Here's a paper that I wrote on the endangerment of legitimate archaeology caught up in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. I found some of the facts of the case fairly interesting.
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Ongoing conflicts of national legitimacy, which range from local tension to full-out war, factor heavily into the process of contemporary archaeology. The dangers faced by archaeologists in war zones or areas of nationalistic unrest are numerous; danger to the physical well-being of a researcher is always a possibility, especially if the researcher is employed by a non-neutral party or has a controversial purpose at a site that is disapproved of by a participant in the conflict. A display of this can be seen in the case of Albert Glock, an American archaeologist who was assassinated almost twenty years ago during his work on sites in areas disputed between the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel. While the case of Dr. Glock is fairly unique in that he was killed outright for as-yet-unknown purposes by an unknown party, his death shows the difficulties faced by archaeologists in zones of ongoing conflict. There are roadblocks present in the path toward an execution of effective archaeological work in Palestine and Israel: active religious and ethnic tension, extremely prevalent poverty, starkly different political opinions and legal disagreements between the powers attempting to exert control over the location of a site are all mud in the water that is proper archaeology within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As highlighted in Karen Lange’s “The Stolen Past”, the looting of West Bank sites by professional artifact dealers and their smugglers as well as desperate locals is compounded by a political disunity that prevents any real progress from being done to either prevent the despoiling of sites or make the region safe for proper archaeology.
Archaeology on the West Bank is controversial in part because discoveries at disputed sites may lend legitimacy to either side in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the eyes of controversial academic Nadia Abu El-Haj, it is not “normal archaeology”: the bias employed in it as well as the dark political implications behind analysis create a difficult scenario for archaeologists . Indeed, nationalism and recognition for legitimacy are two major sources fueling the Levantine dispute and thus much controversy surrounds any archaeological activity pertaining to the region. There is also the possibility that political or religious bias as a result of attempts to gain cultural legitimacy may come into play during the analysis of site results. The sullying of findings by advisors or even the archaeologists themselves in either the Palestinian or Israeli direction is utterly possible and has occurred, according to the studies of Abu El-Haj; she believes that the quest for achieving nationalistic legitimacy through archaeological work has done damage to the archaeological record . In Abu El-Haj’s opinion, it is extremely important for archaeological discoveries to transcend modern-day patrimony or at least avoid directly being influenced by the rivalry over cultural legitimacy in the region . In agreement with this concept is the deceased Albert Glock himself who states that “the “archaeological record” has been selectively used to justify the present occupation” . Glock goes on to state that the West Bank has become victim to “biblical archaeology” – namely, American or European-led archaeological work with the purpose of proving or disproving ancient religious texts .
As of now, Israeli archaeology does not address many important aspects of Israeli history, nor does it properly represent the extreme variety in culture that the region has come to represent historically as well as in contemporary times. A stark focus on Jewish history as opposed to the grander regional history presents a problem in that it puts other cultures and discoveries on a lower tier of importance within the archaeological record. Constant discoveries and study reports executed in the name of reinforcing Israeli legitimacy do not properly investigate the entirety of the archaeological possibilities in the region, nor do they properly serve the discipline of archaeology in that they are skewed results. In the opinion of Abu El-Haj, much of the archaeological studies in the West Bank by Israeli authorities are done in order to find “alleged evidence of the grand architecture and urban splendor of royal cities, of war, heroism and destruction, and of the momentous events in Jewish history” . In doing so, the archaeologists at these disputed sites are downsizing the importance of other cultural presences in the region from the Phoenicians and Romans to the Mamluks and Ottomans. This can be seen through the heavy-handedness of Israeli archaeology: Jewish sites were approached with scrutiny and proper care while other sites of Latin or Arab influence were excavated using equipment such as bulldozers . The damage done to the non-Jewish site invalidates and destroys possible findings there, wounding the archaeological record twofold: not only are nationalistically-influenced findings entering it but the possibility of analysis of the non-Jewish past of the West Bank is reduced due to destruction.
The institution of nationalistic archaeology not only hurts the archaeological record and thus further investigations but also contributes to contemporary political difficulties. As seen in Lange’s “The Stolen Past”, West Bank locals of both Israeli and Palestinian origin have put to use the regional turmoil created by nationalism by raiding unprotected sites in order to make a living. The difficulty of living in the contested region can be seen in the actions of unemployed local men – not professional grave robbers – who are scouring sites in order to survive on a day to day basis; one man in Lange’s article states that in order to feed his family, he must loot to gain money . The low quality of life for those caught up in the conflict presents yet another problem in that it does not foster the growth of a local tradition of archaeology in order to provide an alternative to nationalistic archaeology. Glock notes the disparity between the numbers of Israeli and Palestinian archaeologists and states that there exists no push toward archaeology as a means of combating opposing viewpoints, tracing his reasoning back to the lack of preparation and guidance given to the Palestinians by European powers during the Mandate Period.
Disagreements between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority have removed chances of a unilateral attempt to crack down on looting as zones of power and opposing legal statutes prevail over joint efforts. Many sites are not patrolled simply because the zone is disputed, meaning that neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis will risk the loss of life by protecting a site that the other has also claimed. This creates a dire situation for archaeologists because, assuming they are even able to work at a site, the results may be sparse. In speaking of the destruction of cultural legacy, Al-Quds University’s archaeology director Salah Al-Houdalieh states this precisely, commenting that little will be left for the archaeologists who are privileged enough to do West Bank excavations in the future .
Perhaps the most striking example of why a joint effort is utterly necessary to protect West Bank archaeological sites can be seen just at the end of Lange’s article. She details the Palestinian arrest of two men, one a Palestinian and the other Israeli, at Bethlehem; they had been trading in illicit antiquities and were thus subject to arrest under tentative Palestinian law. The resulting punishment for the Palestinian was very light (under fourteen days in prison) and the punishment for the Israeli man was nonexistent as the looting of archaeological sites does not break any Israeli statutes . This damning lack of justice shows the turmoil on the West Bank as caused by opposing nationalistic powers that do not keep in mind the effects of biased historical or archaeological work. Nationalistic archaeology is pushing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the wrong direction: biased work presents biased results which are then used as fuel for the feud. A move toward “normal archaeology” (as Nadia Abu El-Haj would call it) would not only benefit the archaeological record but also the intellectual legitimacy of both powers as long as they work toward a nominally nonpartisan goal.
Works Cited
1. Abu El-Haj, Nadia. “Translating Truths: Nationalism, the Practice of Archaeology and the Remaking of Past and Present in Contemporary Jerusalem,” American Ethnologist 25 (2008).
2. Glock, Albert. “Archaeology as Cultural Survival: the Future of the Palestinian Past”, Journal of Palestine Studies 23 (1994).
3. Lange, Karen. "The Stolen Past – West Bank Looting," National Geographic, December 2008, < http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/12/palestine-antiquities/lange-text> (08 December 2008).
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I'll try to remain as mum as possible on this very, very controversial issue; however, I must state my belief that any group that uses archaeology or history as political tools is extremely despicable.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Monday, November 24, 2008
As Opposed To The Doors' "The End", The East Is The Best - At Least During the Medieval Era
A second published piece in one day is a trend that I'm going to have to continue. This paper is from my Global History Since 1500 course, one that I took last semester and enjoyed heavily due to the professor (David Thomas) and the subject matter (the whole world).
It pertains to an important part of economic history: the Indian Ocean as well as its role in regional warfare and widespread wealth. I mention one of my personal heroes - Ibn Battuta - constantly. It shares a lot of similarities (and I mean a lot) with my Globalization vs Tribalism essay, which was done for the same course. I learned a whole lot that semester in my History classes.
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Trade along the Indian Ocean was the result of much heroic exploration and a major impact in historic rises in power, such as the Portuguese Empire which grew wealthy, as well as collapses in structure, such as the caravan system across Central Asia. Among the first few to make the arduous journey to the Far East were three men of particular note for one specific reason: they did a fine job of recording their travels. The first individual was the intrepid Italian explorer Marco Polo, who wrote of his times on the islands in the Eastern Indian Ocean as well as many large cities in the Orient and the Muslim world; for years, he worked in Kublai Khan’s court at mythical Xanadu. The second individual was the Moroccan student Ibn Battuta, who travelled at length, sometimes unexpectedly, along the coasts of the Indian Ocean; his travels displayed the true impact of its cultural exchange and the importance of the area’s trade. The final of the great three individuals to survey and travel the Indian Ocean was the Chinese eunuch admiral Zheng He, charged with exerting Ming power over the rulers of the Indies; his attendant Ma Huan recorded much ethnographic information, ranging from the regional garb of women to the religions professed by far-off foreigners. As seen through the travels and discoveries of Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta, and Zheng He, the importance of the Indian Ocean as a trading front is a historical contingency in that the ambitions of intrepid western travelers and the use of the Indian Ocean after sailing around Africa were the result of the collapse of overland trade routes and inaccessibility of the Eastern world to Europeans.
The reasons as to why the three men and their respective entourages trekked across the Indian Ocean shed some light as to why others may have also done so. Marco Polo’s reasoning for his journey, as the son of a prominent Venetian merchant who also travelled with him, was to establish direct links with the producers of the goods from which his family garnered wealth. Wealth may have been a driving force for many of those who looked to the Indian Ocean; it certainly turned out well for Marco Polo and his father, who worked under the employment of Kublai Khan, the Mongol-Yuan Emperor. The authors’ use of Marco Polo as an example of what could be gained from the Indian Ocean is a fine one: essentially, Polo and his entourage experienced vastly more than what they would have dealt with as simple traders in Venice. Polo’s systematic categorizing and recording of the land, including notes on the unique aspects of each place such as the valuable gemstones of Sri Lanka and linguistic isolation of Gujarat, has contributed much to interpretations by modern historians.
The background of Ibn Battuta’s travels from his home in Morocco to the Far East was not based on financial gain; instead, he was a scholar and tasked himself with experiencing the whole of the Dar al-Islam, the realm of the Muslims. His records are certainly scholarly, showing extensive observance of ethnographic observation and recognition of local customs that were heavily influenced by others in the Indian Ocean region. Ibn Battuta’s noting and questioning of the extent of the regional powers with which he dealt brings to light pointed observations; in the cases of the Bedouin banditry that controlled the reservoirs of Aden or the Hindu brigands who attacked Ibn Battuta’s entourage as he operated on the outskirts of the Delhi Sultanate’s territory, the scholar saw rich lands populated by those who were isolated from their rulers in practice and ethnicity . Ibn Battuta recorded huge amounts of information, citing meetings with dozens of political leaders and approximately two thousand separate people with whom he spoke, lending much information to modern-day historians for study.
The Chinese admiral Zheng He’s reason for travelling the Indian Ocean is much different than those of Polo and Ibn Battuta, as he was unconcerned with sole financial compensation or intellectual pursuits. Instead, the naval leader was tasked by the Yongle Emperor of Ming China to force the submission of the many rulers of the Indies to Ming rule, demanding tribute and allegiance from them with the use of the massive Ming Armada. Exertion of power is thus another reason many powers looked upon the Indian Ocean – while not looking to expand territorially like the Portuguese who would come less than a century later, military might aided in the journeys of Zheng He. The admiral’s translator Ma Huan took very extensive records of each place visited by the Ming Armada, explaining at length many ethnographical notations such as clothing, every possible available commodity, agriculture and craftsmanship, cultural practices and the amount of foreigners at any given place.
The Indian Ocean became very important to many powers, especially European or otherwise western ones, for one main reason: trade supremacy. To the Europeans, the Indian Ocean represented a method of avoidance of the Muslim world’s stranglehold on the Far East – using the body of water to travel, merchants and diplomats could avoid conflict with the ummah and do their business directly with the rich foreign lands beyond. However, a major aspect of this was that of how to access the Indian Ocean without notable Muslim interaction. As of the thirteenth century, Venice’s trade with the Far East was conducted through the conduit of Alexandria, which throughout its history had been ruled by followers of Islam. At one point, the Venetians had planned to outmaneuver the Egyptians and flank the Muslim powers by launching naval military expeditions into the Indian Ocean – a prime example of the importance of the Indian Ocean to westerners, and a display of frustration over the Muslim world’s hold on trade with the East. To the powers of the East, the Indian Ocean represented the next great trade venture after the fall of the Silk Road, which the armies of Tamerlane severed by conquering many major cities along the historic trade route. This was not just the case for the powers of the Near East such as the Sultanate of Delhi or the Ilkhanate (which was responsible for the end of the Silk Road in the first place as subjects of Tamerlane) but was also the case of Ming China, which grew concerned over its loss of trade revenue with the West and sought to find a new route for trade. Just months after the collapse of the caravan system across Central Asia, Zheng He was commissioned by the Yongle Emperor to begin his travels along the Indian Ocean to establish trade dominance.
The actions taken by the major regional powers in regards to the Indian Ocean allow for a better understanding of global history in that a major similarity can be made between all powers involved: despite cultural or societal differences, regional powers recognize the importance of trade and react accordingly. The Venetians, craving an open market with the Far East, nearly acted militarily against the Egyptian Sultanate to gain such a benefit. The Ming Chinese saw their trade collapse with the Silk Road and thus sought new ventures to continue on financially. Knowing the importance of trade supremacy and their position within the region, Ibn Battuta reports that the Sultanate of Delhi shunned casual visitors (including foreign traders) to their lands and forced pledges of allegiance and residence upon foreign guests. These are just examples of what can be seen as a whole chain of reactions as empires and regional powers continuously react to changes made by other powers, in turn making their own changes that must be reacted to; thus, the history of the Indian Ocean can be viewed as a string of historical contingency. This contingency can be linked to the topoi system, which is seen as a long series of recurring and almost cyclical ideas and methods pertaining to history. While the setting may be different, powers will follow familiar ideas in order to achieve their goals.
The end of the Indian Ocean as a prosperous global trading network can be blamed on the discovery of the New World by European powers as well as replacement sources of resources being found outside of the Indian Ocean region. The wealth found in the New World surpasses the resources provided by trade on the Indian Ocean; riches abound began to blow into the Christian and Muslim worlds, and even as far as China did travel silver mined in the mountains of Bolivia. The victories of the Spanish conquistadores over the native Aztec and Incan forces of Mesoamerica provided gigantic amounts of gold, drawing even more attention to the New World and away from the Far East. Spanish silver became common in foreign lands as far as China, the Latin “piece of eight” meeting with newly-discovered Japanese silver to choke the East. The focus of goods began to shift away from the East and focus on Europe and the New World, between which luxuries and precious minerals were shipped as they had been in the Indian Ocean years earlier. Europe began to manufacture goods that were once staples of the Eastern economy, even exporting them to the East and effectively destroying economic necessities there such as the once-plentiful textile industries of India and China.
Ultimately, the trade system of the Indian Ocean can be seen solely as a historical contingency in which the different regional powers of Afro-Eurasia reacted appropriately to outlying circumstances; in this case, trade. The Europeans searched for new methods to avoid the Muslim powers between the West and the East, eventually concluding upon the use of the Indian Ocean. The Muslim powers, on the other hand, sought to maintain their supremacy in the region despite the fall of the Silk Road and maintained their power through Indian Ocean trade. Finally, the powers Far East continued its importance in Afro-Eurasian trade by dominating the region in the face of foreign influence. The situation is a blatant contingency due to the reactionary nature of the situation. If the Muslims did not have a monopoly on Eastern trade, the Europeans would not have sought other routes; if the Muslims did not seek to consolidate their regional power and lose the Silk Road, the East would not have sought different methods of dominance. The Indian Ocean was a prime place of importance for those three civilizations due to the general path of history, as events branching off events.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Secondary Sources
1. Lunde, Paul. “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade”, July-August 2005. http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200504/default.htm (February 10 2008)
2. Tignor, Robert, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash and Michael Ts’in.. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.
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I'd hoped to work in the Ghaznavids and Ghorids in any huge capacity like I really want to but it never came to fruition within any essay's framework. The Delhi Sultanate gets a shout-out, though, and that's got a Ghorid legacy. I'll pull it off one day.
It pertains to an important part of economic history: the Indian Ocean as well as its role in regional warfare and widespread wealth. I mention one of my personal heroes - Ibn Battuta - constantly. It shares a lot of similarities (and I mean a lot) with my Globalization vs Tribalism essay, which was done for the same course. I learned a whole lot that semester in my History classes.
---
Trade along the Indian Ocean was the result of much heroic exploration and a major impact in historic rises in power, such as the Portuguese Empire which grew wealthy, as well as collapses in structure, such as the caravan system across Central Asia. Among the first few to make the arduous journey to the Far East were three men of particular note for one specific reason: they did a fine job of recording their travels. The first individual was the intrepid Italian explorer Marco Polo, who wrote of his times on the islands in the Eastern Indian Ocean as well as many large cities in the Orient and the Muslim world; for years, he worked in Kublai Khan’s court at mythical Xanadu. The second individual was the Moroccan student Ibn Battuta, who travelled at length, sometimes unexpectedly, along the coasts of the Indian Ocean; his travels displayed the true impact of its cultural exchange and the importance of the area’s trade. The final of the great three individuals to survey and travel the Indian Ocean was the Chinese eunuch admiral Zheng He, charged with exerting Ming power over the rulers of the Indies; his attendant Ma Huan recorded much ethnographic information, ranging from the regional garb of women to the religions professed by far-off foreigners. As seen through the travels and discoveries of Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta, and Zheng He, the importance of the Indian Ocean as a trading front is a historical contingency in that the ambitions of intrepid western travelers and the use of the Indian Ocean after sailing around Africa were the result of the collapse of overland trade routes and inaccessibility of the Eastern world to Europeans.
The reasons as to why the three men and their respective entourages trekked across the Indian Ocean shed some light as to why others may have also done so. Marco Polo’s reasoning for his journey, as the son of a prominent Venetian merchant who also travelled with him, was to establish direct links with the producers of the goods from which his family garnered wealth. Wealth may have been a driving force for many of those who looked to the Indian Ocean; it certainly turned out well for Marco Polo and his father, who worked under the employment of Kublai Khan, the Mongol-Yuan Emperor. The authors’ use of Marco Polo as an example of what could be gained from the Indian Ocean is a fine one: essentially, Polo and his entourage experienced vastly more than what they would have dealt with as simple traders in Venice. Polo’s systematic categorizing and recording of the land, including notes on the unique aspects of each place such as the valuable gemstones of Sri Lanka and linguistic isolation of Gujarat, has contributed much to interpretations by modern historians.
The background of Ibn Battuta’s travels from his home in Morocco to the Far East was not based on financial gain; instead, he was a scholar and tasked himself with experiencing the whole of the Dar al-Islam, the realm of the Muslims. His records are certainly scholarly, showing extensive observance of ethnographic observation and recognition of local customs that were heavily influenced by others in the Indian Ocean region. Ibn Battuta’s noting and questioning of the extent of the regional powers with which he dealt brings to light pointed observations; in the cases of the Bedouin banditry that controlled the reservoirs of Aden or the Hindu brigands who attacked Ibn Battuta’s entourage as he operated on the outskirts of the Delhi Sultanate’s territory, the scholar saw rich lands populated by those who were isolated from their rulers in practice and ethnicity . Ibn Battuta recorded huge amounts of information, citing meetings with dozens of political leaders and approximately two thousand separate people with whom he spoke, lending much information to modern-day historians for study.
