had actively fought alongside the FLN against the French and the pieds-noirs, without much influence in the direction taken by the post-colonial government. The initial response to this political maneuvering was the1963 foundation of Al-Qiyam Al-Islamiya – “Islamic Values” – an early Islamist organization composed of both reformist theologians and conservative FLN members who called for the FLN to overhaul the new government to fit into an Islamic state framework. This organization’s ideology was indicative of the changing face of Algerian Islam: while incorporating the views of Ben Badis, it also drew influences of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) – a prominent Islamic modernist writer who functioned as the primary ideologue for the ultraconservative Egyptian Islamist group known as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Al-Qiyam did not last long in any official capacity; similar ideals, however, were soon co-opted by the government. Houari Boumedienne (1932-1978), the military leader who led a coup against the presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella (1918-), advocated a policy of both Arabization and Islamization of the state – a move which led to the official recruitment of exiled members of the ultraconservative Islamist Muslim Brotherhood faction. On a lesser note, Boumedienne also utilized the youth of Al-Qiyam to combat leftist and Marxist student groups at state educational facilities – a precedent which would have grisly repercussions – before dissolving the group and pushing the Islamists underground.
While new elements were introduced to Algerian Islam, more familiar aspects of the region’s religion began to fall out of favor with both these new groups as well as the authoritarian government. This new conservatism gained adherence not only among urban Muslims, but also among rural Muslims – at the cost of abandoning a prominent historical aspect of Algerian Islam. The mystic thought of the Sufi marabouts, while still popular in urban areas, came under criticism from Al-Qiyam due to their non-conformist views and, according to the Islamists, their collaboration-through-inaction in favor of the French colonial government. The FLN-led government, too, began to act out against the marabouts for their lack of adherence to the state’s attempts at modernizing both society and religion. In 1968, sporadic violence occurred around the port city of Mostaganem involving Sufis; instead of addressing the dire social issues impacting the locale, including poverty and crime, the government readily blamed the chaos on the rebellious behavior of subversive mystics.
As official policies toward liberal religious thought hardened, so did the religious practice of the Algerians themselves – just in time for nationwide tumult. A massive government campaign toward creating jobs in the cities, as well as a general trend toward urbanization during the 1970’s and 1980’s, led to a swelling of the population in places such as the national capital at Algiers. The factor which lent fuel to this development was the discovery of both oil and natural gases on Algerian territory. These developments occurred as the state of life in Algerian worsened due to the constantly-tightening grip of the one-party government, which violently struck down protests and culled any emergent organizations – religious or otherwise – which emerged without their consent.
Those within the Islamist structure who hoped to achieve unity with the government were pushed aside by the growing bloc of hardline Islamists who espoused ultraorthodox views, claiming that their views were indicative of real Algerian virtues despite their recent foreign influences. Underneath the economic development of the 1980’s, the simmering ire held by the common Algerian toward his or her government began to fall prey to the influence of this subtle Islamism. Urban men and women began to “Islamify” themselves to keep up with these standards of Algerian value, donning traditional religious clothing such as the hijab for women as well as the thawb and kufi for men. In accordance with the Islamists’ Arabizing ideals, men began to wear beards as a sign of piety – a decision which was critiqued by Sufi figures, a historically weakened demographic which the government began to court in the 1980’s as an ally against Islamist influence, as indicative of the “alien” Wahhabi influence which was infecting the country’s religious atmosphere. Regardless of these views, the Algerian adoption of orthodox Arab-Islamic practices continued, and intensified, through the 1980’s.
As unrest increased and an adherence to conservative Islam emerged in popular Algerian society, the Islamist structure was revived. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), led by Muslims bred by a Muslim Brotherhood-styled education system, was founded in the early 1980’s but splintered quickly. The Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), a successor group led by former FLN official Moustafa Bouyali, courted and employed fundamentalist Muslims who had participated as mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan only months beforehand. The MIA endorsed its own uniformity at universities to compete with government attempts to enact the same policies; this led to the 1982 murder of a University of Algiers student as conducted by MIA operatives. The organization called openly for jihad against the Algerian government, branding it as an apostate regime and laying claim to the true legacy of the Algerian Revolution. Religion, once the glue that kept Algeria unified, began to push the state into instability. that had emerged amidst the government’s reconciliatory period.
Most pertinent to the state of Islam in Algeria were the results of the 1991 election. Prior to them, the growing influence of Algerian Islamists – as well as subversive state-employed former Muslim Brotherhood figures – led to a conciliatory approach by the government, who passed restrictive new family laws in 1984 to appease the Islamists. A resurgent Front Islamique du Salut, led by the populist Ali Benhadj (1956-) and funded by the Saudi-linked former FLN minister Abbassi Madani (1931-), gained admittance to the elections and, after an initial round of voting, seemed poised to gain control of the government. The authoritarian party-in-power, however, disavowed the results and banned further elections in the name of preserving democracy. This spark lit the fire which would become the Algerian Civil War – a conflict that would for eleven years and end in a government victory, a continued low-level insurgency, and a splintered sense of religious unity.
Contemporarily, the government still deals with the threat of Islamism. While the older blocs have weakened, new ones – including the infamous Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – have gained power and societal influence, which are utilized to commit acts of terrorism against a state which fundamentalist Muslims still consider an apostate entity. The semi-authoritarian state still regards itself as adhering to Islam, but has taken steps toward secularization – a move which, within the Algerian religious sense, is both despised and understood.
---
Works Cited
Burgat, Francois. Face to Face with Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003.
Burke, Edmund. Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Cudsi, Alexander S. and Ali al-Din Hilal. Islam and Power. London: Croon Helm, 1981.
Deeb, Mary Jane. “Islam and the Algerian State,” in Algeria (Country Study). Library of Congress: Federal Research Division, 2003.
Kepel, Gilles and Anthony F. Roberts (translator). Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Islamic & Politics in the Contemporary World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
Vatin, Jean-Claude. “Popular Puritanism versus State Reformism: Islam in Algeria,” in Islam in the Political Process by James P. Piscatori (editor), 98-121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Winter, Bronwyn. Hijab & the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008.
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If only the professor hadn't put a page limit on it!
Monday, November 24, 2008
Flawed Concepts Through Time, Vol. XXVI: Military Politics
Don't get me wrong, I think military activity is cool in a historical sense - medieval and pre-modern militaries up until the 1900's are really interesting. Maybe it's just the depersonalized nature of pressing a button and having a thousand people explode that turns me off of modern warfare. Call it a penchant for putting a personal touch on things, who knows.
Here's my just-graded (and thus publishable, in my opinion) essay on the negative effects of military politics within the framework of pre-modern Islamic government. The work took on an almost anarchic bent against inappropriate government practices as I began to finish it, and I think that was the view my professor hoped we'd achieve.
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The importance of religion within the Muslim sphere between the age of Mohammad and the eighteenth century is supreme: Islam acted as a definitive compass for life, providing common cultural and social practices for the great amount of people who practiced it; it also birthed new legal systems, allowing for a sense of universal law and safety while in the company of practitioners. Islam, as a belief system, existed primarily as such but barely secondarily as a unifier of disparate peoples and places – the Muslim community, or ‘umma’, was a world-spanning system under which, despite political fractures, a Muslim could travel from the far ends of the North African Maghreb to the southern depths of the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia with little relative problem. The overarching umma, united under a similar religion and thus relatively related cultural practices, would allow for the traveler to find safe haven wherever they would go within the Dar al-Islam, or ‘abode of Islam’. The missionary work of Sufis worked as a major conversional factor for Islam: the fringe regions of the world outside of the Dar al-Islam were soon home to peaceful, materially-uninvolved Muslims who sought to spread the wealth of their religion – meaning that Islam as a religious and communal sphere was constantly expanding across Eurasia. Under the umma, a Muslim could feel ‘asabiyyah’ – group feeling, or social solidarity. According to the Muslim scholar Ibn-Khaldun, asabiyyah was an essential factor to a properly-functioning umma: without it, groups would fight amongst themselves and cities would crumble.