The Chinese admiral Zheng He’s reason for travelling the Indian Ocean is much different than those of Polo and Ibn Battuta, as he was unconcerned with sole financial compensation or intellectual pursuits. Instead, the naval leader was tasked by the Yongle Emperor of Ming China to force the submission of the many rulers of the Indies to Ming rule, demanding tribute and allegiance from them with the use of the massive Ming Armada. Exertion of power is thus another reason many powers looked upon the Indian Ocean – while not looking to expand territorially like the Portuguese who would come less than a century later, military might aided in the journeys of Zheng He. The admiral’s translator Ma Huan took very extensive records of each place visited by the Ming Armada, explaining at length many ethnographical notations such as clothing, every possible available commodity, agriculture and craftsmanship, cultural practices and the amount of foreigners at any given place.
The Indian Ocean became very important to many powers, especially European or otherwise western ones, for one main reason: trade supremacy. To the Europeans, the Indian Ocean represented a method of avoidance of the Muslim world’s stranglehold on the Far East – using the body of water to travel, merchants and diplomats could avoid conflict with the ummah and do their business directly with the rich foreign lands beyond. However, a major aspect of this was that of how to access the Indian Ocean without notable Muslim interaction. As of the thirteenth century, Venice’s trade with the Far East was conducted through the conduit of Alexandria, which throughout its history had been ruled by followers of Islam. At one point, the Venetians had planned to outmaneuver the Egyptians and flank the Muslim powers by launching naval military expeditions into the Indian Ocean – a prime example of the importance of the Indian Ocean to westerners, and a display of frustration over the Muslim world’s hold on trade with the East. To the powers of the East, the Indian Ocean represented the next great trade venture after the fall of the Silk Road, which the armies of Tamerlane severed by conquering many major cities along the historic trade route. This was not just the case for the powers of the Near East such as the Sultanate of Delhi or the Ilkhanate (which was responsible for the end of the Silk Road in the first place as subjects of Tamerlane) but was also the case of Ming China, which grew concerned over its loss of trade revenue with the West and sought to find a new route for trade. Just months after the collapse of the caravan system across Central Asia, Zheng He was commissioned by the Yongle Emperor to begin his travels along the Indian Ocean to establish trade dominance.
The actions taken by the major regional powers in regards to the Indian Ocean allow for a better understanding of global history in that a major similarity can be made between all powers involved: despite cultural or societal differences, regional powers recognize the importance of trade and react accordingly. The Venetians, craving an open market with the Far East, nearly acted militarily against the Egyptian Sultanate to gain such a benefit. The Ming Chinese saw their trade collapse with the Silk Road and thus sought new ventures to continue on financially. Knowing the importance of trade supremacy and their position within the region, Ibn Battuta reports that the Sultanate of Delhi shunned casual visitors (including foreign traders) to their lands and forced pledges of allegiance and residence upon foreign guests. These are just examples of what can be seen as a whole chain of reactions as empires and regional powers continuously react to changes made by other powers, in turn making their own changes that must be reacted to; thus, the history of the Indian Ocean can be viewed as a string of historical contingency. This contingency can be linked to the topoi system, which is seen as a long series of recurring and almost cyclical ideas and methods pertaining to history. While the setting may be different, powers will follow familiar ideas in order to achieve their goals.
The end of the Indian Ocean as a prosperous global trading network can be blamed on the discovery of the New World by European powers as well as replacement sources of resources being found outside of the Indian Ocean region. The wealth found in the New World surpasses the resources provided by trade on the Indian Ocean; riches abound began to blow into the Christian and Muslim worlds, and even as far as China did travel silver mined in the mountains of Bolivia. The victories of the Spanish conquistadores over the native Aztec and Incan forces of Mesoamerica provided gigantic amounts of gold, drawing even more attention to the New World and away from the Far East. Spanish silver became common in foreign lands as far as China, the Latin “piece of eight” meeting with newly-discovered Japanese silver to choke the East. The focus of goods began to shift away from the East and focus on Europe and the New World, between which luxuries and precious minerals were shipped as they had been in the Indian Ocean years earlier. Europe began to manufacture goods that were once staples of the Eastern economy, even exporting them to the East and effectively destroying economic necessities there such as the once-plentiful textile industries of India and China.
Ultimately, the trade system of the Indian Ocean can be seen solely as a historical contingency in which the different regional powers of Afro-Eurasia reacted appropriately to outlying circumstances; in this case, trade. The Europeans searched for new methods to avoid the Muslim powers between the West and the East, eventually concluding upon the use of the Indian Ocean. The Muslim powers, on the other hand, sought to maintain their supremacy in the region despite the fall of the Silk Road and maintained their power through Indian Ocean trade. Finally, the powers Far East continued its importance in Afro-Eurasian trade by dominating the region in the face of foreign influence. The situation is a blatant contingency due to the reactionary nature of the situation. If the Muslims did not have a monopoly on Eastern trade, the Europeans would not have sought other routes; if the Muslims did not seek to consolidate their regional power and lose the Silk Road, the East would not have sought different methods of dominance. The Indian Ocean was a prime place of importance for those three civilizations due to the general path of history, as events branching off events.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Secondary Sources
1. Lunde, Paul. “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade”, July-August 2005. http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200504/default.htm (February 10 2008)
2. Tignor, Robert, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash and Michael Ts’in.. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.
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I'd hoped to work in the Ghaznavids and Ghorids in any huge capacity like I really want to but it never came to fruition within any essay's framework. The Delhi Sultanate gets a shout-out, though, and that's got a Ghorid legacy. I'll pull it off one day.
Flawed Concepts Through Time, Vol. XXVI: Military Politics
Don't get me wrong, I think military activity is cool in a historical sense - medieval and pre-modern militaries up until the 1900's are really interesting. Maybe it's just the depersonalized nature of pressing a button and having a thousand people explode that turns me off of modern warfare. Call it a penchant for putting a personal touch on things, who knows.
Here's my just-graded (and thus publishable, in my opinion) essay on the negative effects of military politics within the framework of pre-modern Islamic government. The work took on an almost anarchic bent against inappropriate government practices as I began to finish it, and I think that was the view my professor hoped we'd achieve.
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The importance of religion within the Muslim sphere between the age of Mohammad and the eighteenth century is supreme: Islam acted as a definitive compass for life, providing common cultural and social practices for the great amount of people who practiced it; it also birthed new legal systems, allowing for a sense of universal law and safety while in the company of practitioners. Islam, as a belief system, existed primarily as such but barely secondarily as a unifier of disparate peoples and places – the Muslim community, or ‘umma’, was a world-spanning system under which, despite political fractures, a Muslim could travel from the far ends of the North African Maghreb to the southern depths of the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia with little relative problem. The overarching umma, united under a similar religion and thus relatively related cultural practices, would allow for the traveler to find safe haven wherever they would go within the Dar al-Islam, or ‘abode of Islam’. The missionary work of Sufis worked as a major conversional factor for Islam: the fringe regions of the world outside of the Dar al-Islam were soon home to peaceful, materially-uninvolved Muslims who sought to spread the wealth of their religion – meaning that Islam as a religious and communal sphere was constantly expanding across Eurasia. Under the umma, a Muslim could feel ‘asabiyyah’ – group feeling, or social solidarity. According to the Muslim scholar Ibn-Khaldun, asabiyyah was an essential factor to a properly-functioning umma: without it, groups would fight amongst themselves and cities would crumble.
Hamilton Gibb’s piece “The Community in Islamic History”, as published in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, extolls upon the lack of necessity for traditional government within the early Islamic world. The development of the umma as a structure within Islam is a unique experience for the religion – Christianity, for instance, did not have such a continent-spanning community that provided for its members in the way the umma does. In this way, the Islamic world needed less governance: a cohesive community would fight less amongst itself as would the disjointed world of Christian Europe. Although it experienced roughness along the way in the form of pretenders to rule and fanatics in its ranks, the umma learned to deal with these difficulties. Gibb speaks sternly on the fact that the umma is not a political entity: while a widespread government may put to use strict orthodoxy in all manners of life (including politics), the umma did the opposite by bringing together very different people under a community that fostered an all-encompassing “Islamic culture”. Gibb comments on the propensity for criticism toward the umma for not promoting, through influence of political reforms, helpful standards such as change in education; he counters his own point by pointing to the Islamic revival of Hellenistic literature, an example of the already established Islamic tradition of high intellectual and cultural importance. However, the Muslim sphere was not wholly influenced by Greek works in politics and philosophy – it was not of their heritage and, thus, not as adhered to as it was in the Christian world. Instead of promoting reforms in government and material culture, Muslims gave birth to new spirituality through the work of Sufis – orthodox thought was not heavily addressed in the face of spiritual symbolism and theological issues. This proved to be a handicap in cases involved foreign influence and earthly matters – the umma had trouble confronting new challenges such as opposing governments within the Islamic world and began to oppose disunifying challenges to their community. Eventually, centralized governments proved to be a harsh opponent toward the umma; in the modern day, the politically-inclined doubt the general existence of the umma. Gibb, on the other hand, believes that the umma is still very much alive at its core and is expanding due to its all-encompassing nature and its lack of involvement with troubling, diving societal aspects such as politics.
J.C. Hurewitz discusses the invariable nature of military involvement and social disunity in Islamic politics in his Journal of the American Oriental Society article, “Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750”. Hurewitz sees military politics as a regular method of power transmission for dynasties and political systems within the Dar al-Islam and states that they are extremely popular due to a lack of concrete succession policies. Most Muslim dynasties were tribalist and militaristic at their roots due to the origin of their religion: the harsh upbringing of the umma resulted in superior martial ability, supporting the belief that the subjects of stable Islamic leader have little to fear due to the superior protective ability of that figure. Hurewitz states that the famed scholar Ibn-Khaldun would be widely displeased with the three existing Muslim dynasties of the 1700’s – the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire – due to their high propensity for bureaucracy and a lack of social unity, factors which would eventually lead to their downfall (yet not so in the case of the Ottomans, who would exist only due to Europeans who feared a regional power vacuum in the face of Ottoman collapse). Despite political disunity, the umma still existed: states were connected through common religion and legal background in shari’ah, allowing traveling Muslims such as Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Battuta to work in very different settings due to their understanding of universal Muslim law. However, political disunity did prove from time to time to be harmful – for instance, the Safavid development of their uniquely Shiite Ja’fari code in the face of Sunni neighbors did little to unify the Dar al-Islam. In fact, little outside of the basic political structure existed within the Islamic sphere that would suggest a capability for governments to exist in the European sense: lines of sovereignty were never properly drawn in the Muslim world, creating regional legal imbalances and disputes. Fratricide proved to be a major problem for every major Muslim dynasty in the Near East: the Ottomans were eventually forced to legalize only specific ways of kin murder due to its high prevalence and the Safavids were faced with possibly dozens of murders every time a succession crisis occurred. This lack of traditional rules led to a lack of balance within the politics of the Dar al-Islam, balanced only through military politics: power was enforced through constant strength of arms due to government policies not covering essential subjects such as succession and power boundaries. Eventually, military power came into play as a major decider in succession: those with the most support from the military as well as administrative support from the palace would be best in the running for the position of leader. This led to heated rivalries between family members, all of whom could must some military power due to their position as nobility; in turn, this led to disunity within the umma due to the possibility of widespread armed conflict between Muslims. This focus on government that the major Muslim dynasties allowed actually found itself undermined due to a necessary focus on military strength: the Turkic Qizilbash nomads who entered into the military service of rival Safavid princes, for instance, eventually came to dominate the political scene of the region due to the military clout they held. Similarly, nomadic Berber groups employed by the Moroccan ‘Alawi leaders such as Mawlay Isma’il would exert a large amount of influence over succession upon leaders’ deaths. The Ottomans felt the impact of the Janissaries upon their courts upon the dilution of the strict military corps by Murad III, who discontinued the Islamization of the group by allowing free Muslims, as opposed to non-Muslim slaves or conscripts; this led to an essential corruption within the military. Hurewitz concludes that the use of an army as a political tool proved to be a major obstacle in the path of Islamic unity.
Advancing government proved to be a very complicated obstacle for Islam and its umma. In medieval and Renaissance-age Europe, governments and ruling systems would be challenged, overthrown and modified to fit the societies over which they resided; the Dar al-Islam was no different, as it would take little time until politics would come head-to-head with the umma. Non-tribal or religious politics and government within the Islamic world are a juxtapositional, if not detrimental, presence: inherently, politics act as a partitioner within groups of people, dividing people into different factions that almost assuredly come to blows over almost any societal detail. Gibb’s comments on material governments presenting a challenge and splitting up the non-orthodox, spiritually-inclined umma support this. Politics breed rivalries within the umma that remove the legitimacy and existence of asabiyyah – politically-fueled fractures within a community prevent social solidarity, invalidating the umma’s purpose. Modernly-defined government within the Islamic sphere leads ultimately to selfish, self-promoting behavior that creates power blocs within the umma, shattering it for good and leading to a lack of protective unity.
As stated by Ibn-Khaldun, this lack of unity inevitably leads to annihilation: other factions possessing a functioning asabiyyah, such as Turkic nomads or other less-centralized yet concentrated Muslim contingencies can easily tear apart the shreds of society that separative government leaves in its wake. The tendency of Muslim dynasties to resort to allowing militaristic influence to take over their own government shows, quite blatantly, the accuracy of Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion: the umma will eventually collapse in the face of centralized government due to a loss of asabiyyah. Asabiyyah is essential to nomadic life, and to an extent military life, because it stresses a unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. Properly-governed people lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads.
Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. In Gibbs’ article, it can be seen that those Muslims who focus on government and material matters lose their focus on religion and spirituality; while they make eventually make progress against the non-orthodox umma, it is all for naught once factionalization becomes overwhelming. Politics causes people to factionalize quickly; they have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders . The splintering of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia as a result of a succession crisis would be a damning example of this.
Without asabiyyah, Islamic folk who focus on government instead of social unity find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the purpose of the umma however, is to function as a support system for its people, uniting them under religion as opposed to focusing on earthly matters . Among the non-political umma there is little corruption for this very reason. Political issues not only divide the umma between opposing state and political parties but also cause fractures in society in terms of wealth and ability. When the political system is eventually corrupted and militaristic factions compete for power, the entire populace suffers – chunks of the umma are erased in the name of succession and political boundaries. The government experienced by Muslims from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century fails to follow traditional Islamic standards: it cleaves apart the umma, leaving savagery in its wake.
Ibn-Khaldun; trans. F. Rosenthal. Ed. N.J. Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction], 124.
Ibn-Khaldun, 134.
Bibliography
1. Gibb, Hamilton A.R. April 1963. The Community in Islamic History. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Volume 25, Issue 2.
2. Hurewitz, J.C. March 1968. Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Volume 88, Issue 1.
3. Ibn-Khaldun. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Ed. Nessim Joseph Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction]. Princeton University, 1981. 124-54.
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A pre-modern Islamic political piece I recently read, 'Ministers and Bribery' by Sari Mehmed Pasha (an Ottoman vizier who introduced anti-corruption thought into the government's virtues before being cut down by a man who was either a crazed dervish or a hired blade of the sultan), seems to be the response to my view. Through proper jurisdiction, an Islamic government is incorruptible; needless to say, however, was the corruptibility of the Ottoman government throughout its tenure. Despite his potentially conspired end, I find him to be an entirely reasonable source whose political ideals should be studied closer by modern politicians both in the Middle East and elsewhere. I'll put up an assignment pertaining to Sari's work pretty soon.
Here's my just-graded (and thus publishable, in my opinion) essay on the negative effects of military politics within the framework of pre-modern Islamic government. The work took on an almost anarchic bent against inappropriate government practices as I began to finish it, and I think that was the view my professor hoped we'd achieve.
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The importance of religion within the Muslim sphere between the age of Mohammad and the eighteenth century is supreme: Islam acted as a definitive compass for life, providing common cultural and social practices for the great amount of people who practiced it; it also birthed new legal systems, allowing for a sense of universal law and safety while in the company of practitioners. Islam, as a belief system, existed primarily as such but barely secondarily as a unifier of disparate peoples and places – the Muslim community, or ‘umma’, was a world-spanning system under which, despite political fractures, a Muslim could travel from the far ends of the North African Maghreb to the southern depths of the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia with little relative problem. The overarching umma, united under a similar religion and thus relatively related cultural practices, would allow for the traveler to find safe haven wherever they would go within the Dar al-Islam, or ‘abode of Islam’. The missionary work of Sufis worked as a major conversional factor for Islam: the fringe regions of the world outside of the Dar al-Islam were soon home to peaceful, materially-uninvolved Muslims who sought to spread the wealth of their religion – meaning that Islam as a religious and communal sphere was constantly expanding across Eurasia. Under the umma, a Muslim could feel ‘asabiyyah’ – group feeling, or social solidarity. According to the Muslim scholar Ibn-Khaldun, asabiyyah was an essential factor to a properly-functioning umma: without it, groups would fight amongst themselves and cities would crumble.
Hamilton Gibb’s piece “The Community in Islamic History”, as published in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, extolls upon the lack of necessity for traditional government within the early Islamic world. The development of the umma as a structure within Islam is a unique experience for the religion – Christianity, for instance, did not have such a continent-spanning community that provided for its members in the way the umma does. In this way, the Islamic world needed less governance: a cohesive community would fight less amongst itself as would the disjointed world of Christian Europe. Although it experienced roughness along the way in the form of pretenders to rule and fanatics in its ranks, the umma learned to deal with these difficulties. Gibb speaks sternly on the fact that the umma is not a political entity: while a widespread government may put to use strict orthodoxy in all manners of life (including politics), the umma did the opposite by bringing together very different people under a community that fostered an all-encompassing “Islamic culture”. Gibb comments on the propensity for criticism toward the umma for not promoting, through influence of political reforms, helpful standards such as change in education; he counters his own point by pointing to the Islamic revival of Hellenistic literature, an example of the already established Islamic tradition of high intellectual and cultural importance. However, the Muslim sphere was not wholly influenced by Greek works in politics and philosophy – it was not of their heritage and, thus, not as adhered to as it was in the Christian world. Instead of promoting reforms in government and material culture, Muslims gave birth to new spirituality through the work of Sufis – orthodox thought was not heavily addressed in the face of spiritual symbolism and theological issues. This proved to be a handicap in cases involved foreign influence and earthly matters – the umma had trouble confronting new challenges such as opposing governments within the Islamic world and began to oppose disunifying challenges to their community. Eventually, centralized governments proved to be a harsh opponent toward the umma; in the modern day, the politically-inclined doubt the general existence of the umma. Gibb, on the other hand, believes that the umma is still very much alive at its core and is expanding due to its all-encompassing nature and its lack of involvement with troubling, diving societal aspects such as politics.