Hamilton Gibb’s piece “The Community in Islamic History”, as published in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, extolls upon the lack of necessity for traditional government within the early Islamic world. The development of the umma as a structure within Islam is a unique experience for the religion – Christianity, for instance, did not have such a continent-spanning community that provided for its members in the way the umma does. In this way, the Islamic world needed less governance: a cohesive community would fight less amongst itself as would the disjointed world of Christian Europe. Although it experienced roughness along the way in the form of pretenders to rule and fanatics in its ranks, the umma learned to deal with these difficulties. Gibb speaks sternly on the fact that the umma is not a political entity: while a widespread government may put to use strict orthodoxy in all manners of life (including politics), the umma did the opposite by bringing together very different people under a community that fostered an all-encompassing “Islamic culture”. Gibb comments on the propensity for criticism toward the umma for not promoting, through influence of political reforms, helpful standards such as change in education; he counters his own point by pointing to the Islamic revival of Hellenistic literature, an example of the already established Islamic tradition of high intellectual and cultural importance. However, the Muslim sphere was not wholly influenced by Greek works in politics and philosophy – it was not of their heritage and, thus, not as adhered to as it was in the Christian world. Instead of promoting reforms in government and material culture, Muslims gave birth to new spirituality through the work of Sufis – orthodox thought was not heavily addressed in the face of spiritual symbolism and theological issues. This proved to be a handicap in cases involved foreign influence and earthly matters – the umma had trouble confronting new challenges such as opposing governments within the Islamic world and began to oppose disunifying challenges to their community. Eventually, centralized governments proved to be a harsh opponent toward the umma; in the modern day, the politically-inclined doubt the general existence of the umma. Gibb, on the other hand, believes that the umma is still very much alive at its core and is expanding due to its all-encompassing nature and its lack of involvement with troubling, diving societal aspects such as politics.
J.C. Hurewitz discusses the invariable nature of military involvement and social disunity in Islamic politics in his Journal of the American Oriental Society article, “Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750”. Hurewitz sees military politics as a regular method of power transmission for dynasties and political systems within the Dar al-Islam and states that they are extremely popular due to a lack of concrete succession policies. Most Muslim dynasties were tribalist and militaristic at their roots due to the origin of their religion: the harsh upbringing of the umma resulted in superior martial ability, supporting the belief that the subjects of stable Islamic leader have little to fear due to the superior protective ability of that figure. Hurewitz states that the famed scholar Ibn-Khaldun would be widely displeased with the three existing Muslim dynasties of the 1700’s – the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire – due to their high propensity for bureaucracy and a lack of social unity, factors which would eventually lead to their downfall (yet not so in the case of the Ottomans, who would exist only due to Europeans who feared a regional power vacuum in the face of Ottoman collapse). Despite political disunity, the umma still existed: states were connected through common religion and legal background in shari’ah, allowing traveling Muslims such as Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Battuta to work in very different settings due to their understanding of universal Muslim law. However, political disunity did prove from time to time to be harmful – for instance, the Safavid development of their uniquely Shiite Ja’fari code in the face of Sunni neighbors did little to unify the Dar al-Islam. In fact, little outside of the basic political structure existed within the Islamic sphere that would suggest a capability for governments to exist in the European sense: lines of sovereignty were never properly drawn in the Muslim world, creating regional legal imbalances and disputes. Fratricide proved to be a major problem for every major Muslim dynasty in the Near East: the Ottomans were eventually forced to legalize only specific ways of kin murder due to its high prevalence and the Safavids were faced with possibly dozens of murders every time a succession crisis occurred. This lack of traditional rules led to a lack of balance within the politics of the Dar al-Islam, balanced only through military politics: power was enforced through constant strength of arms due to government policies not covering essential subjects such as succession and power boundaries. Eventually, military power came into play as a major decider in succession: those with the most support from the military as well as administrative support from the palace would be best in the running for the position of leader. This led to heated rivalries between family members, all of whom could must some military power due to their position as nobility; in turn, this led to disunity within the umma due to the possibility of widespread armed conflict between Muslims. This focus on government that the major Muslim dynasties allowed actually found itself undermined due to a necessary focus on military strength: the Turkic Qizilbash nomads who entered into the military service of rival Safavid princes, for instance, eventually came to dominate the political scene of the region due to the military clout they held. Similarly, nomadic Berber groups employed by the Moroccan ‘Alawi leaders such as Mawlay Isma’il would exert a large amount of influence over succession upon leaders’ deaths. The Ottomans felt the impact of the Janissaries upon their courts upon the dilution of the strict military corps by Murad III, who discontinued the Islamization of the group by allowing free Muslims, as opposed to non-Muslim slaves or conscripts; this led to an essential corruption within the military. Hurewitz concludes that the use of an army as a political tool proved to be a major obstacle in the path of Islamic unity.