J.C. Hurewitz discusses the invariable nature of military involvement and social disunity in Islamic politics in his Journal of the American Oriental Society article, “Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750”. Hurewitz sees military politics as a regular method of power transmission for dynasties and political systems within the Dar al-Islam and states that they are extremely popular due to a lack of concrete succession policies. Most Muslim dynasties were tribalist and militaristic at their roots due to the origin of their religion: the harsh upbringing of the umma resulted in superior martial ability, supporting the belief that the subjects of stable Islamic leader have little to fear due to the superior protective ability of that figure. Hurewitz states that the famed scholar Ibn-Khaldun would be widely displeased with the three existing Muslim dynasties of the 1700’s – the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire – due to their high propensity for bureaucracy and a lack of social unity, factors which would eventually lead to their downfall (yet not so in the case of the Ottomans, who would exist only due to Europeans who feared a regional power vacuum in the face of Ottoman collapse). Despite political disunity, the umma still existed: states were connected through common religion and legal background in shari’ah, allowing traveling Muslims such as Ibn-Khaldun and Ibn-Battuta to work in very different settings due to their understanding of universal Muslim law. However, political disunity did prove from time to time to be harmful – for instance, the Safavid development of their uniquely Shiite Ja’fari code in the face of Sunni neighbors did little to unify the Dar al-Islam. In fact, little outside of the basic political structure existed within the Islamic sphere that would suggest a capability for governments to exist in the European sense: lines of sovereignty were never properly drawn in the Muslim world, creating regional legal imbalances and disputes. Fratricide proved to be a major problem for every major Muslim dynasty in the Near East: the Ottomans were eventually forced to legalize only specific ways of kin murder due to its high prevalence and the Safavids were faced with possibly dozens of murders every time a succession crisis occurred. This lack of traditional rules led to a lack of balance within the politics of the Dar al-Islam, balanced only through military politics: power was enforced through constant strength of arms due to government policies not covering essential subjects such as succession and power boundaries. Eventually, military power came into play as a major decider in succession: those with the most support from the military as well as administrative support from the palace would be best in the running for the position of leader. This led to heated rivalries between family members, all of whom could must some military power due to their position as nobility; in turn, this led to disunity within the umma due to the possibility of widespread armed conflict between Muslims. This focus on government that the major Muslim dynasties allowed actually found itself undermined due to a necessary focus on military strength: the Turkic Qizilbash nomads who entered into the military service of rival Safavid princes, for instance, eventually came to dominate the political scene of the region due to the military clout they held. Similarly, nomadic Berber groups employed by the Moroccan ‘Alawi leaders such as Mawlay Isma’il would exert a large amount of influence over succession upon leaders’ deaths. The Ottomans felt the impact of the Janissaries upon their courts upon the dilution of the strict military corps by Murad III, who discontinued the Islamization of the group by allowing free Muslims, as opposed to non-Muslim slaves or conscripts; this led to an essential corruption within the military. Hurewitz concludes that the use of an army as a political tool proved to be a major obstacle in the path of Islamic unity.
Advancing government proved to be a very complicated obstacle for Islam and its umma. In medieval and Renaissance-age Europe, governments and ruling systems would be challenged, overthrown and modified to fit the societies over which they resided; the Dar al-Islam was no different, as it would take little time until politics would come head-to-head with the umma. Non-tribal or religious politics and government within the Islamic world are a juxtapositional, if not detrimental, presence: inherently, politics act as a partitioner within groups of people, dividing people into different factions that almost assuredly come to blows over almost any societal detail. Gibb’s comments on material governments presenting a challenge and splitting up the non-orthodox, spiritually-inclined umma support this. Politics breed rivalries within the umma that remove the legitimacy and existence of asabiyyah – politically-fueled fractures within a community prevent social solidarity, invalidating the umma’s purpose. Modernly-defined government within the Islamic sphere leads ultimately to selfish, self-promoting behavior that creates power blocs within the umma, shattering it for good and leading to a lack of protective unity.
As stated by Ibn-Khaldun, this lack of unity inevitably leads to annihilation: other factions possessing a functioning asabiyyah, such as Turkic nomads or other less-centralized yet concentrated Muslim contingencies can easily tear apart the shreds of society that separative government leaves in its wake. The tendency of Muslim dynasties to resort to allowing militaristic influence to take over their own government shows, quite blatantly, the accuracy of Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion: the umma will eventually collapse in the face of centralized government due to a loss of asabiyyah. Asabiyyah is essential to nomadic life, and to an extent military life, because it stresses a unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. Properly-governed people lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads.
Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. In Gibbs’ article, it can be seen that those Muslims who focus on government and material matters lose their focus on religion and spirituality; while they make eventually make progress against the non-orthodox umma, it is all for naught once factionalization becomes overwhelming. Politics causes people to factionalize quickly; they have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders . The splintering of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia as a result of a succession crisis would be a damning example of this.
Without asabiyyah, Islamic folk who focus on government instead of social unity find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the purpose of the umma however, is to function as a support system for its people, uniting them under religion as opposed to focusing on earthly matters . Among the non-political umma there is little corruption for this very reason. Political issues not only divide the umma between opposing state and political parties but also cause fractures in society in terms of wealth and ability. When the political system is eventually corrupted and militaristic factions compete for power, the entire populace suffers – chunks of the umma are erased in the name of succession and political boundaries. The government experienced by Muslims from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century fails to follow traditional Islamic standards: it cleaves apart the umma, leaving savagery in its wake.
Ibn-Khaldun; trans. F. Rosenthal. Ed. N.J. Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction], 124.
Ibn-Khaldun, 134.
Bibliography
1. Gibb, Hamilton A.R. April 1963. The Community in Islamic History. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Volume 25, Issue 2.
2. Hurewitz, J.C. March 1968. Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Volume 88, Issue 1.
3. Ibn-Khaldun. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Ed. Nessim Joseph Dawood. Al-Muqadimmah [The Introduction]. Princeton University, 1981. 124-54.
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A pre-modern Islamic political piece I recently read, 'Ministers and Bribery' by Sari Mehmed Pasha (an Ottoman vizier who introduced anti-corruption thought into the government's virtues before being cut down by a man who was either a crazed dervish or a hired blade of the sultan), seems to be the response to my view. Through proper jurisdiction, an Islamic government is incorruptible; needless to say, however, was the corruptibility of the Ottoman government throughout its tenure. Despite his potentially conspired end, I find him to be an entirely reasonable source whose political ideals should be studied closer by modern politicians both in the Middle East and elsewhere. I'll put up an assignment pertaining to Sari's work pretty soon.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
Russian Leader Goes Crazy, Kills Indiscriminately, Isn't Stalin
Well then who is it? It's Ivan, the guy Stalin imitated in order to get his kicks. My professor really liked this paper - it's an analytical book review of Isabel de Madariaga's Ivan The Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. I wasn't sure how well I did on it but the instructor's high praise bolstered how I felt about it.
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An utterly brutal and undoubtedly troubled man, Grand Prince – and later Tsar – Ivan IV of Moscow stands as one of the starkest and least human personalities of Russia’s authoritarian history. As investigated in Isabel de Madariaga’s Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia, the paranoia of the Tsar can be explained as a result of the many negative influences he felt along his life. From the beginning of Ivan’s life until his death, intrigue in the courts lead to death among his family and confidantes, forcing him to utilize similar underhandedness in order to regain his royal power after years of his supporters being crushed publicly. Ivan’s mental state would continue to deteriorate as a result of possible court intrigues: the death of his beloved wife Anastasia soon after his own brush with death quickly led to his wedding with the widely-despised ‘pagan’ princess Maria Temrjukovna, who acted harshly toward Ivan and may have incited him to poison her for political gain, showing the full change in Ivan’s personality over the course of two marriages. Maria would only be the second of Ivan’s eventual eight wives, all of whom would suffer at the hands of Ivan. His cruelty, which bloomed during his youth as he pointlessly ended lives with nary a care, became center stage during his rule as he ravaged any and all potential rivals to his power (as well as the general public) with the use of his Oprichnina, a personal “state” consisting of totally loyal, notably savage subjects; these men would become known for their wanton slaughters of entire populations in locales such as Novgorod and Tver. Later, Ivan IV’s sanity collapsed sharply and, with it, did the stability his harshness had achieved: opponents such as the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania encroached upon Ivan’s borders as he acted wildly at home, committing acts such as the accidental murder of his son Ivan, granting the position of heir to his other son Feodor – a future Tsar regarded as aloof, politically uninterested and, in the opinion of de Madariaga, mentally unsound. Fedor’s inability to not only rule but also reproduce would eventually collapse the nigh-ancient dynasty of Rurik, leading to the tumultuous Time of Troubles. It is very evident that through Ivan’s life, most specifically his developmental years and young adulthood, negative influences played a major part in the shaping of his personality: his mental instability, self-importance and cruel authoritarianism can all be seen as results of events in his youth. Despite his political skill, reform-based management preferences and general intelligence, Ivan IV would forever be remembered for his maddening paranoia – which, as seen in Isabel de Madariaga’s seminal Ivan the Terrible, originated early in Ivan’s life as a result of the dangerous environment into which Ivan was born.
The emphasis of this review will be based on de Madariaga’s focus on the youth of Ivan IV, for good reason: the author places a special importance upon the early experiences of the future Tsar of All Russia, citing many examples that would be repeated through Ivan’s life which would come to characterize his personality and, in general, his reign. Court treachery and barbarity toward rivals were heavily experienced by Ivan during his youth – the offenses experienced by Ivan and his brother Iuri at the hands of the Shiusky’s during the Regency Council period bred contempt in young Ivan, giving him reason to repeat the actions of that period upon later rivals. The direct cruelty Ivan experienced also fueled that part of his personality: he exhibited rage toward defenseless creatures and, later in his youth, adult subjects. This cruelty would come to characterize his rule: grisly, widespread executions as a result of paranoia were commonplace. Other examples as provided by de Madariaga and analyzed in this piece will show the necessity of the author’s emphasis upon Ivan IV’s youth.
De Madariaga rings true in her belief that the early youth of Ivan IV is rife with situations that may eventually breed a contemptible, paranoid individual. The very first of these examples would be the Regency Council set up by his father Vasily III and his mother Elena Glinskaya: as easily observable by Ivan, his importance to his parents and their supporters overshadowed the stability and potential acquiescence of the boyars – rivals to Ivan IV’s reign such as the Shiusky family were suppressed with physical harm, and insults toward the honor of rival princes were made on a constant basis (and usually followed by arrests) . This sort of background may have granted Ivan IV an inflated sense of self importance; the later influence of Vasily III’s ally Metropolitan Makarii, too, can be seen as a major influence in this regard. One of Ivan’s only true outlets during this time of his life was the church, where latent delusions of grandeur in young Ivan were influenced heavily by the teachings of Makarii, whose words may have convinced Ivan that he possessed the favor of God. Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod, was also responsible for introducing Ivan to the Poems of Repentance, a series of hymns focused on the admittance of mortal sins; de Madariaga’s comments on the appropriateness of the subject matter in pertinence to Ivan’s behavior is a display of the message she is accurately attempting to portray in her branding of Ivan as a disturbed individual . De Madariaga makes note of Makarii’s impact on Ivan’s religious self-importance quite often; it is a valid point, however, in that Ivan used his position to assume the title of Tsar, a notably non-secular role. In doing so, Ivan attempts to place himself into the same role as the Byzantine Emperor or, in the West, Holy Roman Emperor: a monarch whose role was bestowed upon him by the will of God. This action by Ivan is further evidence as provided by de Madariaga of a potential for mental instability in terms of an extreme inflated ego.
De Madariaga mentions that through this holy outlet Ivan may have also fell under the spell of Vlad Tepes Dracul, the infamous Wallachian voivod whose shocking actions against court rivals and his Turkish enemies – done so in the name of protecting his own assets – could have dictated to Ivan the proper way of responding to internal threats . Another example of a negative influence upon Ivan can be seen when, in the midst of the Regency Council period, Ivan’s hale and hearty mother Elena died suddenly – poisoned, by de Madariaga’s estimation, and mourned only by Ivan . The death of Elena and the succession of neglectful political rivals undoubtedly had a major impact on Ivan, now eight years old. De Madariaga’s mentioning of this as an impact upon Ivan’s personality is dreadfully important: it is the first true exposure of Ivan to human cruelty. The result of his mother’s death leads to the virtual abandonment of Ivan and his brother Iuri by the political structure until his adulthood – leading Ivan, naturally, to become a frustrated individual with a skewed sense of self-importance. Madariaga’s claims make it plain to see from where Ivan’s youthful habits, including animal torture, began to originate . Later, Ivan acts out further against defenseless prey when he and his friends act as criminals and chase innocent women with little reason other than malice. He would go on to execute three princes as a result of boredom during army exercise. These examples may strike the reader as similar to Ivan’s later origination and administering of the ‘Oprichnina’ system, which functioned similarly in its brigand-esque activity and intentional harassment of non-guilty subjects. Without this build-up, de Madariaga would be hard pressed to explain the mean behavior exhibited by Ivan later in life.
Ivan is seen accurately through his youth by de Madariaga as a cunning yet overly suspicious individual, even in his youth. As discussed earlier, Ivan was influenced negatively through the intrigue of the Muscovite court; this can be seen through the death of his mother and neglect at the hands of the rival Shiusky party. Despite this, Ivan showed a quick aptitude for adherence to such underhanded behavior: before his marriage to Elena Glinskaya, some of Ivan’s letters as well as other documents support harsh actions against former friends and the families of rivals that strike a tone similar to the traitorous methods put to use by the Regency Council in the suppression of rivals to the Rurikid power structure . De Madariaga’s special mentioning of this event harkens to Ivan’s later years in which he would brutally attack and destroy entire lineages that he considered, despite the reality of their position, rivals to his own power. The Oprichnina were a further example of this: formed originally as a separate ruling body free from the influence of the plotting boyars, the organization was eventually put to use as an oppressive deterrent against any who opposed Ivan’s rule (or who he suspected of doing so, factually or not). Through this and other mentioned examples, de Madariaga makes clear that Ivan’s youth is just a foreshadowing to later events: the future Tsar’s early years would set the stage for a Russia at the whim of a man, quick to act, whose suspicions would rule his realm.
De Madariaga’s ability to articulate her case on the subject of Ivan IV’s development toward the desolate historical figure he now represents is admirable in the least. The lengthy cases she makes pertaining to Ivan’s religious importance are central to his own self-view and assumption of formerly Byzantine religious importance. His cruelty is explained truthfully as being a result of the behavior he was exposed to and the treatment he dealt with at the hands of early opponents; this maturing negative behavior would become a hallmark of his name. His political maneuverings are simply an extension of his harshness: his consistent actions against any perceived threats and his institutionalization of the Oprichnina were executed as a result of the behavior for which he became known. It is not only the treatment he was victim to that is to blame for his identity as a vindictive, paranoid ruler but also how he acted unchecked due to his position – de Madariaga’s discussion of his youth show this, despite how early on in his life the events occurred.
Works Cited
1 de Madariaga, Isabel. Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 1981.
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That's a wrap. Hope you enjoyed the "gripping narrative".
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An utterly brutal and undoubtedly troubled man, Grand Prince – and later Tsar – Ivan IV of Moscow stands as one of the starkest and least human personalities of Russia’s authoritarian history. As investigated in Isabel de Madariaga’s Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia, the paranoia of the Tsar can be explained as a result of the many negative influences he felt along his life. From the beginning of Ivan’s life until his death, intrigue in the courts lead to death among his family and confidantes, forcing him to utilize similar underhandedness in order to regain his royal power after years of his supporters being crushed publicly. Ivan’s mental state would continue to deteriorate as a result of possible court intrigues: the death of his beloved wife Anastasia soon after his own brush with death quickly led to his wedding with the widely-despised ‘pagan’ princess Maria Temrjukovna, who acted harshly toward Ivan and may have incited him to poison her for political gain, showing the full change in Ivan’s personality over the course of two marriages. Maria would only be the second of Ivan’s eventual eight wives, all of whom would suffer at the hands of Ivan. His cruelty, which bloomed during his youth as he pointlessly ended lives with nary a care, became center stage during his rule as he ravaged any and all potential rivals to his power (as well as the general public) with the use of his Oprichnina, a personal “state” consisting of totally loyal, notably savage subjects; these men would become known for their wanton slaughters of entire populations in locales such as Novgorod and Tver. Later, Ivan IV’s sanity collapsed sharply and, with it, did the stability his harshness had achieved: opponents such as the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania encroached upon Ivan’s borders as he acted wildly at home, committing acts such as the accidental murder of his son Ivan, granting the position of heir to his other son Feodor – a future Tsar regarded as aloof, politically uninterested and, in the opinion of de Madariaga, mentally unsound. Fedor’s inability to not only rule but also reproduce would eventually collapse the nigh-ancient dynasty of Rurik, leading to the tumultuous Time of Troubles. It is very evident that through Ivan’s life, most specifically his developmental years and young adulthood, negative influences played a major part in the shaping of his personality: his mental instability, self-importance and cruel authoritarianism can all be seen as results of events in his youth. Despite his political skill, reform-based management preferences and general intelligence, Ivan IV would forever be remembered for his maddening paranoia – which, as seen in Isabel de Madariaga’s seminal Ivan the Terrible, originated early in Ivan’s life as a result of the dangerous environment into which Ivan was born.
The emphasis of this review will be based on de Madariaga’s focus on the youth of Ivan IV, for good reason: the author places a special importance upon the early experiences of the future Tsar of All Russia, citing many examples that would be repeated through Ivan’s life which would come to characterize his personality and, in general, his reign. Court treachery and barbarity toward rivals were heavily experienced by Ivan during his youth – the offenses experienced by Ivan and his brother Iuri at the hands of the Shiusky’s during the Regency Council period bred contempt in young Ivan, giving him reason to repeat the actions of that period upon later rivals. The direct cruelty Ivan experienced also fueled that part of his personality: he exhibited rage toward defenseless creatures and, later in his youth, adult subjects. This cruelty would come to characterize his rule: grisly, widespread executions as a result of paranoia were commonplace. Other examples as provided by de Madariaga and analyzed in this piece will show the necessity of the author’s emphasis upon Ivan IV’s youth.
De Madariaga rings true in her belief that the early youth of Ivan IV is rife with situations that may eventually breed a contemptible, paranoid individual. The very first of these examples would be the Regency Council set up by his father Vasily III and his mother Elena Glinskaya: as easily observable by Ivan, his importance to his parents and their supporters overshadowed the stability and potential acquiescence of the boyars – rivals to Ivan IV’s reign such as the Shiusky family were suppressed with physical harm, and insults toward the honor of rival princes were made on a constant basis (and usually followed by arrests) . This sort of background may have granted Ivan IV an inflated sense of self importance; the later influence of Vasily III’s ally Metropolitan Makarii, too, can be seen as a major influence in this regard. One of Ivan’s only true outlets during this time of his life was the church, where latent delusions of grandeur in young Ivan were influenced heavily by the teachings of Makarii, whose words may have convinced Ivan that he possessed the favor of God. Makarii, the Archbishop of Novgorod, was also responsible for introducing Ivan to the Poems of Repentance, a series of hymns focused on the admittance of mortal sins; de Madariaga’s comments on the appropriateness of the subject matter in pertinence to Ivan’s behavior is a display of the message she is accurately attempting to portray in her branding of Ivan as a disturbed individual . De Madariaga makes note of Makarii’s impact on Ivan’s religious self-importance quite often; it is a valid point, however, in that Ivan used his position to assume the title of Tsar, a notably non-secular role. In doing so, Ivan attempts to place himself into the same role as the Byzantine Emperor or, in the West, Holy Roman Emperor: a monarch whose role was bestowed upon him by the will of God. This action by Ivan is further evidence as provided by de Madariaga of a potential for mental instability in terms of an extreme inflated ego.