Advancing government proved to be a very complicated obstacle for Islam and its umma. In medieval and Renaissance-age Europe, governments and ruling systems would be challenged, overthrown and modified to fit the societies over which they resided; the Dar al-Islam was no different, as it would take little time until politics would come head-to-head with the umma. Non-tribal or religious politics and government within the Islamic world are a juxtapositional, if not detrimental, presence: inherently, politics act as a partitioner within groups of people, dividing people into different factions that almost assuredly come to blows over almost any societal detail. Gibb’s comments on material governments presenting a challenge and splitting up the non-orthodox, spiritually-inclined umma support this. Politics breed rivalries within the umma that remove the legitimacy and existence of asabiyyah – politically-fueled fractures within a community prevent social solidarity, invalidating the umma’s purpose. Modernly-defined government within the Islamic sphere leads ultimately to selfish, self-promoting behavior that creates power blocs within the umma, shattering it for good and leading to a lack of protective unity.
As stated by Ibn-Khaldun, this lack of unity inevitably leads to annihilation: other factions possessing a functioning asabiyyah, such as Turkic nomads or other less-centralized yet concentrated Muslim contingencies can easily tear apart the shreds of society that separative government leaves in its wake. The tendency of Muslim dynasties to resort to allowing militaristic influence to take over their own government shows, quite blatantly, the accuracy of Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion: the umma will eventually collapse in the face of centralized government due to a loss of asabiyyah. Asabiyyah is essential to nomadic life, and to an extent military life, because it stresses a unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. Properly-governed people lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads.
Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. In Gibbs’ article, it can be seen that those Muslims who focus on government and material matters lose their focus on religion and spirituality; while they make eventually make progress against the non-orthodox umma, it is all for naught once factionalization becomes overwhelming. Politics causes people to factionalize quickly; they have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders . The splintering of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia as a result of a succession crisis would be a damning example of this.
Without asabiyyah, Islamic folk who focus on government instead of social unity find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the purpose of the umma however, is to function as a support system for its people, uniting them under religion as opposed to focusing on earthly matters . Among the non-political umma there is little corruption for this very reason. Political issues not only divide the umma between opposing state and political parties but also cause fractures in society in terms of wealth and ability. When the political system is eventually corrupted and militaristic factions compete for power, the entire populace suffers – chunks of the umma are erased in the name of succession and political boundaries. The government experienced by Muslims from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century fails to follow traditional Islamic standards: it cleaves apart the umma, leaving savagery in its wake.
Ibn-Khaldun; trans. F. Rosenthal. Ed. N.J. Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction], 124.
Ibn-Khaldun, 134.
Bibliography
1. Gibb, Hamilton A.R. April 1963. The Community in Islamic History. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Volume 25, Issue 2.
2. Hurewitz, J.C. March 1968. Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Volume 88, Issue 1.
3. Ibn-Khaldun. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Ed. Nessim Joseph Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction]. Princeton University, 1981. 124-54.
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A pre-modern Islamic political piece I recently read, 'Ministers and Bribery' by Sari Mehmed Pasha (an Ottoman vizier who introduced anti-corruption thought into the government's virtues before being cut down by a man who was either a crazed dervish or a hired blade of the sultan), seems to be the response to my view. Through proper jurisdiction, an Islamic government is incorruptible; needless to say, however, was the corruptibility of the Ottoman government throughout its tenure. Despite his potentially conspired end, I find him to be an entirely reasonable source whose political ideals should be studied closer by modern politicians both in the Middle East and elsewhere. I'll put up an assignment pertaining to Sari's work pretty soon.
Here's my just-graded (and thus publishable, in my opinion) essay on the negative effects of military politics within the framework of pre-modern Islamic government. The work took on an almost anarchic bent against inappropriate government practices as I began to finish it, and I think that was the view my professor hoped we'd achieve.
---
The importance of religion within the Muslim sphere between the age of Mohammad and the eighteenth century is supreme: Islam acted as a definitive compass for life, providing common cultural and social practices for the great amount of people who practiced it; it also birthed new legal systems, allowing for a sense of universal law and safety while in the company of practitioners. Islam, as a belief system, existed primarily as such but barely secondarily as a unifier of disparate peoples and places – the Muslim community, or ‘umma’, was a world-spanning system under which, despite political fractures, a Muslim could travel from the far ends of the North African Maghreb to the southern depths of the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia with little relative problem. The overarching umma, united under a similar religion and thus relatively related cultural practices, would allow for the traveler to find safe haven wherever they would go within the Dar al-Islam, or ‘abode of Islam’. The missionary work of Sufis worked as a major conversional factor for Islam: the fringe regions of the world outside of the Dar al-Islam were soon home to peaceful, materially-uninvolved Muslims who sought to spread the wealth of their religion – meaning that Islam as a religious and communal sphere was constantly expanding across Eurasia. Under the umma, a Muslim could feel ‘asabiyyah’ – group feeling, or social solidarity. According to the Muslim scholar Ibn-Khaldun, asabiyyah was an essential factor to a properly-functioning umma: without it, groups would fight amongst themselves and cities would crumble.
Hamilton Gibb’s piece “The Community in Islamic History”, as published in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, extolls upon the lack of necessity for traditional government within the early Islamic world. The development of the umma as a structure within Islam is a unique experience for the religion – Christianity, for instance, did not have such a continent-spanning community that provided for its members in the way the umma does. In this way, the Islamic world needed less governance: a cohesive community would fight less amongst itself as would the disjointed world of Christian Europe. Although it experienced roughness along the way in the form of pretenders to rule and fanatics in its ranks, the umma learned to deal with these difficulties. Gibb speaks sternly on the fact that the umma is not a political entity: while a widespread government may put to use strict orthodoxy in all manners of life (including politics), the umma did the opposite by bringing together very different people under a community that fostered an all-encompassing “Islamic culture”. Gibb comments on the propensity for criticism toward the umma for not promoting, through influence of political reforms, helpful standards such as change in education; he counters his own point by pointing to the Islamic revival of Hellenistic literature, an example of the already established Islamic tradition of high intellectual and cultural importance. However, the Muslim sphere was not wholly influenced by Greek works in politics and philosophy – it was not of their heritage and, thus, not as adhered to as it was in the Christian world. Instead of promoting reforms in government and material culture, Muslims gave birth to new spirituality through the work of Sufis – orthodox thought was not heavily addressed in the face of spiritual symbolism and theological issues. This proved to be a handicap in cases involved foreign influence and earthly matters – the umma had trouble confronting new challenges such as opposing governments within the Islamic world and began to oppose disunifying challenges to their community. Eventually, centralized governments proved to be a harsh opponent toward the umma; in the modern day, the politically-inclined doubt the general existence of the umma. Gibb, on the other hand, believes that the umma is still very much alive at its core and is expanding due to its all-encompassing nature and its lack of involvement with troubling, diving societal aspects such as politics.
J.C. Hurewitz discusses the invariable nature of military involvement and social disunity in Islamic politics in his Journal of the American Oriental Society article, “Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750”. Hurewitz sees military politics as a regular method of power transmission for dynasties and political systems within the Dar al-Islam and states that they are extremely popular due to a lack of concrete succession policies. Most Muslim dynasties were tribalist and militaristic at their roots due to the origin of their religion: the harsh upbringing of the umma resulted in superior martial ability, supporting the belief that the subjects of stable Islamic leader have little to fear due to the superior protective ability of that figure. Hurewitz states that the famed scholar Ibn-Khaldun would be widely displeased with the three existing Muslim dynasties of the 1700’s – the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire – due to their high propensity for bureaucracy and a lack of social unity, factors which would eventually lead to their downfall (yet not so in the case of the Ottomans, who would exist only due to Europeans who feared a regional power vacuum in the face of Ottoman collapse). Despite political disunity, the umma still existed: states were connected through common religion and legal background in shari’ah, allowing traveling Muslims such as Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Battuta to work in very different settings due to their understanding of universal Muslim law. However, political disunity did prove from time to time to be harmful – for instance, the Safavid development of their uniquely Shiite Ja’fari code in the face of Sunni neighbors did little to unify the Dar al-Islam. In fact, little outside of the basic political structure existed within the Islamic sphere that would suggest a capability for governments to exist in the European sense: lines of sovereignty were never properly drawn in the Muslim world, creating regional legal imbalances and disputes. Fratricide proved to be a major problem for every major Muslim dynasty in the Near East: the Ottomans were eventually forced to legalize only specific ways of kin murder due to its high prevalence and the Safavids were faced with possibly dozens of murders every time a succession crisis occurred. This lack of traditional rules led to a lack of balance within the politics of the Dar al-Islam, balanced only through military politics: power was enforced through constant strength of arms due to government policies not covering essential subjects such as succession and power boundaries. Eventually, military power came into play as a major decider in succession: those with the most support from the military as well as administrative support from the palace would be best in the running for the position of leader. This led to heated rivalries between family members, all of whom could must some military power due to their position as nobility; in turn, this led to disunity within the umma due to the possibility of widespread armed conflict between Muslims. This focus on government that the major Muslim dynasties allowed actually found itself undermined due to a necessary focus on military strength: the Turkic Qizilbash nomads who entered into the military service of rival Safavid princes, for instance, eventually came to dominate the political scene of the region due to the military clout they held. Similarly, nomadic Berber groups employed by the Moroccan ‘Alawi leaders such as Mawlay Isma’il would exert a large amount of influence over succession upon leaders’ deaths. The Ottomans felt the impact of the Janissaries upon their courts upon the dilution of the strict military corps by Murad III, who discontinued the Islamization of the group by allowing free Muslims, as opposed to non-Muslim slaves or conscripts; this led to an essential corruption within the military. Hurewitz concludes that the use of an army as a political tool proved to be a major obstacle in the path of Islamic unity.