De Madariaga mentions that through this holy outlet Ivan may have also fell under the spell of Vlad Tepes Dracul, the infamous Wallachian voivod whose shocking actions against court rivals and his Turkish enemies – done so in the name of protecting his own assets – could have dictated to Ivan the proper way of responding to internal threats . Another example of a negative influence upon Ivan can be seen when, in the midst of the Regency Council period, Ivan’s hale and hearty mother Elena died suddenly – poisoned, by de Madariaga’s estimation, and mourned only by Ivan . The death of Elena and the succession of neglectful political rivals undoubtedly had a major impact on Ivan, now eight years old. De Madariaga’s mentioning of this as an impact upon Ivan’s personality is dreadfully important: it is the first true exposure of Ivan to human cruelty. The result of his mother’s death leads to the virtual abandonment of Ivan and his brother Iuri by the political structure until his adulthood – leading Ivan, naturally, to become a frustrated individual with a skewed sense of self-importance. Madariaga’s claims make it plain to see from where Ivan’s youthful habits, including animal torture, began to originate . Later, Ivan acts out further against defenseless prey when he and his friends act as criminals and chase innocent women with little reason other than malice. He would go on to execute three princes as a result of boredom during army exercise. These examples may strike the reader as similar to Ivan’s later origination and administering of the ‘Oprichnina’ system, which functioned similarly in its brigand-esque activity and intentional harassment of non-guilty subjects. Without this build-up, de Madariaga would be hard pressed to explain the mean behavior exhibited by Ivan later in life.
Ivan is seen accurately through his youth by de Madariaga as a cunning yet overly suspicious individual, even in his youth. As discussed earlier, Ivan was influenced negatively through the intrigue of the Muscovite court; this can be seen through the death of his mother and neglect at the hands of the rival Shiusky party. Despite this, Ivan showed a quick aptitude for adherence to such underhanded behavior: before his marriage to Elena Glinskaya, some of Ivan’s letters as well as other documents support harsh actions against former friends and the families of rivals that strike a tone similar to the traitorous methods put to use by the Regency Council in the suppression of rivals to the Rurikid power structure . De Madariaga’s special mentioning of this event harkens to Ivan’s later years in which he would brutally attack and destroy entire lineages that he considered, despite the reality of their position, rivals to his own power. The Oprichnina were a further example of this: formed originally as a separate ruling body free from the influence of the plotting boyars, the organization was eventually put to use as an oppressive deterrent against any who opposed Ivan’s rule (or who he suspected of doing so, factually or not). Through this and other mentioned examples, de Madariaga makes clear that Ivan’s youth is just a foreshadowing to later events: the future Tsar’s early years would set the stage for a Russia at the whim of a man, quick to act, whose suspicions would rule his realm.
De Madariaga’s ability to articulate her case on the subject of Ivan IV’s development toward the desolate historical figure he now represents is admirable in the least. The lengthy cases she makes pertaining to Ivan’s religious importance are central to his own self-view and assumption of formerly Byzantine religious importance. His cruelty is explained truthfully as being a result of the behavior he was exposed to and the treatment he dealt with at the hands of early opponents; this maturing negative behavior would become a hallmark of his name. His political maneuverings are simply an extension of his harshness: his consistent actions against any perceived threats and his institutionalization of the Oprichnina were executed as a result of the behavior for which he became known. It is not only the treatment he was victim to that is to blame for his identity as a vindictive, paranoid ruler but also how he acted unchecked due to his position – de Madariaga’s discussion of his youth show this, despite how early on in his life the events occurred.
Works Cited
1 de Madariaga, Isabel. Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia. Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 1981.
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That's a wrap. Hope you enjoyed the "gripping narrative".
Monday, November 10, 2008
The Temperance Movement: To Saloon or Not To Saloon, That Is Not A Question (Because It's Not Up To You)
Excuse the cryptic title, I'm just trying to justify posting for the second time in a day after a month (and before that, months) of inactivity. This paper was written at the beginning of my sophomore year and I can't tell if it's any better than the work I do now, but I hope it is. Not that it's bad by any means, but one would assume they get better at what they do all day.
The piece touches on the impact of the American dry movement at the turn of the twentieth century - its message (and the corruption of said message) is discussed heartily. The work can most certainly be applied to modern substance abuse prevention programs (Above The Influence? C'mon, now) and the villain's face they attach to the use of, well, anything.
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To suggest that alcohol has done no wrong in this world is quite the fallacious statement; however, to say it can be blamed for every wrong a person can commit is even more false a declaration. During the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, the temperance, or ‘dry’, movement gained a notable amount of steam within American society, impacting the grand ranges of life from the office to the bedroom via the use of the printed word. Beforehand, it had been believed that alcohol had never been a truly acceptable social practice; problems in the developing industrial nation of the United States were blamed on drunkenness, as opposed to the root ailments of poverty, crime and unemployment. One would hope, obviously, that objective information about alcohol would be provided in order to better educate the public about their own choices concerning the matter. However, as history has shown, the exact opposite of what should have happened did indeed happen, and a plethora of skewed information based on scaremongering and shock value was printed and distributed in an effort to promote specific moralistic viewpoints that happened to clash against the imbibing and sale of alcohol. The Anti-Saloon League, which was the organization behind much of the gathering of the temperance movement at the time, consisted mostly of highly moralistic American citizens with a religious slant as well as politicians with an axe to grind or blame to place.
The temperance movement was massively popular among the middle class during the late 1800’s and promoted often by religious figures, doctors and more noted employers (Levine 1). True to their reputation at the time, the Republican Party’s constant pushing of ‘moral views’ culminated in the formation of the Prohibition Party shortly after the end of the Civil War that had engulfed the United States. Soon, another organization known as the ‘Anti-Saloon League’ was formed and operated in a similar fashion to a modern corporation in that it collected political debts and wrote laws with the use of hired lawyers (Levine 1). The Anti-Saloon League, in this situation, can easily be compared to anti-drug and anti-alcohol organizations such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) and others in that they act as company entities, collecting donations and influencing law-making while promoting very specific political viewpoints.
One famous document printed by the Anti-Saloon League detailed an occurring at the trial of a man charged with the ‘willful murder of (his) wife’, ‘firing the fatal shot that killed the wife (he) had sworn to love, cherish and protect’; the document is, as could be guessed, complete with many loaded and moralistic statements (Murder 1). Unsurprisingly, the man (an admitted alcoholic) claims that he is calling upon his church’s pastor as well as God himself (further examples of the Anti-Saloon League’s pushing of their own agenda) in admitting that alcohol is to blame in his actions against his wife and that the only reason she is dead is because of the bars open in the town in which he had lived (Murder 1). He goes on to claim that he had attempted to reform his sinful ways but with the presence of a saloon in his town, his ‘weak, diseased will power’ could not put up a fight against alcohol; later, he attempts to turn his case around by blaming the murder on the local government which had voted saloons into existence and had effectively caused thousands of possible deaths (Murder 1). This document is one of many documents printed by the Anti-Saloon League which promote its heavy-handed, conservative viewpoint against alcohol. This document is similar in its attempted message that alcohol is to blame for many of life’s problems when compared to literature released by organizations such as Alcoholics Anonymous, which is at its core a religiously-motivated organization dedicated to the recovery of alcoholics.
Alcohol was compared to the heroin in its utter addictiveness as well as the inherent evil that the substance contained due to its capacity to destroy lives (Levine 1). Let’s stop here and ponder that last statement: alcohol is just as addictive as and more harmful than heroin. Outwardly, people may balk at this statement; however, a closer look would not hurt. There is no doubt that both substances are highly addictive, and every person has heard stories about how either has ruined a life close to their own at a surprisingly rapid rate with a low turnover rate for those already affected by the substances. According to the research of Daniel M. Perrine, an associate professor of chemistry at Layola College, alcohol can indeed be compared to heroin in its capacity for addiction with only nicotine topping both of them (Perrine 1). In mild disagreement with Perrine are Jack Henningfield of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and Neal L. Benowitz of the University of San Francisco, who teamed up for a study on the addictiveness of six well known drugs and found that while heroin and alcohol are both addictive, heroin sits on a altogether higher level than alcohol does in terms of dependence and tolerance (Henningfield 1). The weighted information presented by the Anti-Saloon League draws similarities to modern anti-drug campaigns, especially in terms of pre-90’s movements against drugs which proclaimed of harms caused by drugs which did no such harm. One of the more extreme examples of this would be the infamous film Tell Your Children (better known as Reefer Madness) which displays marijuana as a “violent narcotic” that causes families to fall apart in an instant and causes death (either the user’s, or a passer-by’s) to occur within seconds of ingesting the substance (Tell Your Children). One of the better-known quotes of the movie, which was presented as nothing but a factual interpretation of the drug’s effects upon an everyday person, is the following.
“Yes. I remember. Just a young boy... under the influence of drugs... who killed his entire family with an axe.” (Joseph Forte, Tell Your Children)
Please note that this is a (n) (now) obvious exaggeration as to what marijuana actually does to a person. (11/10/08: I actually meant horribly incorrect, but I was trying to phrase it in a way that didn't make me think the film makers were propagandist assholes, as I think they're comedic genuises). According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse the negative effects of ingesting marijuana upon a human being include short term memory loss, loss of coordination and distorted perception (NIDA 1). Nowhere on the site, which is officiated by the US government, does it suggest that the urge to slay one’s family with a wood-cutting implement is a common side effect of marijuana use. This is an example of the same sort of scaremongering used by organizations such as the Anti-Saloon League and their ‘Charged with Murder’ pamphlet.
Without a doubt, alcohol and modern drugs have very distinct problems which can be addressed through proper campaigns concerning them. However, as seen in the examples of modern campaigns as well as the works of the Anti-Saloon League, this does not occur in enough of a realistic, truthful capacity. Perhaps a more objective campaign format would benefit modern temperance movements; in the very least, it would be harder to find faults with them if they actually presented the facts.
Works Cited
Levine, Harry G., and Craig Reinarman. "Temperance, Prohibition, Alcohol Control." DrugText. DrugText Foundation. 05 Mar. 2007.
Perrine, Daniel M. The Chemistry of Mind-Altering Drugs. Baltimore: American Chemical Society, 1997.
Henningfield, Jack E., and Neal L. Benowitz. "Is Nicotine Addictive? It Depends on Whose Criteria You Use." New York Times 2 Aug. 1994.
Charged with Murder. Westerville: The American Anti-Saloon League P Bureau, 191-.
---
At least I used footnotes now. It's still a decent essay, I'd say.
The piece touches on the impact of the American dry movement at the turn of the twentieth century - its message (and the corruption of said message) is discussed heartily. The work can most certainly be applied to modern substance abuse prevention programs (Above The Influence? C'mon, now) and the villain's face they attach to the use of, well, anything.
---
To suggest that alcohol has done no wrong in this world is quite the fallacious statement; however, to say it can be blamed for every wrong a person can commit is even more false a declaration. During the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, the temperance, or ‘dry’, movement gained a notable amount of steam within American society, impacting the grand ranges of life from the office to the bedroom via the use of the printed word. Beforehand, it had been believed that alcohol had never been a truly acceptable social practice; problems in the developing industrial nation of the United States were blamed on drunkenness, as opposed to the root ailments of poverty, crime and unemployment. One would hope, obviously, that objective information about alcohol would be provided in order to better educate the public about their own choices concerning the matter. However, as history has shown, the exact opposite of what should have happened did indeed happen, and a plethora of skewed information based on scaremongering and shock value was printed and distributed in an effort to promote specific moralistic viewpoints that happened to clash against the imbibing and sale of alcohol. The Anti-Saloon League, which was the organization behind much of the gathering of the temperance movement at the time, consisted mostly of highly moralistic American citizens with a religious slant as well as politicians with an axe to grind or blame to place.
The temperance movement was massively popular among the middle class during the late 1800’s and promoted often by religious figures, doctors and more noted employers (Levine 1). True to their reputation at the time, the Republican Party’s constant pushing of ‘moral views’ culminated in the formation of the Prohibition Party shortly after the end of the Civil War that had engulfed the United States. Soon, another organization known as the ‘Anti-Saloon League’ was formed and operated in a similar fashion to a modern corporation in that it collected political debts and wrote laws with the use of hired lawyers (Levine 1). The Anti-Saloon League, in this situation, can easily be compared to anti-drug and anti-alcohol organizations such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) and others in that they act as company entities, collecting donations and influencing law-making while promoting very specific political viewpoints.
One famous document printed by the Anti-Saloon League detailed an occurring at the trial of a man charged with the ‘willful murder of (his) wife’, ‘firing the fatal shot that killed the wife (he) had sworn to love, cherish and protect’; the document is, as could be guessed, complete with many loaded and moralistic statements (Murder 1). Unsurprisingly, the man (an admitted alcoholic) claims that he is calling upon his church’s pastor as well as God himself (further examples of the Anti-Saloon League’s pushing of their own agenda) in admitting that alcohol is to blame in his actions against his wife and that the only reason she is dead is because of the bars open in the town in which he had lived (Murder 1). He goes on to claim that he had attempted to reform his sinful ways but with the presence of a saloon in his town, his ‘weak, diseased will power’ could not put up a fight against alcohol; later, he attempts to turn his case around by blaming the murder on the local government which had voted saloons into existence and had effectively caused thousands of possible deaths (Murder 1). This document is one of many documents printed by the Anti-Saloon League which promote its heavy-handed, conservative viewpoint against alcohol. This document is similar in its attempted message that alcohol is to blame for many of life’s problems when compared to literature released by organizations such as Alcoholics Anonymous, which is at its core a religiously-motivated organization dedicated to the recovery of alcoholics.
Alcohol was compared to the heroin in its utter addictiveness as well as the inherent evil that the substance contained due to its capacity to destroy lives (Levine 1). Let’s stop here and ponder that last statement: alcohol is just as addictive as and more harmful than heroin. Outwardly, people may balk at this statement; however, a closer look would not hurt. There is no doubt that both substances are highly addictive, and every person has heard stories about how either has ruined a life close to their own at a surprisingly rapid rate with a low turnover rate for those already affected by the substances. According to the research of Daniel M. Perrine, an associate professor of chemistry at Layola College, alcohol can indeed be compared to heroin in its capacity for addiction with only nicotine topping both of them (Perrine 1). In mild disagreement with Perrine are Jack Henningfield of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and Neal L. Benowitz of the University of San Francisco, who teamed up for a study on the addictiveness of six well known drugs and found that while heroin and alcohol are both addictive, heroin sits on a altogether higher level than alcohol does in terms of dependence and tolerance (Henningfield 1). The weighted information presented by the Anti-Saloon League draws similarities to modern anti-drug campaigns, especially in terms of pre-90’s movements against drugs which proclaimed of harms caused by drugs which did no such harm. One of the more extreme examples of this would be the infamous film Tell Your Children (better known as Reefer Madness) which displays marijuana as a “violent narcotic” that causes families to fall apart in an instant and causes death (either the user’s, or a passer-by’s) to occur within seconds of ingesting the substance (Tell Your Children). One of the better-known quotes of the movie, which was presented as nothing but a factual interpretation of the drug’s effects upon an everyday person, is the following.
“Yes. I remember. Just a young boy... under the influence of drugs... who killed his entire family with an axe.” (Joseph Forte, Tell Your Children)
Please note that this is a (n) (now) obvious exaggeration as to what marijuana actually does to a person. (11/10/08: I actually meant horribly incorrect, but I was trying to phrase it in a way that didn't make me think the film makers were propagandist assholes, as I think they're comedic genuises). According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse the negative effects of ingesting marijuana upon a human being include short term memory loss, loss of coordination and distorted perception (NIDA 1). Nowhere on the site, which is officiated by the US government, does it suggest that the urge to slay one’s family with a wood-cutting implement is a common side effect of marijuana use. This is an example of the same sort of scaremongering used by organizations such as the Anti-Saloon League and their ‘Charged with Murder’ pamphlet.
Without a doubt, alcohol and modern drugs have very distinct problems which can be addressed through proper campaigns concerning them. However, as seen in the examples of modern campaigns as well as the works of the Anti-Saloon League, this does not occur in enough of a realistic, truthful capacity. Perhaps a more objective campaign format would benefit modern temperance movements; in the very least, it would be harder to find faults with them if they actually presented the facts.
Works Cited
Levine, Harry G., and Craig Reinarman. "Temperance, Prohibition, Alcohol Control." DrugText. DrugText Foundation. 05 Mar. 2007
Perrine, Daniel M. The Chemistry of Mind-Altering Drugs. Baltimore: American Chemical Society, 1997.
Henningfield, Jack E., and Neal L. Benowitz. "Is Nicotine Addictive? It Depends on Whose Criteria You Use." New York Times 2 Aug. 1994.
Charged with Murder. Westerville: The American Anti-Saloon League P Bureau, 191-.
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At least I used footnotes now. It's still a decent essay, I'd say.
Unlike the Bible, the Navajo Creation Story Had Transsexuals
This is my critique of Paul G. Zolbrod's very important compiling of the 'Diné bahanè', or Navajo Creation Story. Every culture (or, traditionally, religion) has their own creation story and after reading this version of the Navajo tradition as provided by Zolbrod's impressive efforts, I have come to realize the importance of belief in the development of culture and the importance of society to the individual in terms of basic comprehension. Anyway. Enjoy.
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Zolbrod, Paul G. Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story. 2nd ed. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico P, 1984. 431 pp.
Zolbrod’s work in Diné bahanè is anthropologically unique because it is traditional ethnographic work yet most certainly functions as such. The bulk of the text is a the author’s rendition of the traditional Navajo creation story, a very long and tumultuous experience describing how the spiritual foundations and historical annals of the people that call themselves “Diné” - the Navajo Nation.
The format of Zolbrod’s text is suitable and, at times, particularly helpful for the potential student of Navajo mythology. The table of contents follows an orderly theme but may feature some surprises for a person who may not grasp the depth of Diné bahanè. The pronunciation key is a very useful reference for those readers who may attempt to pronounce the deluge of Navajo names, titles and terms throughout the story. Past the Introduction (which will be spoken of at length) is ‘The Text’ – a thick portion of the book (approximately 250 pages) consisting of the creation story as compiled by Zolbrod. Following this is ‘Notes’ – the author’s constant use this section allows it to billow outward and number approximately 60 pages, full of detailed personal opinions and scholarly references.
Zolbrod’s completionist attitude and non-traditional background, as explained in the very important Introduction as well as the Text, add much to Diné bahanè. Zolbrod speaks of his time as a literature professor in the early 1960’s and mentions a distinct interest in ‘preliterate poetry’ – literary works that began and, for the most part, lived in the oral tradition with little written existence; in the case of the Navajo, an intense emphasis on human performance and oration disallows the written word to do justice for the group’s mythological traditions. A professor of English works, Zolbrod finds himself entranced with the peculiarities of Native American literature, which he pursues using analytical and sorely academic methods that are not fully applicable. He ventures onto the field, hoping to begin work on a compilation of Native American mythological tales. At this point, he uneducated in anthropology and essentially ignorant to his future difficulty; unsurprisingly, he finds disappointment when a Pueblo governor explains to him the improbably large scope of his work, made even harder due to his ethnicity and background. He meets with the Navajo, a group known to be more open with their traditions, and begins his compiling of their mythologies. Zolbrod also finds Washington Matthews’ expansive text Navajo Legends, at that time the leading reference on the Navajo creation story, but finds fault as his own research progresses: Matthews’ morals seem to cloud the text as important references to sex and gender are ignored completely. In addition, Matthews compiles Diné bahanè as a simple text: he removes the essential human nature from the work, delivering it to the reader as a basic story instead of, as Zolbrod sees it, a work that defines Navajo culture and personal comprehension. He is appreciative of Matthews in the end, however – without his original compiling, Zolbrod would never have been able to complete his own work and compile the most complete (and coherent) version of the Diné bahanè to date.
An important aspect to keep in mind about Zolbrod’s Diné bahanè is that it is not the compilation of an anthropologist, nor is it an example of traditional ethnographic work. It is the professional study of an English literature professor hoping to record the spiritual stories of a Native American group – no small feat, especially when it is considered that Zolbrod’s regimentation in terms of comprehension for English literature does not apply to the Navajo. Constant references are made to important Eurasian literary works such as the Gilgamesh Epic as well as Homer’s tales – a telltale sign of Zolbrod’s background. From the view of a student of anthropology, the author’s work leaves an impact: despite his early behavior and lack of knowledge, Zolbrod’s dedication to the work and his efforts in dealing with the Navajo show that a non-traditional approach to anthropology always has an important place in cultural studies. The author’s attention toward the importance of the creation story to the Navajo as a general basis for their culture and comprehension shows a keen understanding for the foreign worldview of the people he is studying. At one point, Zolbrod speaks of the Navajo’s comparisons between real life happenings and the Diné bahanè in order to better understand current events: during World War II, Adolf Hitler is associated with Ye’iitsoh, a monster the Navajo see as a killer of innocents and a destroyer of landscapes. This example, as provided by Zolbrod, shows the true important of the Diné bahanè: it is the foundation for Navajo life.
Although he chides Washington Matthews on his presentation of the same stories as bland and non-cultural in Navajo Legends, the author’s background does show in Diné bahanè: despite its subject matter, it reads as many English-translated mythologies or ‘folk tales’ do. While this is a frustrating concept – especially considering Zolbrod’s heavy criticism of Matthews – it does have an important use: as a bridge to cross for those possessing a background consisting solely of English literature. Zolbrod’s work is very easy to understand and may help those who are afraid of delving into Native American literature due to its assumedly ‘different’ nature; teachers and professors, for example, would find a grand amount of potential in Diné bahanè. Any person with exposure to folk tales would have no trouble understanding the events of the Navajo creation story due to Zolbrod’s extensive work and the general straightforwardness of the tales.
Zolbrod’s recognition of his own work being potentially unsuitable for his purpose as a true display of Navajo culture is, while troubling, a benefit to the reader. The author’s own view of his work may be overly critical – he seems to share the viewpoint of several Navajo that he meets in thinking that the Diné bahanè is untranslatable because of the significance of its public performance; to make up for it, Zolbrod attempts to display the creation story in a phenomenally complete and detailed account that will do the work written justice. This may also have resulted in his impressive amount of notes and references, many of which are essential for even basic comprehension. The full nature of his work is a boon to an academic with a dedicated interest in Navajo culture or a need to find further sources on the subject: Zolbrod’s references are lengthy and extremely helpful for those hoping to learn more.
Paul Zolbrod’s Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story is work that, to the uninformed, may not seem like anthropology at all but instead as a simple folk literature. However, for Zolbrod to comprehend the events and importance of the creation story, he had to conform himself into the mold an anthropologist. The author’s willingness to investigate and compile such a monstrous oral tradition into print while also attempting to preserve the meaning behind the words themselves shows a keen mind, willing to acculturate and dedicate itself to a work in which many others would have not found as much meaning. Zolbrod’s work is irreplaceable and, despite his position as a non-anthropologist, his work here is most certainly a suitable ethnography.
Bibliography
Zolbrod, Paul G. Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story. 2nd ed. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico P, 1984. 431 pp.
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So there you go. You should go read the text - it's hefty, but it's definitely an interesting read. Lots of people seem to underestimate the complexity of Native American groups or lump them into one "cultural" group. I've learned in my time under the professorship of Pierre Morenon at Rhode Island College that this is most certainly an incorrect assessment of the many, many ways of life that Native Americans put to use.
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Zolbrod, Paul G. Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story. 2nd ed. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico P, 1984. 431 pp.
Zolbrod’s work in Diné bahanè is anthropologically unique because it is traditional ethnographic work yet most certainly functions as such. The bulk of the text is a the author’s rendition of the traditional Navajo creation story, a very long and tumultuous experience describing how the spiritual foundations and historical annals of the people that call themselves “Diné” - the Navajo Nation.
The format of Zolbrod’s text is suitable and, at times, particularly helpful for the potential student of Navajo mythology. The table of contents follows an orderly theme but may feature some surprises for a person who may not grasp the depth of Diné bahanè. The pronunciation key is a very useful reference for those readers who may attempt to pronounce the deluge of Navajo names, titles and terms throughout the story. Past the Introduction (which will be spoken of at length) is ‘The Text’ – a thick portion of the book (approximately 250 pages) consisting of the creation story as compiled by Zolbrod. Following this is ‘Notes’ – the author’s constant use this section allows it to billow outward and number approximately 60 pages, full of detailed personal opinions and scholarly references.
Zolbrod’s completionist attitude and non-traditional background, as explained in the very important Introduction as well as the Text, add much to Diné bahanè. Zolbrod speaks of his time as a literature professor in the early 1960’s and mentions a distinct interest in ‘preliterate poetry’ – literary works that began and, for the most part, lived in the oral tradition with little written existence; in the case of the Navajo, an intense emphasis on human performance and oration disallows the written word to do justice for the group’s mythological traditions. A professor of English works, Zolbrod finds himself entranced with the peculiarities of Native American literature, which he pursues using analytical and sorely academic methods that are not fully applicable. He ventures onto the field, hoping to begin work on a compilation of Native American mythological tales. At this point, he uneducated in anthropology and essentially ignorant to his future difficulty; unsurprisingly, he finds disappointment when a Pueblo governor explains to him the improbably large scope of his work, made even harder due to his ethnicity and background. He meets with the Navajo, a group known to be more open with their traditions, and begins his compiling of their mythologies. Zolbrod also finds Washington Matthews’ expansive text Navajo Legends, at that time the leading reference on the Navajo creation story, but finds fault as his own research progresses: Matthews’ morals seem to cloud the text as important references to sex and gender are ignored completely. In addition, Matthews compiles Diné bahanè as a simple text: he removes the essential human nature from the work, delivering it to the reader as a basic story instead of, as Zolbrod sees it, a work that defines Navajo culture and personal comprehension. He is appreciative of Matthews in the end, however – without his original compiling, Zolbrod would never have been able to complete his own work and compile the most complete (and coherent) version of the Diné bahanè to date.
An important aspect to keep in mind about Zolbrod’s Diné bahanè is that it is not the compilation of an anthropologist, nor is it an example of traditional ethnographic work. It is the professional study of an English literature professor hoping to record the spiritual stories of a Native American group – no small feat, especially when it is considered that Zolbrod’s regimentation in terms of comprehension for English literature does not apply to the Navajo. Constant references are made to important Eurasian literary works such as the Gilgamesh Epic as well as Homer’s tales – a telltale sign of Zolbrod’s background. From the view of a student of anthropology, the author’s work leaves an impact: despite his early behavior and lack of knowledge, Zolbrod’s dedication to the work and his efforts in dealing with the Navajo show that a non-traditional approach to anthropology always has an important place in cultural studies. The author’s attention toward the importance of the creation story to the Navajo as a general basis for their culture and comprehension shows a keen understanding for the foreign worldview of the people he is studying. At one point, Zolbrod speaks of the Navajo’s comparisons between real life happenings and the Diné bahanè in order to better understand current events: during World War II, Adolf Hitler is associated with Ye’iitsoh, a monster the Navajo see as a killer of innocents and a destroyer of landscapes. This example, as provided by Zolbrod, shows the true important of the Diné bahanè: it is the foundation for Navajo life.
Although he chides Washington Matthews on his presentation of the same stories as bland and non-cultural in Navajo Legends, the author’s background does show in Diné bahanè: despite its subject matter, it reads as many English-translated mythologies or ‘folk tales’ do. While this is a frustrating concept – especially considering Zolbrod’s heavy criticism of Matthews – it does have an important use: as a bridge to cross for those possessing a background consisting solely of English literature. Zolbrod’s work is very easy to understand and may help those who are afraid of delving into Native American literature due to its assumedly ‘different’ nature; teachers and professors, for example, would find a grand amount of potential in Diné bahanè. Any person with exposure to folk tales would have no trouble understanding the events of the Navajo creation story due to Zolbrod’s extensive work and the general straightforwardness of the tales.
Zolbrod’s recognition of his own work being potentially unsuitable for his purpose as a true display of Navajo culture is, while troubling, a benefit to the reader. The author’s own view of his work may be overly critical – he seems to share the viewpoint of several Navajo that he meets in thinking that the Diné bahanè is untranslatable because of the significance of its public performance; to make up for it, Zolbrod attempts to display the creation story in a phenomenally complete and detailed account that will do the work written justice. This may also have resulted in his impressive amount of notes and references, many of which are essential for even basic comprehension. The full nature of his work is a boon to an academic with a dedicated interest in Navajo culture or a need to find further sources on the subject: Zolbrod’s references are lengthy and extremely helpful for those hoping to learn more.
Paul Zolbrod’s Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story is work that, to the uninformed, may not seem like anthropology at all but instead as a simple folk literature. However, for Zolbrod to comprehend the events and importance of the creation story, he had to conform himself into the mold an anthropologist. The author’s willingness to investigate and compile such a monstrous oral tradition into print while also attempting to preserve the meaning behind the words themselves shows a keen mind, willing to acculturate and dedicate itself to a work in which many others would have not found as much meaning. Zolbrod’s work is irreplaceable and, despite his position as a non-anthropologist, his work here is most certainly a suitable ethnography.
Bibliography
Zolbrod, Paul G. Diné bahanè: The Navajo Creation Story. 2nd ed. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico P, 1984. 431 pp.
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So there you go. You should go read the text - it's hefty, but it's definitely an interesting read. Lots of people seem to underestimate the complexity of Native American groups or lump them into one "cultural" group. I've learned in my time under the professorship of Pierre Morenon at Rhode Island College that this is most certainly an incorrect assessment of the many, many ways of life that Native Americans put to use.
Friday, October 3, 2008
Men On Horses Kill, Sit Down; Find Themselves Slain By Other Horse-Riding Men
The title says it all. The works of Ibn-Khaldun and al-Kashgari amount to a good amount of information about the relatively cyclical series of events that occurred in Central Asia and the Middle East during the Medieval Era in pertinance to Turkic dynasties. Enjoy my take on al-Kashgari's famous 'Divan Lugat at-Turk' and Ibn-Khaldun's even more-renown 'Al-Muqadimmah'.
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The work of Mahmud al-Kashgari in the ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ – the Compendium of Turkic Dialects – is a fascinating display of Medieval Islamic linguistics as conducted by a native speaker of Turkic languages as well as an important example of a commissioned Abbasid court document constructed in order to better understand the Caliphate’s powerful new neighbors. Al-Kashgari’s writing also shows what the ‘favor of Allah’ was to medieval Muslims as well as the utter importance of the concept. When studied in combination with Ibn-Khaldun’s seminal ‘Al-Muqaddimah’ – The Introduction – a certain sort of appreciation (well past fear) for the Turkic people and nomadic riders of the East can be seen in their educated, cosmopolitan contemporaries. ‘Al-Muqadimmah’ and ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ work well hand-in-hand due to their mutual respect of the Turkic nomads: through Allah’s favor and their possession the ‘asabiyyah’ (social solidarity, group spirit), they are a supremely powerful force.
Al-Kashgari’s reasons for writing the ‘adab’ (or instructional) document ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ lie mostly on the shoulders of the inquisitive and opportunistic Abbasid courts. Al-Kashgari speaks repeatedly on the importance of dealing with the Turks in accordance to their own customs and languages in order to avoid their ire and possibly gain their favor and protection, as they were a people like none other. The author states repeatedly the many honors bestowed upon the Turks – the favor of Allah, for instance, is pronounced in a way that is not mildly epic.
“The slave Mahmud ibn al-Husayn ibn Muhammad says: I saw that Allah the Most High made the sun of power to rise in the constellation of the Turks and let the orbiting of the stars be directed by means of their authority. He called them Turks and entrusted to them dominion…”
The Turks were mighty in battle and in leadership as a result of Allah’s favor – a concept that the Abbasids must have realized in their encounters with them. According to Al-Kashgari, descendants of Turkic peoples would be emboldened with religious power and would be destined to lord over the world. The blows struck against them by any foe would be turned aside due to their invincibility through Allah and any who hoped to survive and thrive under their rule would submit as quickly as possible or be pierced through by the projectiles of nomadic bowmen. Al-Kashgari goes on to state that in is dealings, he discussed the importance of subservience to the Turks with several Islamic clergymen; the concluding discussion of the subject was that learning the languages of the Turks seemed almost to be a required duty of the Muslims because their favored position and even if the Turks have not received a holy decree, it could be decided logically that learning their tongues would still be extremely beneficial.
In summation, the purpose of al-Kashgari’s work on the Divan Lugat at-Turk is one of necessity on the part of the Abbasids. As professed in the Divan, the Turks are becoming a major power in the Middle East and Central Asia at the time of the writing. At this time, the Abbasid Caliphate’s authority was waning; not to be undone through the abandonment of their rule by new Persian and Syrian dynasties, the Abbasids were most likely hoping to bring the Turks into their fold in order to regain not only territory but also prestige. For a well-situated native speaker of Turkic languages like al-Kashgari to compose a book of dialects and tongues would be a major boon for the Caliphate: the chance to ally with the nomadic Turks may prove to the Islamic world that the Abbasids not only retained their authority but would reassert it upon their rebellious former vassal. Al-Kashgari’s emphasis on religion only pushed this further: a new force rising from the East and having Allah’s divine invincibility meant very much to the Caliphate, who throughout history had been Islam’s closest earthly link to Allah’s authority. If the two forces came to blows, the Abbasids would all but surrender their divine authority by attacking their rivals instead of proving their position. Thus, the Caliphate took the logical route: ally with those who shared a common role of religious importance and reap the benefits.
In comparison to al-Kashgari’s linguistic and commentarial work in Divan Lugat at-Turk, Ibn-Khaldun’s Al-Muqaddimah is more of a sociological piece that investigates the success and collapse of dynasties and empires throughout time with a central focus on ‘asabiyyah’ – a group feeling or solidarity among Muslims. Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion on the subject of the all-important asabiyyah, which allows for a group to spread, conquer and flourish, is that the folk of the cities forgets what unites them after years of easy living, disunity and little faith. Ibn-Khaldun states plainly that those who live within the confounds of dynastical power cannot comprehend asabiyyah because they have not put it to use or lived under it since their lives have lacked the difficulty dealt with by nomads or less-sedentary people.
“The situation is not at all understood by the great mass. They forget it, because they have forgotten the time when the[ir] dynasty first became established… Thus, they know nothing about what took place with God’s help at the beginning of the dynasty. They merely notice...that group feeling is no longer needed to establish power.”
To Ibn-Khaldun, ‘asabiyyah’ is the very foundation for power in the Muslim world – without it, the disconnected, faithless masses cannot hope to succeed. ‘Asabiyyah’ is essential to nomadic life because it stresses a tribal unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. The people of the city lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads. Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. Settled people begin to factionalize in terms of power and have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders ; a very poignant example of this would be the split of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shiite as a result of a succession crisis over the position of Caliph. Without ‘asabiyyah’, sedentary folk find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the Turks as nomads, however, live only for the survival and supremacy of their people– they are united in this aspect . Among the nomadic Turks there is little corruption caused by luxury as their austere lifestyles disallow much opportunity for it; the nomads do not lose their toughness or focus over time as city folk do.
Faith and religious favor are aspects heavily investigated by Ibn-Khaldun – his conclusion is heavy in its support for nomads and their use of ‘asabiyyah’. Without group feeling, Ib-Khaldun states, a group cannot achieve societal superiority: the use of religion as a central tenant of ‘asabiyyah’ is an extremely important aspect of this superiority . Ibn-Khaldun also professes that the positions of rulers and dynasties can be usurped and destroyed by family groups that possess a strong enough backing, be it religious or otherwise . This is most certainly the case in the Muslim world, as the very founding of its faith occurred and was allowed to thrive as a result of social unity among early Muslims under Muhammad himself.
A group hoping for change or supremacy must back up their strong, truthful message with both cohesive, honest meaning and capable offensive and defensive ability. The Turks, as spoken of by al-Kashgari, are a militarily strong and mobile group who are united not only by a similar nomadic culture but also in their religion – an honest, uncorrupted form of Islam that is free of political influence. Without strength and capable unity, a group hoping to bring about change would undoubtedly fail, and rightfully so – their message would be found lacking. Ibn-Khaldun provides the examples of the Sufi at-Tuwayziri and the Ghumarahan al’-Abbas, both of whom attempted to prompt revolt against those in power and failed due to dishonesty and a lack of strength .
The nomadic peoples of Central Asia and the Middle East are described by al-Kashgari and Ibn-Khaldun as a superior, overpowering force against the tranquil, weakening city dwellers of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Their effective use of religion and culture as a uniting factor – ‘asabiyyah’ – as well as their superior military ability threaten the very existence of cosmopolitan dynasties, which have become weak and indulgent due to a lack of difficulty or challenge. Once united, the Turkic nomads had a major effect upon the Middle East – through the various stages of nomadic migration, the Middle East either thrived or waned drastically. In the case of al-Kashgari’s Divan Lugat at-Turk, the Abbasids would honor its political and linguistic importance by allying with the powerful Seljuq Turks – a move that would allow the Abbasids to bolster their forces significantly with powerful mobile regiments as well as regain an amount of authority among former vassals such as the Qarakhanids and Ghaznavids of Central Asia. In an interesting twist of fate, the Abbasid Caliphate would eventually fall under the political control of Turkic peoples and come to be ruled by them; soon afterward, another Turkic group – the Mongol Hordes – would demolish the Caliphate’s center at Baghdad with little hope for resistance. This cycle of invasion by toughened nomads upon complacent settled conquerors would continue in the area and across the world for a fairly long amount of time – truly a testament to the efforts of al-Kashgari and Ibn-Khaldun as well as the messages promoted in their works.
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The end. I hope you didn't find it too dry - really, I hope you found it.
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The work of Mahmud al-Kashgari in the ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ – the Compendium of Turkic Dialects – is a fascinating display of Medieval Islamic linguistics as conducted by a native speaker of Turkic languages as well as an important example of a commissioned Abbasid court document constructed in order to better understand the Caliphate’s powerful new neighbors. Al-Kashgari’s writing also shows what the ‘favor of Allah’ was to medieval Muslims as well as the utter importance of the concept. When studied in combination with Ibn-Khaldun’s seminal ‘Al-Muqaddimah’ – The Introduction – a certain sort of appreciation (well past fear) for the Turkic people and nomadic riders of the East can be seen in their educated, cosmopolitan contemporaries. ‘Al-Muqadimmah’ and ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ work well hand-in-hand due to their mutual respect of the Turkic nomads: through Allah’s favor and their possession the ‘asabiyyah’ (social solidarity, group spirit), they are a supremely powerful force.
Al-Kashgari’s reasons for writing the ‘adab’ (or instructional) document ‘Divan Lugat at-Turk’ lie mostly on the shoulders of the inquisitive and opportunistic Abbasid courts. Al-Kashgari speaks repeatedly on the importance of dealing with the Turks in accordance to their own customs and languages in order to avoid their ire and possibly gain their favor and protection, as they were a people like none other. The author states repeatedly the many honors bestowed upon the Turks – the favor of Allah, for instance, is pronounced in a way that is not mildly epic.
“The slave Mahmud ibn al-Husayn ibn Muhammad says: I saw that Allah the Most High made the sun of power to rise in the constellation of the Turks and let the orbiting of the stars be directed by means of their authority. He called them Turks and entrusted to them dominion…”
The Turks were mighty in battle and in leadership as a result of Allah’s favor – a concept that the Abbasids must have realized in their encounters with them. According to Al-Kashgari, descendants of Turkic peoples would be emboldened with religious power and would be destined to lord over the world. The blows struck against them by any foe would be turned aside due to their invincibility through Allah and any who hoped to survive and thrive under their rule would submit as quickly as possible or be pierced through by the projectiles of nomadic bowmen. Al-Kashgari goes on to state that in is dealings, he discussed the importance of subservience to the Turks with several Islamic clergymen; the concluding discussion of the subject was that learning the languages of the Turks seemed almost to be a required duty of the Muslims because their favored position and even if the Turks have not received a holy decree, it could be decided logically that learning their tongues would still be extremely beneficial.