Advancing government proved to be a very complicated obstacle for Islam and its umma. In medieval and Renaissance-age Europe, governments and ruling systems would be challenged, overthrown and modified to fit the societies over which they resided; the Dar al-Islam was no different, as it would take little time until politics would come head-to-head with the umma. Non-tribal or religious politics and government within the Islamic world are a juxtapositional, if not detrimental, presence: inherently, politics act as a partitioner within groups of people, dividing people into different factions that almost assuredly come to blows over almost any societal detail. Gibb’s comments on material governments presenting a challenge and splitting up the non-orthodox, spiritually-inclined umma support this. Politics breed rivalries within the umma that remove the legitimacy and existence of asabiyyah – politically-fueled fractures within a community prevent social solidarity, invalidating the umma’s purpose. Modernly-defined government within the Islamic sphere leads ultimately to selfish, self-promoting behavior that creates power blocs within the umma, shattering it for good and leading to a lack of protective unity.
As stated by Ibn-Khaldun, this lack of unity inevitably leads to annihilation: other factions possessing a functioning asabiyyah, such as Turkic nomads or other less-centralized yet concentrated Muslim contingencies can easily tear apart the shreds of society that separative government leaves in its wake. The tendency of Muslim dynasties to resort to allowing militaristic influence to take over their own government shows, quite blatantly, the accuracy of Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion: the umma will eventually collapse in the face of centralized government due to a loss of asabiyyah. Asabiyyah is essential to nomadic life, and to an extent military life, because it stresses a unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. Properly-governed people lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads.
Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. In Gibbs’ article, it can be seen that those Muslims who focus on government and material matters lose their focus on religion and spirituality; while they make eventually make progress against the non-orthodox umma, it is all for naught once factionalization becomes overwhelming. Politics causes people to factionalize quickly; they have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders . The splintering of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia as a result of a succession crisis would be a damning example of this.
Without asabiyyah, Islamic folk who focus on government instead of social unity find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the purpose of the umma however, is to function as a support system for its people, uniting them under religion as opposed to focusing on earthly matters . Among the non-political umma there is little corruption for this very reason. Political issues not only divide the umma between opposing state and political parties but also cause fractures in society in terms of wealth and ability. When the political system is eventually corrupted and militaristic factions compete for power, the entire populace suffers – chunks of the umma are erased in the name of succession and political boundaries. The government experienced by Muslims from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century fails to follow traditional Islamic standards: it cleaves apart the umma, leaving savagery in its wake.
Ibn-Khaldun; trans. F. Rosenthal. Ed. N.J. Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction], 124.
Ibn-Khaldun, 134.
Bibliography
1. Gibb, Hamilton A.R. April 1963. The Community in Islamic History. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Volume 25, Issue 2.
2. Hurewitz, J.C. March 1968. Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Volume 88, Issue 1.
3. Ibn-Khaldun. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Ed. Nessim Joseph Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction]. Princeton University, 1981. 124-54.
---
A pre-modern Islamic political piece I recently read, 'Ministers and Bribery' by Sari Mehmed Pasha (an Ottoman vizier who introduced anti-corruption thought into the government's virtues before being cut down by a man who was either a crazed dervish or a hired blade of the sultan), seems to be the response to my view. Through proper jurisdiction, an Islamic government is incorruptible; needless to say, however, was the corruptibility of the Ottoman government throughout its tenure. Despite his potentially conspired end, I find him to be an entirely reasonable source whose political ideals should be studied closer by modern politicians both in the Middle East and elsewhere. I'll put up an assignment pertaining to Sari's work pretty soon.
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