In summation, the purpose of al-Kashgari’s work on the Divan Lugat at-Turk is one of necessity on the part of the Abbasids. As professed in the Divan, the Turks are becoming a major power in the Middle East and Central Asia at the time of the writing. At this time, the Abbasid Caliphate’s authority was waning; not to be undone through the abandonment of their rule by new Persian and Syrian dynasties, the Abbasids were most likely hoping to bring the Turks into their fold in order to regain not only territory but also prestige. For a well-situated native speaker of Turkic languages like al-Kashgari to compose a book of dialects and tongues would be a major boon for the Caliphate: the chance to ally with the nomadic Turks may prove to the Islamic world that the Abbasids not only retained their authority but would reassert it upon their rebellious former vassal. Al-Kashgari’s emphasis on religion only pushed this further: a new force rising from the East and having Allah’s divine invincibility meant very much to the Caliphate, who throughout history had been Islam’s closest earthly link to Allah’s authority. If the two forces came to blows, the Abbasids would all but surrender their divine authority by attacking their rivals instead of proving their position. Thus, the Caliphate took the logical route: ally with those who shared a common role of religious importance and reap the benefits.
In comparison to al-Kashgari’s linguistic and commentarial work in Divan Lugat at-Turk, Ibn-Khaldun’s Al-Muqaddimah is more of a sociological piece that investigates the success and collapse of dynasties and empires throughout time with a central focus on ‘asabiyyah’ – a group feeling or solidarity among Muslims. Ibn-Khaldun’s opinion on the subject of the all-important asabiyyah, which allows for a group to spread, conquer and flourish, is that the folk of the cities forgets what unites them after years of easy living, disunity and little faith. Ibn-Khaldun states plainly that those who live within the confounds of dynastical power cannot comprehend asabiyyah because they have not put it to use or lived under it since their lives have lacked the difficulty dealt with by nomads or less-sedentary people.
“The situation is not at all understood by the great mass. They forget it, because they have forgotten the time when the[ir] dynasty first became established… Thus, they know nothing about what took place with God’s help at the beginning of the dynasty. They merely notice...that group feeling is no longer needed to establish power.”
To Ibn-Khaldun, ‘asabiyyah’ is the very foundation for power in the Muslim world – without it, the disconnected, faithless masses cannot hope to succeed. ‘Asabiyyah’ is essential to nomadic life because it stresses a tribal unity that allows the individual to simply survive under the protection of their family. The people of the city lack this sort of familial unity because they are protected by the ruling dynasty and no longer need to relate to one another like the nomads. Religion too, is important under asabiyyah, because it acts as a uniting factor that brings followers together for very basic reasons: worship and support. Settled people begin to factionalize in terms of power and have no use for unity or respect for faith as they fight amongst themselves, or in the name of their political leaders ; a very poignant example of this would be the split of the Muslim world between Sunni and Shiite as a result of a succession crisis over the position of Caliph. Without ‘asabiyyah’, sedentary folk find themselves enraptured with earthly luxuries and political intrigue; the Turks as nomads, however, live only for the survival and supremacy of their people– they are united in this aspect . Among the nomadic Turks there is little corruption caused by luxury as their austere lifestyles disallow much opportunity for it; the nomads do not lose their toughness or focus over time as city folk do.
Faith and religious favor are aspects heavily investigated by Ibn-Khaldun – his conclusion is heavy in its support for nomads and their use of ‘asabiyyah’. Without group feeling, Ib-Khaldun states, a group cannot achieve societal superiority: the use of religion as a central tenant of ‘asabiyyah’ is an extremely important aspect of this superiority . Ibn-Khaldun also professes that the positions of rulers and dynasties can be usurped and destroyed by family groups that possess a strong enough backing, be it religious or otherwise . This is most certainly the case in the Muslim world, as the very founding of its faith occurred and was allowed to thrive as a result of social unity among early Muslims under Muhammad himself.
A group hoping for change or supremacy must back up their strong, truthful message with both cohesive, honest meaning and capable offensive and defensive ability. The Turks, as spoken of by al-Kashgari, are a militarily strong and mobile group who are united not only by a similar nomadic culture but also in their religion – an honest, uncorrupted form of Islam that is free of political influence. Without strength and capable unity, a group hoping to bring about change would undoubtedly fail, and rightfully so – their message would be found lacking. Ibn-Khaldun provides the examples of the Sufi at-Tuwayziri and the Ghumarahan al’-Abbas, both of whom attempted to prompt revolt against those in power and failed due to dishonesty and a lack of strength .
The nomadic peoples of Central Asia and the Middle East are described by al-Kashgari and Ibn-Khaldun as a superior, overpowering force against the tranquil, weakening city dwellers of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Their effective use of religion and culture as a uniting factor – ‘asabiyyah’ – as well as their superior military ability threaten the very existence of cosmopolitan dynasties, which have become weak and indulgent due to a lack of difficulty or challenge. Once united, the Turkic nomads had a major effect upon the Middle East – through the various stages of nomadic migration, the Middle East either thrived or waned drastically. In the case of al-Kashgari’s Divan Lugat at-Turk, the Abbasids would honor its political and linguistic importance by allying with the powerful Seljuq Turks – a move that would allow the Abbasids to bolster their forces significantly with powerful mobile regiments as well as regain an amount of authority among former vassals such as the Qarakhanids and Ghaznavids of Central Asia. In an interesting twist of fate, the Abbasid Caliphate would eventually fall under the political control of Turkic peoples and come to be ruled by them; soon afterward, another Turkic group – the Mongol Hordes – would demolish the Caliphate’s center at Baghdad with little hope for resistance. This cycle of invasion by toughened nomads upon complacent settled conquerors would continue in the area and across the world for a fairly long amount of time – truly a testament to the efforts of al-Kashgari and Ibn-Khaldun as well as the messages promoted in their works.
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The end. I hope you didn't find it too dry - really, I hope you found it.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Summer Is Done; With It, My Inability To Post
Expect a flood of new posts in the next few days, now that I am able to actually have things to put up. Thank goodness for school - I would atrophy without it.
Here's some article comparisons for Russian history. I was on a kick for the Khazars, a Jewish(!)-led Medieval nomadic group based just to the northeast of the Black Sea. I strayed from that and showed my love for colonialism and adventure, etc etc etc in the second article but it all turned out well. My professor's comments on the work included his admiration for my position as an 'archival junkie'.
The articles are George V. Lantzeff's "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion" (The American Slavic and East Europe Review, Vol. 6, pp1-10) and Richard Foltz's "Judaism and the Silk Route" (The History Teacher, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp9-16). Enjoy.
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Lantzeff’s work focuses on the colonial policies of competing Russian principalities from the tenth century to the fourteenth century. The wealthy Novgorodian Republic and the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal – an entity that would become the Grand Duchy of Muscovy – were two major participants in the conflict. Initially a discussion of the Novgorodian tribute collected from tribal groups up to and including the Ural Mountains, Lantzeff expounds upon the rough competition between the Republic and Rostov-Suzdal on a martial and political level. Rostov-Suzdal’s founding of Nizhny Novgorod, a major part of Rus’ colonialism, spelled the end of that era as the Tatars invaded.
Lantzeff does a fine job of explaining the fairly unexplored area of Rus’ colonialism in his “Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion”. It is a surprise on an academic level that such little emphasis is put on early Russian colonialism, considering the founding of Novgorod as an essentially Varangian possession as well as Russia’s future as an empire known for its frontier expansionism. Considering the generally unaddressed nature of the issue, Lantzeff’s work is a suitable introduction to pre-Mongol Russian expansion to the east: it shows the amateur Russian historian that even outside of the traditional territory of rival principalities, the struggles between the territories of European Russia were long-reaching.
The reasons for and background surrounding Rus’ colonialism provided by Lantzeff are clear enough to the casual reader. The Novgorodians sought new resources to continue the building of their mercantile empire, and Rostov-Suzdal finally acted on the greedy eye it had cast on the colonial possessions of the rival trade republic. Lantzeff mentions repeatedly, and rightfully so, the originality and importance of the Novgorodians’ frontiersmen-esque methods in establishing colonies and charging tribute from the indigenous people and settlers: it would be a technique put to use by not only the Russians in time to come but by almost all other colonial powers as an introductory method of gaining regional control. Lantzeff’s use of Russian chronicles in describing the lands being colonized by the Rus’ inspires thoughts of a semi-mythical far-off land. Admittedly, the distance to be crossed between say, Novgorod and the Ural Mountains, is fairly impressive; the descriptions given by Lantzeff only enhance this quality. His use of statistics and official records, too, add to the scope of the conflict: the participation of almost a hundred princes in an alliance aiming to grab up Novgorod’s riches, the large amounts of captives as a result of martial actions between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal as well as the surprisingly consistent dates between attacks put the situation into perspective.
The lack of much detail outside of statistics and basic reasoning in Lantzeff’s work did prevent the article from shining in a particular fashion. The author could have gone much more in-depth with his work and seemed to toe the line between basic historical information and further description that would have helped his work significantly. True, Lantzeff covered the necessary facts of the situation: he addressed the “who and where” as well as whatever else background was needed for his work but did not go into detail. An example of this would be his addressing of the actual battles between the Novgorodians and the Rostov-Suzdalians, as well as the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Volga Bulgars: there was no discussion of battle tactics or superior arms, nor was there a record of the obvious value of raiding gained by the future Muscovites (although Lantzeff does mention the garnering of the spoils). The author seems to ignore the grand amount of comparisons that could be made between the Rostov-Suzdalians and their later Muscovite counterparts who instituted a fairly similar system of colonialism. Lantzeff spoke of Kiev’s preference toward Novgorod as opposed to Rostov-Suzdal as well as the general ire directed at Novgorod from the other princely states but did not discuss any background – namely, that Novgorod regularly paid heed as well as tribute to Kiev due to its powerful position in regional economics and politics (a trend that would end very soon as the Mongols made their way westward) and that the two powers relied on each other for economic and military means. A final overarching fact that Lantzeff seemed to ignore was the political clout of Novgorod throughout the ages. Its economic power, geographic position, relationship with Kiev and general importance as a Rus’ principality allowed Novgorod much leeway in terms of its actions (political or martial) and monetary ventures, which Lantzeff could have addressed as it is a factor of importance in the colonial competition between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal. After all, Novgorod participated heartily in Mongol politics after the Horde had effectively collapsed the other Russian principalities – a fact that Lantzeff only brushes on at the end of the article.
“Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion” is an interesting and informative article that does a decent job of explaining the very early colonial ventures of the Russian people. While Lantzeff accomplishes the task of providing a suitable background to the conflict between the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Novgorodians, he does not delve deep enough into the situation to sate a reader expecting more than an overview of the events. On the whole, however, the article is most certainly an acceptable piece of work and has no problem gaining the attention of a reader who is new to the information.
Works Cited
Lantzeff, George V. "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion." The American Slavic and East European Review 6.3 (1947): 1-10.
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Here is the other - this is the one that pertained (vaguely) to the Khazars, but more to medieval Jews in general.
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“Judaism and the Silk Route” is an article pertaining to the impact made upon the Silk Route by followers of Judaism throughout history. Richard Foltz examines Judaism’s cohabitation with local beliefs including Iranian ideology, a factor that allowed Judaism to spread along the route and not only give birth to small pockets of Jewish traders along the Eurasian beltline but also influenced indigenous peoples’ beliefs and actions. Foltz also speaks about the adaptive ability of the Jews in the face of Islamization in Central Asia, leaving them to be the only non-Muslim religious minority in the area.
A positive aspect of Richard Foltz’s work on this subject is that it is immersive in its scope. Foltz’s work on “Judaism and the Silk Route” is one of the few examples of academic work that I have seem that is not neck-deep in discussion pertaining to the limitation and oppression of Judaic merchants and operatives on the Eurasian landmass. Rather, to someone who is new to the subject of continent-spanning Jewry, it is a welcome matter: throughout history, followers of Judaism have fostered transcontinental trade on a scale as massive as the almost fantastical Silk Route (or Road). Foltz starts with a historical background of the Levant and the Middle East pertaining to the Jews, specifically their time in Mesopotamia under the heel of the Babylonians and the flowering of Jewish activity under Persian influence. The foundations of several major cities in Iran can be sourced to Jewish ex-slaves and even the ideology of Persia has influenced and been influenced by Judaism: the systems of belief share similar holidays and legends pertaining to the region, a fine example of the influence and prospering of Jews in the region. Foltz’s detailed explanation of the Radanites and their power base in the Mediterranean shows that, despite the seemingly negative reputation given to European Jews, they were still a force to be reckoned with from an economic standpoint.
As Foltz mentions, the various converts to Judaism along the Silk Route are a very interesting (and sometimes peculiar) aspect of the Jews’ widespread nature. The actions of Mediterranean Jews led them to communication with the “Khazars” – a nomadic Turkic group centered on the northeast shore of the Black Sea who hoped to trade slaves with the Jews. Foltz’s use of the Turkish proverb, “There is no Iranian merchant without a Turkish associate, just as there is no cap without a head” strikes home the relationship between the two differently-civilized worlds of sedentary people and nomadic people in terms of a symbiotic relationship. The Khazar elite eventually converted to Judaism in order to gain the further benefit of what they perceived as ‘religious neutrality’ – that is to say, they would be more privileged than their shamanistic steppe kin due to foreign traders’ familiarity with the Jewish people. This is a very interesting factor: a nomadic group, normally suited to raiding and on-the-move living, wished to gain partial immunity against oppressors by converting to a religion that most viewed as a trader’s ideology. As a student of nomadic history, that concept is a very exciting one and is definitely something I will have to investigate in other regions such as Eastern Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The influence of the Jews on indigenous peoples (and vice versa) as well as the founding of Jewish communities along the Silk Route fosters a uniquely interesting chain of settlements and communication across Eurasia – from Marseille in France to Kaifeng in China.
The positive nature of Foltz’s work here is overshadowed by the fact that little to no mention is made of anti-Jewish sentiment in the regions that they begin to influence. Throughout the early tenure of the Jewish people in Persian lands, a great amount of good was done for the Jews by the Persian royalty; a case for this would be Cyrus the Great’s order to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. However, they were also placed under heavy scrutiny: early Zoroastrian texts list Judaism among the many beliefs that its follower had oppressed. Later dynasties in Persia did not necessarily oppress the Jews but actively sought to limit any Jewish gains toward positions of authority. The large Jewish minority in Central Asia, while influential and long-lasting, did attract negative attention – the Arab conquests resulted in Bukharan Jews having to pay exorbitant taxes, the Mongol Invasions decreased the number of Central Asian followers of Judaism greatly and eventually the hardline Islamic nomadic tribes of the region would turn against the Jews through forced conversion and violence. Foltz fails to mention these events entirely, and thus is not even able to remark upon the fact that one of the only reasons that the Jews were targeted by their oppressors in Central-to-Eastern Eurasia was their perceived higher wealth due to trade along the Silk Route.
“Judaism and the Silk Route” is definitely written in a fashion to ignore the negatives while focusing more on the positive impacts and receptions of the Jewish people operating on and as a result of the Silk Route. While he completely glosses over negative events, Foltz’s work is informative and interesting to someone who may have not been aware of the far-reaching nature of Judaism or the impact of Classical-to-Pre-Modern Jews upon trade and ideology. Foltz’s talk of a continent-spanning Jewish community not suspicion or oppression is sorely wishful thinking across the wide expanse of history; however, that is not to say that for a time it did not exist and prosper.
Works Cited
Foltz, Richard. "Judaism and the Silk Route." The History Teacher 32 (1998): 9-16.
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I don't know why the formatting comes out so weirdly on these, but I'm not particularly troubled by it. If anyone's bothering to read, I hope they won't mind.
Here's some article comparisons for Russian history. I was on a kick for the Khazars, a Jewish(!)-led Medieval nomadic group based just to the northeast of the Black Sea. I strayed from that and showed my love for colonialism and adventure, etc etc etc in the second article but it all turned out well. My professor's comments on the work included his admiration for my position as an 'archival junkie'.
The articles are George V. Lantzeff's "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion" (The American Slavic and East Europe Review, Vol. 6, pp1-10) and Richard Foltz's "Judaism and the Silk Route" (The History Teacher, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp9-16). Enjoy.
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Lantzeff’s work focuses on the colonial policies of competing Russian principalities from the tenth century to the fourteenth century. The wealthy Novgorodian Republic and the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal – an entity that would become the Grand Duchy of Muscovy – were two major participants in the conflict. Initially a discussion of the Novgorodian tribute collected from tribal groups up to and including the Ural Mountains, Lantzeff expounds upon the rough competition between the Republic and Rostov-Suzdal on a martial and political level. Rostov-Suzdal’s founding of Nizhny Novgorod, a major part of Rus’ colonialism, spelled the end of that era as the Tatars invaded.
Lantzeff does a fine job of explaining the fairly unexplored area of Rus’ colonialism in his “Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion”. It is a surprise on an academic level that such little emphasis is put on early Russian colonialism, considering the founding of Novgorod as an essentially Varangian possession as well as Russia’s future as an empire known for its frontier expansionism. Considering the generally unaddressed nature of the issue, Lantzeff’s work is a suitable introduction to pre-Mongol Russian expansion to the east: it shows the amateur Russian historian that even outside of the traditional territory of rival principalities, the struggles between the territories of European Russia were long-reaching.
The reasons for and background surrounding Rus’ colonialism provided by Lantzeff are clear enough to the casual reader. The Novgorodians sought new resources to continue the building of their mercantile empire, and Rostov-Suzdal finally acted on the greedy eye it had cast on the colonial possessions of the rival trade republic. Lantzeff mentions repeatedly, and rightfully so, the originality and importance of the Novgorodians’ frontiersmen-esque methods in establishing colonies and charging tribute from the indigenous people and settlers: it would be a technique put to use by not only the Russians in time to come but by almost all other colonial powers as an introductory method of gaining regional control. Lantzeff’s use of Russian chronicles in describing the lands being colonized by the Rus’ inspires thoughts of a semi-mythical far-off land. Admittedly, the distance to be crossed between say, Novgorod and the Ural Mountains, is fairly impressive; the descriptions given by Lantzeff only enhance this quality. His use of statistics and official records, too, add to the scope of the conflict: the participation of almost a hundred princes in an alliance aiming to grab up Novgorod’s riches, the large amounts of captives as a result of martial actions between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal as well as the surprisingly consistent dates between attacks put the situation into perspective.
The lack of much detail outside of statistics and basic reasoning in Lantzeff’s work did prevent the article from shining in a particular fashion. The author could have gone much more in-depth with his work and seemed to toe the line between basic historical information and further description that would have helped his work significantly. True, Lantzeff covered the necessary facts of the situation: he addressed the “who and where” as well as whatever else background was needed for his work but did not go into detail. An example of this would be his addressing of the actual battles between the Novgorodians and the Rostov-Suzdalians, as well as the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Volga Bulgars: there was no discussion of battle tactics or superior arms, nor was there a record of the obvious value of raiding gained by the future Muscovites (although Lantzeff does mention the garnering of the spoils). The author seems to ignore the grand amount of comparisons that could be made between the Rostov-Suzdalians and their later Muscovite counterparts who instituted a fairly similar system of colonialism. Lantzeff spoke of Kiev’s preference toward Novgorod as opposed to Rostov-Suzdal as well as the general ire directed at Novgorod from the other princely states but did not discuss any background – namely, that Novgorod regularly paid heed as well as tribute to Kiev due to its powerful position in regional economics and politics (a trend that would end very soon as the Mongols made their way westward) and that the two powers relied on each other for economic and military means. A final overarching fact that Lantzeff seemed to ignore was the political clout of Novgorod throughout the ages. Its economic power, geographic position, relationship with Kiev and general importance as a Rus’ principality allowed Novgorod much leeway in terms of its actions (political or martial) and monetary ventures, which Lantzeff could have addressed as it is a factor of importance in the colonial competition between Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal. After all, Novgorod participated heartily in Mongol politics after the Horde had effectively collapsed the other Russian principalities – a fact that Lantzeff only brushes on at the end of the article.
“Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion” is an interesting and informative article that does a decent job of explaining the very early colonial ventures of the Russian people. While Lantzeff accomplishes the task of providing a suitable background to the conflict between the Rostov-Suzdalians and the Novgorodians, he does not delve deep enough into the situation to sate a reader expecting more than an overview of the events. On the whole, however, the article is most certainly an acceptable piece of work and has no problem gaining the attention of a reader who is new to the information.
Works Cited
Lantzeff, George V. "Russian Eastward Expansion before the Mongol Invasion." The American Slavic and East European Review 6.3 (1947): 1-10.
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Here is the other - this is the one that pertained (vaguely) to the Khazars, but more to medieval Jews in general.
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“Judaism and the Silk Route” is an article pertaining to the impact made upon the Silk Route by followers of Judaism throughout history. Richard Foltz examines Judaism’s cohabitation with local beliefs including Iranian ideology, a factor that allowed Judaism to spread along the route and not only give birth to small pockets of Jewish traders along the Eurasian beltline but also influenced indigenous peoples’ beliefs and actions. Foltz also speaks about the adaptive ability of the Jews in the face of Islamization in Central Asia, leaving them to be the only non-Muslim religious minority in the area.
A positive aspect of Richard Foltz’s work on this subject is that it is immersive in its scope. Foltz’s work on “Judaism and the Silk Route” is one of the few examples of academic work that I have seem that is not neck-deep in discussion pertaining to the limitation and oppression of Judaic merchants and operatives on the Eurasian landmass. Rather, to someone who is new to the subject of continent-spanning Jewry, it is a welcome matter: throughout history, followers of Judaism have fostered transcontinental trade on a scale as massive as the almost fantastical Silk Route (or Road). Foltz starts with a historical background of the Levant and the Middle East pertaining to the Jews, specifically their time in Mesopotamia under the heel of the Babylonians and the flowering of Jewish activity under Persian influence. The foundations of several major cities in Iran can be sourced to Jewish ex-slaves and even the ideology of Persia has influenced and been influenced by Judaism: the systems of belief share similar holidays and legends pertaining to the region, a fine example of the influence and prospering of Jews in the region. Foltz’s detailed explanation of the Radanites and their power base in the Mediterranean shows that, despite the seemingly negative reputation given to European Jews, they were still a force to be reckoned with from an economic standpoint.
As Foltz mentions, the various converts to Judaism along the Silk Route are a very interesting (and sometimes peculiar) aspect of the Jews’ widespread nature. The actions of Mediterranean Jews led them to communication with the “Khazars” – a nomadic Turkic group centered on the northeast shore of the Black Sea who hoped to trade slaves with the Jews. Foltz’s use of the Turkish proverb, “There is no Iranian merchant without a Turkish associate, just as there is no cap without a head” strikes home the relationship between the two differently-civilized worlds of sedentary people and nomadic people in terms of a symbiotic relationship. The Khazar elite eventually converted to Judaism in order to gain the further benefit of what they perceived as ‘religious neutrality’ – that is to say, they would be more privileged than their shamanistic steppe kin due to foreign traders’ familiarity with the Jewish people. This is a very interesting factor: a nomadic group, normally suited to raiding and on-the-move living, wished to gain partial immunity against oppressors by converting to a religion that most viewed as a trader’s ideology. As a student of nomadic history, that concept is a very exciting one and is definitely something I will have to investigate in other regions such as Eastern Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The influence of the Jews on indigenous peoples (and vice versa) as well as the founding of Jewish communities along the Silk Route fosters a uniquely interesting chain of settlements and communication across Eurasia – from Marseille in France to Kaifeng in China.
The positive nature of Foltz’s work here is overshadowed by the fact that little to no mention is made of anti-Jewish sentiment in the regions that they begin to influence. Throughout the early tenure of the Jewish people in Persian lands, a great amount of good was done for the Jews by the Persian royalty; a case for this would be Cyrus the Great’s order to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. However, they were also placed under heavy scrutiny: early Zoroastrian texts list Judaism among the many beliefs that its follower had oppressed. Later dynasties in Persia did not necessarily oppress the Jews but actively sought to limit any Jewish gains toward positions of authority. The large Jewish minority in Central Asia, while influential and long-lasting, did attract negative attention – the Arab conquests resulted in Bukharan Jews having to pay exorbitant taxes, the Mongol Invasions decreased the number of Central Asian followers of Judaism greatly and eventually the hardline Islamic nomadic tribes of the region would turn against the Jews through forced conversion and violence. Foltz fails to mention these events entirely, and thus is not even able to remark upon the fact that one of the only reasons that the Jews were targeted by their oppressors in Central-to-Eastern Eurasia was their perceived higher wealth due to trade along the Silk Route.
“Judaism and the Silk Route” is definitely written in a fashion to ignore the negatives while focusing more on the positive impacts and receptions of the Jewish people operating on and as a result of the Silk Route. While he completely glosses over negative events, Foltz’s work is informative and interesting to someone who may have not been aware of the far-reaching nature of Judaism or the impact of Classical-to-Pre-Modern Jews upon trade and ideology. Foltz’s talk of a continent-spanning Jewish community not suspicion or oppression is sorely wishful thinking across the wide expanse of history; however, that is not to say that for a time it did not exist and prosper.
Works Cited
Foltz, Richard. "Judaism and the Silk Route." The History Teacher 32 (1998): 9-16.
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I don't know why the formatting comes out so weirdly on these, but I'm not particularly troubled by it. If anyone's bothering to read, I hope they won't mind.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Globalization vs. Tribalism
Here's my final paper for Global History Since 1500, a class taught by my advisor - and, really, one of the most helpful faculty members of RIC - Prof. David Thomas. He's reinvigorated my interest in Middle Eastern History and the History of Islam. He has a quaint (read: overwhelming) interest in globalization and, after reading a few books on the subject (both modern and historical commentaries), I'm beginning to develop one myself.
I find that many people have no idea as to what globalization actually is or what it means for them. Most Americans I speak to about the subject just express their ire toward subcontinental Indians who are "taking all the telemarketing jobs"; which is, to say, most Americans I speak to on the subject do not know the history of the idea of globalization. I hope they come across my blog today, boy I tell you!
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By the 1800’s, the world had turned upside down.For the grand majority of history, wealth flowed from the prosperous Far East and Near East to the comparatively backwater West – spices travelled long routes through the steppes and mountains from the majestic pavilions of divine China to be sold just off the muddy streets of warlike Europe. Problems did indeed appear: the Islamic sphere, specifically the Ottoman Empire, certainly caused a problem for the Europeans, who required (or at least desired) goods from the East and did not deign to work through Europe’s largest bordering opposing religious bloc, which led to the European entry into a historic system: the Indian Ocean Trade. Trade along the Indian Ocean was the result of much heroic exploration and a major impact in historic rises in power, such as the Portuguese Empire which grew wealthy. It also led to collapses in structure, such as the caravan system across Central Asia.
The Indian Ocean became very important to many powers, especially European or otherwise western ones, for one main reason: trade supremacy. To the Europeans, the Indian Ocean represented a method of avoidance of the Muslim world’s stranglehold on the Far East – using the body of water to travel allowed merchants and diplomats a new way of avoiding conflict with the ummah. Europeans could do their business directly with the rich foreign lands beyond. However, a major aspect of this was that of how to access the Indian Ocean without notable Muslim interaction. As of the thirteenth century, Venice’s trade with the Far East was conducted through the conduit of Alexandria, which throughout its history had been ruled by followers of Islam. The panache of the European powers and their desire for trade dominance can be seen in their ability to take initiative on the subject of Indian Ocean Trade. At one point, the Venetians had planned to outmaneuver the Egyptians and flank the Muslim powers by launching naval military expeditions into the Indian Ocean – a prime example of the importance of the Indian Ocean to westerners, and a display of frustration over the Muslim world’s hold on trade with the East.
To the powers of the East, the Indian Ocean represented the next great trade venture after the fall of the Silk Road, which the armies of Tamerlane severed by conquering many major cities along the historic trade route. This was not just the case for the powers of the Near East such as the Sultanate of Delhi or the Ilkhanate (which was responsible for the end of the Silk Road in the first place as subjects of Tamerlane) but was also the case of Ming China, which grew concerned over its loss of trade revenue with the West and sought to find a new route for trade.
Just months after the collapse of the caravan system across Central Asia, Zheng He was commissioned by the Yongle Emperor to begin his travels along the Indian Ocean to establish trade dominance.
The actions taken by the major regional powers in regards to the Indian Ocean allow for a better understanding of global history in that a major similarity can be made between all powers involved: espite cultural or societal differences, regional powers recognize the importance of trade and react accordingly. The Venetians, craving an open market with the Far East, nearly acted militarily against the Egyptian Sultanate to gain such a benefit. The Ming Chinese saw their trade collapse with the Silk Road and thus sought new ventures to continue on financially. Knowing the importance of trade supremacy and their position within the region, Ibn Battuta reports that the Sultanate of Delhi shunned casual visitors (including foreign traders) to their lands and forced pledges of allegiance and residence upon foreign guests.
These are just examples of what can be seen as a whole chain of reactions as empires and regional powers continuously react to changes made by other powers, in turn making their own changes that must be reacted to; thus, the history of the Indian Ocean can be viewed as a string of historical contingency. This contingency can be linked to the topoi system, which is seen as a long series of recurring and almost cyclical ideas and methods pertaining to history. While the setting may be different, powers will follow familiar ideas in order to achieve their goals.
The end of the Indian Ocean as a prosperous global trading network can be blamed on the discovery of the New World by European powers as well as replacement sources of resources being found outside of the Indian Ocean region. The wealth found in the New World surpasses the resources provided by trade on the Indian Ocean; riches abound began to blow into the Christian and Muslim worlds, and even as far as China did travel silver mined in the mountains of Bolivia. The victories of the Spanish conquistadores over the native Aztec and Incan forces of Mesoamerica provided gigantic amounts of gold, drawing even more attention to the New World and away from the Far East. Spanish silver became common in foreign lands as far as China, the Latin “piece of eight” meeting with newly-discovered Japanese silver to choke the East Europe began to manufacture goods that were once staples of the Eastern economy, even exporting them to the East and effectively destroying economic necessities there such as the once-plentiful textile industries of India and China.
British colonial actions in India, hundreds of years after the abandonment of the Indian Ocean Trade, can be seen as another facet of how European nation-states came to dominate the globe: the power of industrialism and technology. British use of technology allowed for the direct subduing and ruling of a subcontinent of people, consisting of many different cultural groups and identities, by a comparably small group of comparably uniform foreigners. Without technology, there is a good chance that Britain would not have made the immediate ground it did in fighting native forces in India, effectively removing the splendid jewel from the British crown. In general, Europeans were easily able to subdue native peoples into basic servitude due to a massive technological advantage. Following the initial conquering, entire populations were put to work with a specific purpose in mind – British-ruled India worked to gather huge amounts of raw materials that were shipped back to England for production. British subjects worked as local administrators, military leaders and officials in India during time of British imperialism there; they did not arrive in large numbers from the home country like settlers would for a colony, but worked in important overseer positions as the majority of the work was done by conquered Indian subjects. This importation of the British state system reverberated within Indian society – it held enough sway within Britain’s colonial rule of the region that fierce Indian nationalists would later try to work within in to gain their homeland’s freedom from British rule.
The gains made by the British during their occupation of India are important to consider in terms of European superiority over the globe. After the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, the British began to mistrust the Indians on a base level and decided to remove the administration of the region from the British East India Company in order to place it under direct imperial authority. This led to India becoming the “jewel in the British crown” as India was modernized industrially, transferring the region’s method of business from a place of privatized exploitation to a huge, productive imperialistic colony. British administrators installed dams, allowing for irrigation that farmers used for Raj-approved cotton production and tea production in order to counter Chinese tea importation.
New British territories became sources of huge wealth, India specifically; British businessmen gained much from financing railroads in the East and raw materials made their way back to the Old World for production. The development of new products came at a rapid pace, allowing for a large increase in western imports and even further wealth for colonizer nations. India was forced to become consumer of British exports, such as textiles, due to lack of British protection of local Indian industry. This led to a British dependency and further importance placed on the British Raj, or ruling body in India, due to the large chunk of the British economy for which India accounted; as a result, Britain put a grand amount of effort into maintaining its control of India. The British managed to keep a monopoly on their colonial governments, preventing indigenous residents from reclaiming rights to industry and thus reaping the full benefits of their rule. The lack of non-British or local goods forced India to rely on Britain for its resources. New governmental systems came into use that promoted private industry and property while shelving the rights of the lower classes
To a point, this may have prompted residents from India to fill out the workforces in other parts of the British Empire as they searched for work, increasing levels of production across their territories. The British were thus a force of globalization – its goods were widespread across the world and workers from its colonies found themselves halfway across the globe, still working in the same system but at a different level. Indians were forced to work within the British system due to the power held over their head by their colonial masters due to superior technology and logistics.
The aforementioned examples of globalization in terms of trade supremacy and later colonial rule are examples of why major powers, usually Western in origin, are the world forces which “decide the rules”. Due to the West’s exploitation of the New World and eventually the East – the very pinnacle of the world the West once floundered in – the direction of wealth and, indeed, the origins of wealth switched to Europe and its colonies. India and China found themselves destitute as European industrialization and New World colonization removed the importance placed on goods from the East. Quality Indian textiles were no longer necessary: cheap, easily produced British alternatives were in higher demand than their Eastern counterparts. The same could be said about specific spices and herbs which, while still imported from the East, could be cultivated in European colonies in the New World as well as in British India[14]. At the same time, the East found itself reliant upon the West: through colonial strength, European forces such as the British, French and Dutch had subdued much of the East to garner its resources and strengthen its own markets by limiting what goods their new imperial subjects could obtain from the rest of the empire, let alone outside of the empire. Separate empires did not intermingle in colonial goods, or allow their possessions to interact with the other empires; the British, for example, would not have allowed their Indian subjects to appeal to the Dutch for better rates on food.
European control over the East damaged states greatly – China found itself in dire straits, drowning in New World silver and addicted to European-smuggled opium due to the value placed by Europeans upon Chinese tea. The scattered states of India were in imperial shackles as British forces occupied the entire subcontinent, forcing its subjects to work as glorified slaves in order to produce goods for the British Empire – subjects who were, at the same time, forced to import goods from other British dominions as a means of obtaining resources due to high foreign tariffs and suppressed local industry[15]. Through this sort of manipulation, European powers were able to gain complete control over the world. This did not register well with its inhabitants, however; as seen in the case of India, groups like the radical Swadeshi Samitis became popular due to their outcries against the unjust British system[16]. These organizations promoted local industry and, unlike their more tame National Congress counterparts who attempted to work within the system to free themselves, demanded immediate change due to the unfair practices of the British[17]. India, a land of splintered groups and many cultures, eventually found itself united after a century of harsh, exploitive imperialist control.
Globalization finds its roots in the practices of the European powers and their actions while participating in the Indian Ocean Trade as well as their eventual moves for colonial power over the East. The promises of globalization, according to Benjamin R. Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld”, are plentiful: an end to conflicts, economic prosperity and a global community are among its goals[18]. Freedom and peace are major driving forces behind globalization, not for any specific moralistic goal; rather, global cooperation and unity allows for a free, efficient market across the world that can be utilized by all participants – namely large global corporations[19]. This is comparable to a system such as the British Empire at their peak: an internally peaceful, well-ordered empire is supported by a stable, flourishing economy with proper production and consumption as conducted by trade companies. A notable flaw within the world of true globalization is that as long as the leader of a region or people ensures the openness of the market, they can act as brutally as they see fit. According to Barber, a leader who strikes against neighbors and closes up the markets has two black marks against them; Barber provides the example of Saddam Hussein, whose attacks on Kuwait and harsh civil rule made him a detriment to globalization[20]. A historical comparison can be made between Saddam Hussein and the Qianlong Emperor of China, who resisted British globalization as a result of the European smuggling of opium into Imperial Chinese territory. This caused the Emperor to close off Chinese markets and rouse the ire of European powers.
The orderly appearance of contemporary globalization stems from a strong historical basis as well as modern proof that a uniform system is the best type. Without an orderly, rigid system of globalization, the market cannot be as efficient as possible; snags in the process, such as a leader not opening up its markets or a region with a particularly strong cultural, ethnic or religious presence refusing to trade with outside sources, slow down globalization. “Jihad vs. McWorld” states that the four imperatives of globalization are those of the market, resources, information and ecological; working in unity, these four concepts ensure the survival of a globalized system[21]. The “market imperative” requires a transnational market that, while possibly endangering regional markets, caters to all regions by distributing appropriate resources under free trade and the efficient behavior of international financial entities such as banks and trade groups (as seen in the “resource imperative”). Globalized markets remain effective through as much use of “common” aspects as possible – a stark use of common languages, currency and behaviors (cosmopolitan in nature) promote an air of non-conflict and conformity in order for globalization to be so competent. In addition, a free flow of communication and information must exist, as businesses and commerce require these to expedite their work[22].
The alternate to globalization, according to Barber, would be tribalism, which the author refers to as “permanent rebellion against uniformity and integration”[23] – including, but not limited to, the forces of globalization. While globalization stresses the existence of a single (or as few as possible) operating global sphere of cooperation and economic activity, tribalism demands the breakdown of these spheres into as many parts as theoretically possible. Cultural identity is stressed over the concept of national identities, sect beliefs over basic religious practices and dissenting separatist factions over any basic ethnic group. Modern-day examples include French-Canadian Quebecois, Basques in Spain as well as Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia while historical examples include Portugal nominating itself as a separate group from the Spanish crowns of the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the unique Ibadi Omanis who broke free of Seljuk rule and established their own Imamate in 1053 to 1054. All aforementioned groups stressed their own cultural identity as reasons for breaking free of a system which did not properly encompass their existence. However, this leads to a severe prominence of parochialism and exclusion among those who adhere to tribalism. Conflict against outside (and inside) sources is constant within the system of tribalism as groups struggle for recognition and solidarity. India is a fantastic example of this – when the British pulled out of the subcontinent after World War II, the region collapsed in infighting between Hindus, Tamils, Sikhs and Muslims[24].
The perspectives provided in Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld” are extremely logical and can be seen as very accurate in most cases; this, however, does not spell a good fortune for democracy. Separating and classifying the actions of the entire world throughout history into two major categories seems extremely daunting; one may find it impossible to avoid the use of “good” and “bad” as headers on this list. Barber does manage to remain as non-biased and impartial toward either globalization (“McWorld”) or tribalism (“Jihad”), speaking on the positive and negative aspects of both systems as fairly as possible. A frightening aspect of Barber’s work is that one of the main driving factors of both tribalism and globalization is that democracy is essentially ignored in both systems, an idea made even more frightening upon the realization of the prominence of both systems in today’s world. Replacing democracy with adherence to global market entities or tribalist leaders is fairly intimidating as the driving force of the modern world has been democracy. Within globalization, democracy is pushed aside to ensure streamlined markets through the use of merit and technology; within tribalism, there is no need for democracy in the face of exclusionary tactics and striking out against strangers.
On the other hand, in some places democracy may not be a desired form of government and globalization may not be a desired way of life – they cannot be pushed upon residents[25]. An example can be seen in British India: the use of a trading company to act as the face of the British Empire in the region as well as the use of traditional British law and legal proceedings did not meet with much satisfaction from British Indian subjects. Barber speaks of Poland as a post-Soviet state possibly pledging allegiance to the Pope and, while joining the global sphere, adhering to its Catholicism; this not only endangers its role in globalization but also democracy[26]. Again, this is not to say that democracy and globalization are intertwined; globalization does not need democracy to exist, and vice versa.
An aspect of Barber’s work that may not be particularly accurate is his belief that, eventually, globalization will overrun tribalism. He believes that “material civilization” has not encountered an obstacle that it could not pass[27]. Berber does not mention how, within all globalized nations and regions, there are many movements for separatism or cultural activity ranging from lingual groups to religious groups with every possible identifier in between. As long as any one tribalist group exists, the system of globalization cannot be complete. This is not to say that a separatist cultural group in Akron, Ohio will collapse the entire system of globalization; however, with its existence, it prevents a globalized system from working at full efficiency. Groups like this cannot be stamped out through the popularization of globalization, which demands uniformity for efficiency, for they are too important an aspect of peoples’ lives to be abandoned. Take the British Empire: despite their strong attempts to turn Indians into “Brown Englishmen” through infusions of culture and religion, Indians still continued practicing their own cultures and belief systems[28]. If the British had been able to transform the Indians into “Brown Englishmen”, their Indian possessions would have worked at a fuller competency. Despite strong attempts, Indians demanded cultural identity; movements proposing the concept became popular and were eventually one of the major reasons as to why India gained its independence, removing itself from a system of globalization in favor of tribalism. As long as the unique qualities of groups of people are recognized, no matter the part of the world or the qualities themselves, globalization can be deferred from victory.
Bibliography
Barber, Benjamin R. "Jihad Vs. McWorld." The Atlantic Monthly Mar. 1992.
Lunde, Paul. “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade”, July-August 2005. http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200504/default.htm (April 28 2008)
Tignor, Robert, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash and Michael Ts’in. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. The focus of goods began to shift away from the East and focus on Europe and the New World, between which luxuries and precious minerals were shipped as they had been in the Indian Ocean years earlier. Europe’s declining dependence on the East as a result of the abandonment of the Indian Ocean Trade was the first of Asia’s death knells in terms of global dominance.
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I hope you enjoyed it.
I find that many people have no idea as to what globalization actually is or what it means for them. Most Americans I speak to about the subject just express their ire toward subcontinental Indians who are "taking all the telemarketing jobs"; which is, to say, most Americans I speak to on the subject do not know the history of the idea of globalization. I hope they come across my blog today, boy I tell you!
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By the 1800’s, the world had turned upside down.For the grand majority of history, wealth flowed from the prosperous Far East and Near East to the comparatively backwater West – spices travelled long routes through the steppes and mountains from the majestic pavilions of divine China to be sold just off the muddy streets of warlike Europe. Problems did indeed appear: the Islamic sphere, specifically the Ottoman Empire, certainly caused a problem for the Europeans, who required (or at least desired) goods from the East and did not deign to work through Europe’s largest bordering opposing religious bloc, which led to the European entry into a historic system: the Indian Ocean Trade. Trade along the Indian Ocean was the result of much heroic exploration and a major impact in historic rises in power, such as the Portuguese Empire which grew wealthy. It also led to collapses in structure, such as the caravan system across Central Asia.
The Indian Ocean became very important to many powers, especially European or otherwise western ones, for one main reason: trade supremacy. To the Europeans, the Indian Ocean represented a method of avoidance of the Muslim world’s stranglehold on the Far East – using the body of water to travel allowed merchants and diplomats a new way of avoiding conflict with the ummah. Europeans could do their business directly with the rich foreign lands beyond. However, a major aspect of this was that of how to access the Indian Ocean without notable Muslim interaction. As of the thirteenth century, Venice’s trade with the Far East was conducted through the conduit of Alexandria, which throughout its history had been ruled by followers of Islam. The panache of the European powers and their desire for trade dominance can be seen in their ability to take initiative on the subject of Indian Ocean Trade. At one point, the Venetians had planned to outmaneuver the Egyptians and flank the Muslim powers by launching naval military expeditions into the Indian Ocean – a prime example of the importance of the Indian Ocean to westerners, and a display of frustration over the Muslim world’s hold on trade with the East.
To the powers of the East, the Indian Ocean represented the next great trade venture after the fall of the Silk Road, which the armies of Tamerlane severed by conquering many major cities along the historic trade route. This was not just the case for the powers of the Near East such as the Sultanate of Delhi or the Ilkhanate (which was responsible for the end of the Silk Road in the first place as subjects of Tamerlane) but was also the case of Ming China, which grew concerned over its loss of trade revenue with the West and sought to find a new route for trade.
Just months after the collapse of the caravan system across Central Asia, Zheng He was commissioned by the Yongle Emperor to begin his travels along the Indian Ocean to establish trade dominance.
The actions taken by the major regional powers in regards to the Indian Ocean allow for a better understanding of global history in that a major similarity can be made between all powers involved: espite cultural or societal differences, regional powers recognize the importance of trade and react accordingly. The Venetians, craving an open market with the Far East, nearly acted militarily against the Egyptian Sultanate to gain such a benefit. The Ming Chinese saw their trade collapse with the Silk Road and thus sought new ventures to continue on financially. Knowing the importance of trade supremacy and their position within the region, Ibn Battuta reports that the Sultanate of Delhi shunned casual visitors (including foreign traders) to their lands and forced pledges of allegiance and residence upon foreign guests.
These are just examples of what can be seen as a whole chain of reactions as empires and regional powers continuously react to changes made by other powers, in turn making their own changes that must be reacted to; thus, the history of the Indian Ocean can be viewed as a string of historical contingency. This contingency can be linked to the topoi system, which is seen as a long series of recurring and almost cyclical ideas and methods pertaining to history. While the setting may be different, powers will follow familiar ideas in order to achieve their goals.
The end of the Indian Ocean as a prosperous global trading network can be blamed on the discovery of the New World by European powers as well as replacement sources of resources being found outside of the Indian Ocean region. The wealth found in the New World surpasses the resources provided by trade on the Indian Ocean; riches abound began to blow into the Christian and Muslim worlds, and even as far as China did travel silver mined in the mountains of Bolivia. The victories of the Spanish conquistadores over the native Aztec and Incan forces of Mesoamerica provided gigantic amounts of gold, drawing even more attention to the New World and away from the Far East. Spanish silver became common in foreign lands as far as China, the Latin “piece of eight” meeting with newly-discovered Japanese silver to choke the East Europe began to manufacture goods that were once staples of the Eastern economy, even exporting them to the East and effectively destroying economic necessities there such as the once-plentiful textile industries of India and China.
British colonial actions in India, hundreds of years after the abandonment of the Indian Ocean Trade, can be seen as another facet of how European nation-states came to dominate the globe: the power of industrialism and technology. British use of technology allowed for the direct subduing and ruling of a subcontinent of people, consisting of many different cultural groups and identities, by a comparably small group of comparably uniform foreigners. Without technology, there is a good chance that Britain would not have made the immediate ground it did in fighting native forces in India, effectively removing the splendid jewel from the British crown. In general, Europeans were easily able to subdue native peoples into basic servitude due to a massive technological advantage. Following the initial conquering, entire populations were put to work with a specific purpose in mind – British-ruled India worked to gather huge amounts of raw materials that were shipped back to England for production. British subjects worked as local administrators, military leaders and officials in India during time of British imperialism there; they did not arrive in large numbers from the home country like settlers would for a colony, but worked in important overseer positions as the majority of the work was done by conquered Indian subjects. This importation of the British state system reverberated within Indian society – it held enough sway within Britain’s colonial rule of the region that fierce Indian nationalists would later try to work within in to gain their homeland’s freedom from British rule.
The gains made by the British during their occupation of India are important to consider in terms of European superiority over the globe. After the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, the British began to mistrust the Indians on a base level and decided to remove the administration of the region from the British East India Company in order to place it under direct imperial authority. This led to India becoming the “jewel in the British crown” as India was modernized industrially, transferring the region’s method of business from a place of privatized exploitation to a huge, productive imperialistic colony. British administrators installed dams, allowing for irrigation that farmers used for Raj-approved cotton production and tea production in order to counter Chinese tea importation.
New British territories became sources of huge wealth, India specifically; British businessmen gained much from financing railroads in the East and raw materials made their way back to the Old World for production. The development of new products came at a rapid pace, allowing for a large increase in western imports and even further wealth for colonizer nations. India was forced to become consumer of British exports, such as textiles, due to lack of British protection of local Indian industry. This led to a British dependency and further importance placed on the British Raj, or ruling body in India, due to the large chunk of the British economy for which India accounted; as a result, Britain put a grand amount of effort into maintaining its control of India. The British managed to keep a monopoly on their colonial governments, preventing indigenous residents from reclaiming rights to industry and thus reaping the full benefits of their rule. The lack of non-British or local goods forced India to rely on Britain for its resources. New governmental systems came into use that promoted private industry and property while shelving the rights of the lower classes
To a point, this may have prompted residents from India to fill out the workforces in other parts of the British Empire as they searched for work, increasing levels of production across their territories. The British were thus a force of globalization – its goods were widespread across the world and workers from its colonies found themselves halfway across the globe, still working in the same system but at a different level. Indians were forced to work within the British system due to the power held over their head by their colonial masters due to superior technology and logistics.
The aforementioned examples of globalization in terms of trade supremacy and later colonial rule are examples of why major powers, usually Western in origin, are the world forces which “decide the rules”. Due to the West’s exploitation of the New World and eventually the East – the very pinnacle of the world the West once floundered in – the direction of wealth and, indeed, the origins of wealth switched to Europe and its colonies. India and China found themselves destitute as European industrialization and New World colonization removed the importance placed on goods from the East. Quality Indian textiles were no longer necessary: cheap, easily produced British alternatives were in higher demand than their Eastern counterparts. The same could be said about specific spices and herbs which, while still imported from the East, could be cultivated in European colonies in the New World as well as in British India[14]. At the same time, the East found itself reliant upon the West: through colonial strength, European forces such as the British, French and Dutch had subdued much of the East to garner its resources and strengthen its own markets by limiting what goods their new imperial subjects could obtain from the rest of the empire, let alone outside of the empire. Separate empires did not intermingle in colonial goods, or allow their possessions to interact with the other empires; the British, for example, would not have allowed their Indian subjects to appeal to the Dutch for better rates on food.
European control over the East damaged states greatly – China found itself in dire straits, drowning in New World silver and addicted to European-smuggled opium due to the value placed by Europeans upon Chinese tea. The scattered states of India were in imperial shackles as British forces occupied the entire subcontinent, forcing its subjects to work as glorified slaves in order to produce goods for the British Empire – subjects who were, at the same time, forced to import goods from other British dominions as a means of obtaining resources due to high foreign tariffs and suppressed local industry[15]. Through this sort of manipulation, European powers were able to gain complete control over the world. This did not register well with its inhabitants, however; as seen in the case of India, groups like the radical Swadeshi Samitis became popular due to their outcries against the unjust British system[16]. These organizations promoted local industry and, unlike their more tame National Congress counterparts who attempted to work within the system to free themselves, demanded immediate change due to the unfair practices of the British[17]. India, a land of splintered groups and many cultures, eventually found itself united after a century of harsh, exploitive imperialist control.
Globalization finds its roots in the practices of the European powers and their actions while participating in the Indian Ocean Trade as well as their eventual moves for colonial power over the East. The promises of globalization, according to Benjamin R. Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld”, are plentiful: an end to conflicts, economic prosperity and a global community are among its goals[18]. Freedom and peace are major driving forces behind globalization, not for any specific moralistic goal; rather, global cooperation and unity allows for a free, efficient market across the world that can be utilized by all participants – namely large global corporations[19]. This is comparable to a system such as the British Empire at their peak: an internally peaceful, well-ordered empire is supported by a stable, flourishing economy with proper production and consumption as conducted by trade companies. A notable flaw within the world of true globalization is that as long as the leader of a region or people ensures the openness of the market, they can act as brutally as they see fit. According to Barber, a leader who strikes against neighbors and closes up the markets has two black marks against them; Barber provides the example of Saddam Hussein, whose attacks on Kuwait and harsh civil rule made him a detriment to globalization[20]. A historical comparison can be made between Saddam Hussein and the Qianlong Emperor of China, who resisted British globalization as a result of the European smuggling of opium into Imperial Chinese territory. This caused the Emperor to close off Chinese markets and rouse the ire of European powers.
The orderly appearance of contemporary globalization stems from a strong historical basis as well as modern proof that a uniform system is the best type. Without an orderly, rigid system of globalization, the market cannot be as efficient as possible; snags in the process, such as a leader not opening up its markets or a region with a particularly strong cultural, ethnic or religious presence refusing to trade with outside sources, slow down globalization. “Jihad vs. McWorld” states that the four imperatives of globalization are those of the market, resources, information and ecological; working in unity, these four concepts ensure the survival of a globalized system[21]. The “market imperative” requires a transnational market that, while possibly endangering regional markets, caters to all regions by distributing appropriate resources under free trade and the efficient behavior of international financial entities such as banks and trade groups (as seen in the “resource imperative”). Globalized markets remain effective through as much use of “common” aspects as possible – a stark use of common languages, currency and behaviors (cosmopolitan in nature) promote an air of non-conflict and conformity in order for globalization to be so competent. In addition, a free flow of communication and information must exist, as businesses and commerce require these to expedite their work[22].
The alternate to globalization, according to Barber, would be tribalism, which the author refers to as “permanent rebellion against uniformity and integration”[23] – including, but not limited to, the forces of globalization. While globalization stresses the existence of a single (or as few as possible) operating global sphere of cooperation and economic activity, tribalism demands the breakdown of these spheres into as many parts as theoretically possible. Cultural identity is stressed over the concept of national identities, sect beliefs over basic religious practices and dissenting separatist factions over any basic ethnic group. Modern-day examples include French-Canadian Quebecois, Basques in Spain as well as Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia while historical examples include Portugal nominating itself as a separate group from the Spanish crowns of the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the unique Ibadi Omanis who broke free of Seljuk rule and established their own Imamate in 1053 to 1054. All aforementioned groups stressed their own cultural identity as reasons for breaking free of a system which did not properly encompass their existence. However, this leads to a severe prominence of parochialism and exclusion among those who adhere to tribalism. Conflict against outside (and inside) sources is constant within the system of tribalism as groups struggle for recognition and solidarity. India is a fantastic example of this – when the British pulled out of the subcontinent after World War II, the region collapsed in infighting between Hindus, Tamils, Sikhs and Muslims[24].
The perspectives provided in Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld” are extremely logical and can be seen as very accurate in most cases; this, however, does not spell a good fortune for democracy. Separating and classifying the actions of the entire world throughout history into two major categories seems extremely daunting; one may find it impossible to avoid the use of “good” and “bad” as headers on this list. Barber does manage to remain as non-biased and impartial toward either globalization (“McWorld”) or tribalism (“Jihad”), speaking on the positive and negative aspects of both systems as fairly as possible. A frightening aspect of Barber’s work is that one of the main driving factors of both tribalism and globalization is that democracy is essentially ignored in both systems, an idea made even more frightening upon the realization of the prominence of both systems in today’s world. Replacing democracy with adherence to global market entities or tribalist leaders is fairly intimidating as the driving force of the modern world has been democracy. Within globalization, democracy is pushed aside to ensure streamlined markets through the use of merit and technology; within tribalism, there is no need for democracy in the face of exclusionary tactics and striking out against strangers.
On the other hand, in some places democracy may not be a desired form of government and globalization may not be a desired way of life – they cannot be pushed upon residents[25]. An example can be seen in British India: the use of a trading company to act as the face of the British Empire in the region as well as the use of traditional British law and legal proceedings did not meet with much satisfaction from British Indian subjects. Barber speaks of Poland as a post-Soviet state possibly pledging allegiance to the Pope and, while joining the global sphere, adhering to its Catholicism; this not only endangers its role in globalization but also democracy[26]. Again, this is not to say that democracy and globalization are intertwined; globalization does not need democracy to exist, and vice versa.
An aspect of Barber’s work that may not be particularly accurate is his belief that, eventually, globalization will overrun tribalism. He believes that “material civilization” has not encountered an obstacle that it could not pass[27]. Berber does not mention how, within all globalized nations and regions, there are many movements for separatism or cultural activity ranging from lingual groups to religious groups with every possible identifier in between. As long as any one tribalist group exists, the system of globalization cannot be complete. This is not to say that a separatist cultural group in Akron, Ohio will collapse the entire system of globalization; however, with its existence, it prevents a globalized system from working at full efficiency. Groups like this cannot be stamped out through the popularization of globalization, which demands uniformity for efficiency, for they are too important an aspect of peoples’ lives to be abandoned. Take the British Empire: despite their strong attempts to turn Indians into “Brown Englishmen” through infusions of culture and religion, Indians still continued practicing their own cultures and belief systems[28]. If the British had been able to transform the Indians into “Brown Englishmen”, their Indian possessions would have worked at a fuller competency. Despite strong attempts, Indians demanded cultural identity; movements proposing the concept became popular and were eventually one of the major reasons as to why India gained its independence, removing itself from a system of globalization in favor of tribalism. As long as the unique qualities of groups of people are recognized, no matter the part of the world or the qualities themselves, globalization can be deferred from victory.
Bibliography
Barber, Benjamin R. "Jihad Vs. McWorld." The Atlantic Monthly Mar. 1992.
Lunde, Paul. “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade”, July-August 2005. http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200504/default.htm (April 28 2008)
Tignor, Robert, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash and Michael Ts’in. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. The focus of goods began to shift away from the East and focus on Europe and the New World, between which luxuries and precious minerals were shipped as they had been in the Indian Ocean years earlier. Europe’s declining dependence on the East as a result of the abandonment of the Indian Ocean Trade was the first of Asia’s death knells in terms of global dominance.
[1] Paul Lunde, “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade: Monsoons, Munde and Gold,” Saudi Aramco World, July-August 2005,
[2] Lunde, “Monsoons, Munde and Gold”.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Lunde, “Ibn Battuta”.
[5] Paul Lunde, “The Indian Ocean and Global Trade: The Coming of the Portuguese”, Saudi Aramco World, < http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200504/the.coming.of.the.portuguese.htm> (February 10 2008)
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Robert Tignor…et al, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 273.
[9] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 287.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 278.
[13] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 283.
[14] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 287.
[15] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 283.
[16] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 340-341.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Benjamin R. Barber. “Jihad vs. McWorld.” The Atlantic Monthly Mar. 1992, 5.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 1.
[22] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 3.
[23] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 4.
[24] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 6.
[25] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 7.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld”, 6.
[28] Tignor, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart, 273.
I hope you enjoyed it.
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